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PREFACE 
Land reform and farm restructuring have always been a major component of the 
transition from plan to market in all formerly socialist countries, and especially 
in the 12 former Soviet republics forming the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). Ukraine, the second most populous country in CIS (after Russia) and 
the third largest by area (after Russia and Kazakhstan), began the process of 
agrarian reform in March 1991, six months before the declaration of independence 
from the Soviet Union. However, all through the 1990s international organizations 
berated Ukraine for its slow and insufficient reforms. Derogatory phrases like "one 
step forward, two steps back", "changing the sign on the door", "disappointing 
performance", "lack of vigorous progress" were universally (and justifiably) used 
to describe the Ukrainian reforms during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk 
(1991-1994) and then (perhaps with less justification) under Leonid Kuchma 
(1994-2004). Evaluating the outcomes of nine years of reforms through 1999, 
World Bank experts summarized the conclusions of their continuous monitoring 
efforts in the following uncomplimentary language (CSAKI, LERMAN, 2001): 
In Ukraine, land reform has been mostly limited to transforming state 
ownership into collective ownership… The weak reforms have failed to 
radically change the traditional collective organization of Ukrainian 
farms… Break-up and internal restructuring of large farms has been very 
limited. Hence it should not be a surprise that the transition process is not 
delivering in terms of increased profitability and efficiency. 
The "big bang" came in December 1999 in the form of Presidential Decree 
No. 1529/99 "On immediate measures to accelerate the reforms in the agricultural 
sector". By this decree Ukraine made the momentous decision to complete land 
privatization through conversion of the "land shares" – paper certificates of 
landownership previously distributed to the rural population – into demarcated 
and titled physical plots. This decision, long advocated by international donors, 
set Ukrainian land policies sharply apart from the policies of other large CIS 
countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus), and put Ukraine roughly on the same 
land reform path as the two smallest CIS members, Moldova and Azerbaijan. 
January 2005 marked the five-year anniversary of this landmark decree. FAO 
accordingly launched a monitoring study to assess the outcomes of reform since 
2000 and to formulate a set of policy recommendations based on the post-2000 Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  ii
reality in the rural sector.
1 The overall purpose of the study was to determine to 
what extent and in what ways there had been fundamental changes in land and 
farm policy after 2000. The methodology included a structured questionnaire-
based survey of three constituencies representing the Ukrainian farm structure: 
The managers of large corporate farms, individual peasant farmers, and operators 
of rural household plots (this survey is referred to as the 2005 FAO farm 
survey). Interviews were also conducted with regional agricultural officials to 
get a view of farm-level changes "from the outside". Official national statistics 
were used to construct a picture of sectoral changes. The survey was designed to 
conduct a comparative analysis of land rights, management structure, and economic 
performance in the two main sectors of Ukrainian agriculture – corporate farms 
and individual farms. We were also planning to collect information that would 
enable us to detect significant differences between the "new wave" corporate 
farms created on the basis of the new legislation in the post-2000 period and the 
"old wave" descendants of the traditional collective and state farms.  
The study is a collaborative effort of three institutions: The Policy Assistance 
Branch of FAO’s Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia (REUP) in Rome, 
the UNDP-sponsored Agricultural Policy for Human Development (APHD) project 
in Kiev, and the Institute of Sociology, also in Kiev. David Sedik as the Head of 
REUP was responsible for the overall design, management, and coordination of the 
study. Vladimir Artyushin and Nikolai Pugachev from the APHD project were in 
charge of the local implementation of the study in Ukraine, including collection and 
analysis of sectoral data. Yurii Privalov, Aleksandr Goncharuk, and Maria Olenina 
from the Institute of Sociology were responsible for the survey field work and over-
saw the construction of the computer database with the survey data. Zvi Lerman 
from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem provided overall scientific guidance 
for the survey and, together with David Sedik, carried out the final analysis on 
which the study is based. 
This book is organized in two parts. Part I presents a brief overview of the 
agricultural policy environment in Ukraine before and after 2000, followed by a 
detailed discussion of the legal foundations of land and farm reform and an 
overall picture of the impacts of reform on the farm sector since 1990. Part II 
presents the findings of a survey of nearly 1,400 individual and corporate farms 
conducted in the spring of 2005 in eight oblasts. The survey has been designed 
to provide focused information highlighting the changes that occurred at the 
farm level since the 1999 Presidential Decree. The Executive Summary at the 
beginning of the volume contains the main findings of the study and some 
policy recommendations. The last chapter (Chapter 16) brings together our main 
conclusions in a more detailed format.  
                                                 
1  For detailed analyses of the reforms during 1991-99 see LERMAN et al., 1994; LERMAN et al., 
1995; LERMAN, CSAKI, 1997; LERMAN, CSAKI, 2000.  Zvi Lerman, David Sedik, Nikolai Pugachov, Aleksandr Goncharuk  iii
The main literature and data sources used in the study are given in the list of 
references at the end. Tables and figures without references to a specific source 
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Land and farm reform in Ukraine began more than 15 years ago and has proved 
to be a lengthy and difficult process. The first round of farm reforms in 1992-93 
initiated privatization of land through the distribution of paper shares to the rural 
population and mandated the transformation of former collective and state farms 
into corporate shareholder structures. The second round of reforms began in 
December 1999 when the corporate farms were obliged by presidential decree to 
convert the paper land shares into fully titled land plots for their shareowners. 
The land received through the conversion of the share certificates could be used 
to establish a new private farm or to enlarge an existing household plot. 
Corporate farms could continue to use the land represented by privately owned 
land shares only if they signed a formal lease contract with the landowners.  
FAO marked the five-year anniversary of the 1999 landmark decree by 
launching a monitoring study to assess the outcomes of reform since 2000 and to 
formulate a set of policy recommendations based on the post-2000 reality in the 
rural sector. Official national statistics were used to construct a picture of 
sectoral changes, while data collected in a questionnaire-based survey of nearly 
1,400 respondents in the spring of 2005 made it possible to conduct a comparative 
farm-level analysis of the reform impacts in the two main sectors of Ukrainian 
agriculture – corporate farms and individual farms.
2  
Change of land policy and GDP growth spur sectoral recovery after 1999 
Following the 1999 land reform nearly 7 million rural residents became owners 
of physical land plots, not just paper shares, and 70% of agricultural land is now 
physically owned by rural individuals. The Ukraine land reform may provide an 
important source of income for rural residents, as the average landowner should 
earn about 400 hryvna per year by renting out his land, the equivalent of two and 
one half months of wages. However, the new landowners are prohibited from 
selling their land because of a moratorium that remains in force until January 
2008 (and may be extended to 2012). 
The 1999 reform has led to the emergence of a new wave of "private" corporate 
farms organized by a single entrepreneur on land leased from rural landowners. 
As of 2004 there were over 4,000 such "private" corporate farms or almost 25% 
of the total number of corporate farms in Ukraine. The remaining 12,000 corporate 
                                                 
2  This survey is referred to in what follows as the 2005 FAO farm survey. The survey design 
is described in more detail in Chapter 6. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  2
farms were organized as "business" companies (hospodarski tovaristva), including 
joint stock companies, limited liability companies, agricultural cooperatives etc.  
The ongoing process of reform has totally changed the face of Ukrainian 
agriculture: From agriculture with predominant concentration of production 
in collective farms it has evolved into agriculture characterized by clear 
dominance of individual farms. Corporate farms today control less than 60% of 
agricultural land (down from nearly 95% prior to the start of reforms in 1990) and 
contribute about 30% of gross agricultural output (down from 70% in 1990). 
The individual sector (consisting of the traditional household plots and the 
independent peasant farms that began to emerge after 1992) controls today more 
than 40% of agricultural land, contributing 70% of agricultural output. Within 
the individual sector, the main contribution to agricultural production is from 
household plots, not peasant farms, as they also control much more land (33% 
versus 8%). The farm structure in Ukraine today is much closer to that in 
Moldova than in Russia. 
The transfer of agricultural land from corporate to individual farms 
accelerated markedly in 1999: The share of the individual sector in agricultural 
land increased from 6% in 1990 to 17% in 1998 and then soared to 41% in 2004. 
The increased share of individual farms in land is reflected in increased size of 
holdings because the total agricultural land in Ukraine has remained constant at 
42 million hectares. Thus, the average peasant farm increased from 25-30 ha in 
1998 to 70-80 ha in 2003-2004, while household plots grew from an average of 
1 hectare in 1992-99 to 2.5 hectares in 2004.  
The 1999 reforms have also affected the performance of Ukrainian agriculture. 
The agricultural output from both individual and corporate farms made a 
spectacular recovery in 1999, as it grew by 30% (in constant prices) between 
1999 and 2004. The recovery has been largely due to growth in the individual 
sector, but some spillover effects are also observed among corporate farms 
(where the decline in output stopped in 2000 and the number of unprofitable 
farms dropped from almost 100% in 1997-99 to around 40% in 2000-2004). It is 
tempting to attribute the sudden improvement in farm performance to the turn-
around in government’s agricultural policies. In fact, however, the increase in 
agricultural output paralleled the increase in GDP and may have been one manifesta-
tion of general economic recovery in Ukraine. 
The two partial productivity measures – the productivity of agricultural land 
and the productivity of agricultural labor – also show signs of recovery since 
1999. The productivity of agricultural land rose from 1,200 hrivny per hectare 
(in 2000 prices) in 1999 to 1,600 hrivny per hectare, an increase of one-third, 
reflecting primarily the growth of agricultural output (since the total agricultural 
land remained roughly constant). The increase in the productivity of agricultural 
labor was even larger: From 10,000 hrivny per worker in 1999 to more than 
15,000 hrivny per worker in 2004, but a large part of this increase may be due to Executive summary  3
a change in the methodology of labor surveys that dramatically depressed the 
reported number of agricultural workers starting in 2002. 
Farm reorganization: Rural people are now less dependent on the local 
corporate farm 
Collective agricultural enterprises (CAE), the organizational form that 
dominated the farm structure in Ukraine between 1993 and 1999, have completely 
disappeared since 1999. Corporate farms are now mainly represented by limited 
liability companies and private lease enterprises. While the number of shareholders 
in corporate farms ranges from 1 to 1,600, fully 16% are single-shareholder entities 
and 31% have only 1 to 3 shareholders.  
Two-thirds of the rural households surveyed received their land shares at least in 
the form of paper certificates and more than half received them in the form of a 
physical plot. These share assignment rates are substantially higher than in 
previous surveys (1994, 1996). However, only peasant farmers have kept the land 
received in the process of reform for their own use. Households mainly lease out 
their land to local corporate farms, and retain a relatively small portion for their 
own use. There is a clear preference on the part of the rural population for 
leasing their shares, not investing them in corporate equity.  
The local corporate farm has lost its role as the main rural employer. Only 20% 
of the adults in the survey report that their main employment is with the corporate 
farm, compared with 67% in 1996. Fully two-thirds of respondents have no 
relations with the corporate farm. Those who have no relation with the local 
corporate farm work mainly on the family farm and in nonagricultural jobs.  
Land and land markets: Significant reliance on leasing contracts 
There are huge gaps in size between the three main categories of farms: The mean 
size in the survey is 1,700 hectares for corporate farms, 140 hectares for peasant 
farms, and 1.7 hectares for household plots. The corporate farms are still much 
larger than in market economies (500-600 hectares per corporate farm in the 
U.S.), while the household plots are still much smaller than the average family 
farm in market economies (130 hectares in land-rich U.S., 20 hectares in EU-15). 
The size gaps perpetuate the strong duality of farm structure that characterized 
Soviet agriculture. 
In household plots the land used for farming is just 36% of the family’s total 
land holdings and the rest is leased out. More than half the rural families lease 
out at least some of their land, while leasing in by households is marginal (3% of 
respondents). The few families who lease in land cultivate much larger holdings: 
Nearly 16 hectares compared with 1-2 hectares for the rest. The entire difference is 
leased land. Growth of the much larger peasant farms is also entirely attributable to 
land leasing: Farms with leased land achieve sizes in excess of 200 hectares, while 
farms without leased land average only 50 hectares. Of the 140 hectares in an Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  4
average peasant farm, only 18% is owned land, while the remaining 82% is leased 
from other landowners or from the state. Thus, on the whole, peasant farmers 
follow a totally different leasing strategy: Most peasant farmers lease in land to 
enlarge the cultivated area, while most rural households lease out land that 
they cannot cultivate. 
Corporate farms, unlike peasant farms and household plots, have very little own land 
and they rely primarily on land leased from individuals (members, shareholders, 
and other rural landowners). In the present circumstances only a small minority of 
shareholders and other lessors actually work in the corporate farm: Most are passive 
landowners who entrust their land to the corporate farm without expecting the 
security of a wage job.  
The average lease payments in the survey are around 100 hrivny per hectare per 
year (based on the answers of both lessors and lessees). Rural families that lease 
out land earn 500-550 hrivny (about $100) a year in lease payments.  
While the participation rates in land lease markets are quite high, the market for 
buying and selling of land is still hopelessly undeveloped: Nobody in the survey 
reported selling land and only 5% of peasant farmers reported buying land in the 
last 5 years. In these few cases, buying, like leasing, has a positive impact on farm 
sizes, strengthening the overall impression that land market transactions are indeed 
conducive to farm enlargement. There is still considerable resistance to the very 
notion of buying and selling land, especially among corporate farm managers and 
household plot operators, less so among peasant farmers. Yet nearly 30% of house-
hold plot operators think they will be able to buy more land for their plot if they 
so desire in the future, while peasant farmers and farm managers expect to rely 
more on leasing from private individual to enlarge their farms. 
Changing business environment: Private trade has replaced state supply and 
procurement 
Respondents from the individual farming sector – peasant farmers and heads of 
rural households – provide a much more positive evaluation than corporate-farm 
managers of the overall effect of the changes associated with the second-wave 
reforms. The managers’ view is less enthusiastic because corporate farms have 
been faced since 2000 with labor force shrinkage, reduction of output, erosion of 
farm profits, and an increase of the tax burden.  
The reduction of farm production notwithstanding, farm managers give a positive 
assessment of the change in the behavior variables among farm workers. The 
traditionally problematic behavioral attributes, such as work discipline, 
motivation, theft and pilfering, or drinking, are better today than in the 
past.  
Managers complain that access to purchased inputs is worse now than before 
2000. Yet a quantitative analysis shows that around 80% of both managers and Executive summary  5
peasant farmers manage to buy inputs, and roughly half this number 
actually buys all that they need. Private trade – commercial suppliers and 
private individuals – is the main channel for farm inputs today. Although state 
suppliers continue to play an important role, they are far behind the commercial 
trade channels and their role has declined dramatically over time.  
There is no evidence of acute shortage of farm machinery in the survey. 
Around 90% of both corporate and peasant farms report tractors and harvesters, 
as well as a complement of light machinery. The much larger corporate farms 
naturally have a larger machinery pool: 67 pieces of various farm machines per 
corporate farm compared with only 11 pieces per peasant farm. The machines 
used by corporate farms are larger and more expensive than those in peasant 
farms. Both corporate and peasant farms rely mainly on own machinery, 
although rentals are reported with considerable frequency. Most of the rented 
equipment originates from private sources: Access to state leasing programs 
is virtually nonexistent in the survey. Household plots have a much smaller 
machinery complement: On average  3 pieces per household, of which only 
1  piece is heavy equipment (a tractor or a harvester). Rural households rely 
much more heavily on equipment rentals and jointly purchased machinery, 
presumably because of capital constraints. 
Managers are far less constrained by the directives of the regional authorities 
and have more freedom in making economic and business decisions than 
before 2000. Access to credit is reported to have improved, although this effect 
may be a purely subjective feeling due to the persistence of soft-budget constraints 
and write-offs at the regional level. Regional authorities claim that they have no 
influence over the allocation of agricultural credit and that these issues are 
decided directly by the commercial banks.  
Rural social sphere: Households now pay for services 
The responsibility for the rural social assets has been largely transferred from 
corporate farms to the local municipality. The corporate farms continue the 
traditional policy of providing support to household plot production. This 
includes assistance with plot cultivation and farm sales, provision of farm inputs, 
transport, and even purchase of consumer goods. Today, however, the households 
cover most of the costs incurred by the corporate farm and household support in 
the survey is about 0.5% of the total annual expenditure of the average farm.  
Farm production and sales: Even household plots are not pure subsistence 
operations 
The value of production shows order of magnitude differences across the 
spectrum of corporate farms, peasant farms, and household plots, which reflect 
the differences in land use. Both corporate and peasant farms concentrate on mixed 
primary agriculture (crops and livestock), with relatively little diversification into 
nonagricultural activities. Crop production dominates the product mix in corporate Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  6
and peasant farms, while household plots continue with evenly balanced crops 
and livestock. Corporate and peasant farms produce mainly cereals, while 
household plots allocate a significant share of their land also to potatoes and 
vegetables. 
Although peasant farms have a smaller share of livestock in their product mix 
than corporate farms, a definite convergence is observed, which may reflect 
capital accumulation in peasant farms since  1998. Many farm managers and 
peasant farmers express their intention to increase livestock production subject 
to feed availability, although farms with livestock show significantly lower profit 
margins than crop-specialized farms. The attitude toward livestock is apparently 
still driven by emotions, not by profitability, although regional authorities no 
longer intervene in livestock production decisions at the farm level. 
Corporate farms and peasant farms are true commercial producers, selling most 
of their output (mainly for cash, not barter). Household plots on average sell only 
20% of their output, but even with these levels of commercial activity they cannot 
be regarded as pure subsistence operations: Nearly two-thirds of household plots 
surveyed report some farm sales and 10% sell more than half their output (like the 
true commercial producers). The stigma of subsistence farming attached to house-
hold plots is not entirely justified: Household plots are in fact semi-commercial 
farms. The share of output sold by household plots increases with plot size, which 
suggests that the level of commercialization of household plots will increase if 
they are allowed to grow beyond the current limits through land market 
mechanisms. 
All farms sell mainly through private channels, including commercial traders 
and privatized processors. Sales to state procurement and the former consumer 
cooperative system are negligible. Household plots are distinguished by a relatively 
high share of direct sales to consumers in the marketplace. 
Farm debt and access to credit: Increasing reliance on banks and suppliers 
Both corporate and peasant farms have a perception of significant access to 
credit: 63% of corporate farm managers and 34% of peasant farmers report that 
they actually borrow. The access to credit has improved over time, and managers 
of corporate farms indicated that the credit situation today was better than before 
2000. Rural households borrow much less frequently (15% of respondents).  
Banks and input suppliers are the main sources of credit for corporate and 
peasant farms. Commodity credit or credit in kind plays a marginal role in the 
survey, while wage arrears or debt for taxes and social deductions do not appear 
to be a problem. The state has practically disappeared as a source of credit for 
peasant farms. Formal credit is gradually replacing informal borrowing from 
relatives and others in the individual sector.  Executive summary  7
Agricultural producers typically borrow for 12 months at annual interest rates 
of around 19%. Given inflation rates of around 9% in 2004, the real cost of 
agricultural borrowing in Ukraine is 9-10% annually, which is quite high by 
world standards. The respondents generally complained that the interest rates 
were too high and the credit term too short: An acceptable interest rate for future 
borrowing would be 8% with credit term of 3 to 4 years. These acceptable interest 
rates are equivalent to zero (or even negative) real interest, which is not attainable 
economically. 
Borrowing from the banks naturally requires collateral, which most corporate and 
peasant farms manage to provide. Lack or insufficiency of collateral was perceived 
as one of the three main obstacles to borrowing (after high interest rates and short 
credit term). 
Contrary to the situation in the past, the level of indebtedness is not particularly 
high: The average farm debt can be paid off with 6-7 months of sales revenue. For 
corporate farms, the situation in 2005 appears to be a significant improvement 
compared with 1998, when debt-to-sales ratios were around 2  years and farm 
indebtedness was a major concern. Farm profitability has also improved significantly 
since 1998, but farms with debt still have lower levels of profitability than farms 
without debt.  
Investment plans: Farms have ambitious investment goals for the future  
All respondents have extensive investment plans for the future, which is a sign of 
general optimism and considerable confidence in the economy. Two-thirds of 
commercial producers (corporate farms and peasant farms) plan to invest in 
production assets, with purchase of farm machinery and livestock at the top of 
the list of priorities. Rural households are evenly divided between those 
planning farm investments (also mainly machinery and livestock) and those 
planning consumption investments (i.e., build a house, buy a car, buy household 
durables). 
The reported investment plans are quite ambitious, estimated at 33% of sales 
revenue for corporate farms and 53% for peasant farms. The total estimated 
investment costs are 5 to 8 times the actual amounts invested in 2004, which is 
clearly another reflection of the high degree of optimism concerning the future.  
Managers and peasant farmers plan to finance their investment with a mix of 
own funds (savings) and bank credit, while rural households intend to rely 
mainly on family savings. Managers list leasing as one of the options for 
financing investment (primarily for machinery, but also for livestock and 
processing equipment), although in practice this channel has been used only 
marginally.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  8
Rural employment: Farm labor is "just right" 
Among families of peasant farmers, the farmer himself works primarily on the 
family farm and it is the spouse who is the main source of income diversification: 
21% of spouses hold hired jobs and another 5% report self-employment outside 
the household. Heads of rural households and their spouses diversify to a much 
greater extent: Fully 40% have an off-farm job as their main occupation. Still 
work on the family farm is a major factor in time allocation: Heads of rural 
households work on the family plots for 8.6 hours a day during 295 days a year; 
those who also work in the corporate farm devote "only" 7.6 hours per day to 
their household plot for 301 days a year (compared to 247 days that they give to 
the corporate farm).  
The average corporate farm in the survey employs between 120 and 130 permanent 
workers, with seasonal labor adding about 16% to the permanent labor force. 
Peasant farms employ on average less than 9 people, of which 3 are family 
members. Virtually all peasant farms report work inputs from family members, 
but only one-half engage hired labor. Overall, the family members contribute 55% 
of the total labor input in peasant farms, whereas hired workers contribute 45%. 
The differences in the number of employed in corporate and peasant farms are 
largely explained by differences in farm size.  
The respondents appear to be satisfied with the labor situation. More than half 
the farm managers are of the opinion that their labor force is "just right" and 
only 2% admit that there are redundancies of farm labor. Labor shortages do not 
appear to be a serious problem among the farms surveyed, as only 40% of 
respondents in both corporate and peasant farms complain that they face shortage 
of labor. Peasant farms experience shortage of unskilled manual labor, whereas 
corporate farms need more skilled labor (machine operators, farm specialists). 
The number of unskilled workers needed is greater than the number of skilled 
workers for farms of both types. 
Non-competitive low pay is an important factor in the inability to hire, but the 
main obstacle seems to be labor supply difficulties. There is lack of sufficiently 
qualified labor, there are problems with the age structure of labor, applicants 
suffer from "bad habits" (i.e., drinking, unreliability), and people simply have no 
motivation to work (they register at the labor exchange, but do not accept farm 
jobs).  
Farm productivity: No advantages to large-scale corporate farms 
From theoretical considerations we expect the productivity of small individual 
farms to be higher than the productivity of large corporate farms. We thus expect 
an overall productivity ranking household plots > peasant farms > corporate 
farms. Indeed, household plots achieve the highest productivity of land (measured 
by the value of output per hectare), but the land productivity in corporate and 
peasant farms is roughly the same. Nevertheless, regression analysis shows that Executive summary  9
the productivity of land decreases with farm size both in the entire sample (all 
three farm types) and in the subsample consisting of corporate and peasant farms 
only. Productivity of labor, on the other hand, is higher in corporate farms than 
in peasant farms (no estimation for household plots was possible).  
Accounting-based calculations of total factor productivity (TFP) as the ratio of 
the value of sales or value of output to the reported costs show that, consistent 
with our expectations, the accounting TFP is somewhat higher for peasant farms 
than for corporate farms (1.5 and 1.3, respectively, which means that the value of 
sales is 50% higher than costs for peasant farms and 30% higher than costs for 
corporate farms). On the other hand, attempts to estimate total factor productivity 
(TFP) by econometric production-function techniques did not produce conclusive 
results: The TFP scores were not significantly different for corporate and peasant 
farms. While these results do not demonstrate the expected productivity advantage 
of individual farms, they establish convincingly that corporate farms are not 
more productive than peasant farms: We do not observe economies of size 
operating among Ukrainian farms, and farms of all types should be allowed 
to evolve on a level playing field.  
Rural family incomes: Peasant farmers earn more, while employee households 
diversify more 
Incomes were estimated for two categories of rural families – peasant farmers 
operating an independent family farm ("farmers"), and other rural families 
operating a traditional household plot in addition to wage employment or 
reliance on social insurance ("employees"). Farmers earn much more than 
employees both per family and per capita. The average yearly income for farmer 
families is 54,500 hrivny, compared with less than 10,000 hrivny for employees. 
For farmers most of the cash income is from farm sales and a very small share 
comes from salaries and pensions. Employees, on the other hand, rely to a much 
greater extent on salaries and pensions and less on farm sales. Another 
component that differentiates farmers from employees is income from property 
(i.e., lease payments for land, dividend payments for asset shares, etc.), which 
accounts for 4.2% of family income for employees and is practically zero for 
farmers. While farmers cultivate all their land and rely primarily on farm 
production as a source of income, employees willingly lease out some of their 
land (mainly their land shares) and thus earn extra income from lease payments. 
The value of own farm products consumed within the household can be regarded 
as additional non-cash income: Consumption of own farm products replaces 
cash expenditure on food purchases. The value of own consumption estimated 
from the survey adds nearly 50% to the cash income of employee families 
and 20% to that of farmer families. Based on these estimates, the value of own 
consumption of farm products is 32% of imputed income for employee families 
and 16% for farmer families. Farm sales remain the dominant component of 
farmers’ income even after imputing the value of own products, whereas in Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  10
employee families wages, pensions, and the value of own products are more 













The absolute difference in cash family income is largely an outcome of the 
difference in farm sizes: 113 ha for farmers, 1.7 ha for employees. Income also 
increases with family size (the labor pool available for production) and 
decreases with the age of the family head. The average age of family members 
has a positive effect on income due to the contribution of pensions that the older 
family members receive. Income naturally increases with family size and 
decreases with the age of the family head. The average age of family members 
has a positive effect on income due to the contribution of pensions that the older 
family members receive. There is also a certain farm type effect: Farmer 
families earn more than employee families adjusted for land and other factors. 
Answers relating to the family standard of living confirm the existence of this 
farm type effect: Farmers’ families achieve a higher (perceived) well-being than 
the employee families. 
Total cash income, and especially farm income, increase with the increase of 
farm size. The share of farm income increases from 17% in the smallest farms to 
more than 70% of total income in the largest. Income per capita also increases 
with farm size, rising quite dramatically from less than 5,000 hrivny per capita for 
households with up to 1-2 hectares to 20,000 hrivny and much more for farms 
larger than 50 hectares. Family well-being accordingly also increases with the 
area of land used (or in case of employee families, also with the area of owned 
land). Families reporting a low level of well-being command significantly less 
land than families reporting a comfortable level of well-being. 
Structure of imputed income  
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Peasant farmers earn more than other rural households in absolute terms, 
they report a substantially higher standard of living, and their family needs 
are more closely satisfied by their income. Yet despite the relatively lucrative 
financial situation the dichotomy of peasant farmers and rural employees appears 
almost solidly frozen: Only 4% of respondents are planning to become peasant 
farmers within the next 2-3 years. These few are mainly motivated by hopes of a 
better future for their children, prospects for higher income, and independence. 
The remaining  96% have no plans to become peasant farmers despite better 
financial prospects. They are primarily deterred by lack of capital, risk aversion, 
as well as age and poor health. Concerns about access to inputs and lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of other family members to continue with farming activities 
are also cited as obstacles.  
Regardless of the relative success of peasant farming, the survey paints a bleak 
picture of the future of the Ukrainian village. Around 50% of respondents (both 
peasant farmers and rural employees) would like to see their children leave the 
village. Around 15% would like their children to stay in the village but go into 
business instead of farming. Farming as a future occupation of the children is 
envisaged by only 24% of peasant farmers and as few as 8% of other rural residents. 
The Ukrainian village is in the danger of being left without a continuing generation 





PART I  
AN OVERVIEW OF SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
POLICIES 
This part reviews the agricultural policy environment in Ukraine before and 
after 2000. The discussion of the developing legal framework is followed by a 
description of the changes in farm structure and the observable impacts of reform 
on agricultural performance. The overview concludes with some international 
comparisons. The data in this part are from publicly available sources, including 
official statistics and published legal documents. Part I is organized around the 
following topics: 
 
1. Agricultural policy in Ukraine before and after 2000 
2. Legal framework for land reform in Ukraine  
3. The farm structure in Ukraine 
4. Impacts on agricultural performance 




1 AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN UKRAINE BEFORE AND  
AFTER 2000 
Land and farm reform has been at the center of agricultural policy in Ukraine 
since its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in October  1991. 
Land and farm reform involves two basic interrelated tasks at the farm level:  
(a) allocating land use rights to individuals and (b) appropriate restructuring of 
former collective (and state) farms in line with the principles of market agriculture. 
Reform, however, should not be viewed as an end in itself. Rather, it is one part of 
a larger effort to create a financially sustainable and competitive agriculture and 
raise rural incomes. It requires a redefinition of government agricultural policies 
away from state intervention in farm-level decisions toward the design of appropriate 
policies for regulating and supporting market oriented agriculture. 
Land and farm reform has proved to be a lengthy and difficult process in 
Ukraine. As noted in the Preface, Ukraine has had two main rounds of land reform 
and farm restructuring, which were initiated by the central government, but impacted 
on both regional authorities and the farms. The first round of farm reforms led 
in 1992-93 to a sweeping transformation of the 12,000 collective and state farms 
into so-called collective agricultural enterprises (CAE). CAEs then underwent 
share-based privatization with land and asset shares distributed to farm employees 
who theoretically enjoyed the right of exit. The second round of reforms began in 
December 1999 with a presidential decree stipulating that CAEs must change 
their organizational form to corporate farms (limited liability companies, joint 
stock companies, partnerships, cooperatives, etc.) by April 30, 2000 and distribute 
fully titled land plots to their shareowners. These reform measures are described 
in detail in the next section. 
Throughout the 1990s agricultural policy in Ukraine emphasized ad hoc 
government intervention in agricultural production, marketing and finance, 
hindering land and farm reform. Agricultural exports were subject to quotas and 
licensing through 1996 and state grain procurement survived through 1997   
(VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, ZORYA, 2001; SEDIK et al., 2000). Even after 1997 
neither internal nor foreign trade was liberalized. Indicative and recommended 
prices (minimum export prices) were set by the government for many commodities. 
Local regional authorities restricted commodity trade by banning sales of 
commodities to other regions until local commodity quotas had been filled. Large 
farm enterprises continued to receive state rationed or state guaranteed credits 
against commodity deliveries. When farms fell into heavy debt, debt repayment Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  16
was used as a justification for expropriation of agricultural commodity stocks 
(SEDIK, 2004). 
Beginning in 1999-2000, in parallel with the second wave of land reform that 
reallocated land use rights from collectives to individuals, Ukrainian agricultural 
policy underwent a transformation that seemed to herald a new policy regime 
(OECD, 2003). First came a significant improvement in trade policies, particularly 
for exports, increasing the competitiveness of Ukrainian agricultural products. The 
government announced it would no longer intervene in farm finance and signify-
cantly reduced its role in agricultural input supply and grain marketing, thus reducing 
the inherent inefficiencies of government controlled input supply and marketing 
systems. By 2002 the predominant form of government finance for the purchase of 
farm inputs became subsidized interest rates. Further legislation in 2000 transferred 
the responsibility for social sphere functions from farm enterprises to local govern-
ments. The agribusiness privatization program that had been largely completed 
between 1994 and 1999 began to yield results in terms of increased efficiencies in 
marketing and input supply chains. For the first time in many years the terms of 
trade in agriculture, i.e., the index of real agricultural output prices relative to 
agricultural input prices, increased by 18% in 2000. 
But again in 2003 doubt was cast on whether Ukrainian agricultural policy had 
actually been transformed fundamentally (VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2003).   
A poor harvest – admittedly the outcome of unfavorable weather – prompted 
renewed state intervention in commodity markets. Minister of Agrarian Policy 
Serhiy Ryzhuk allegedly announced that the government would soon "return to its 
previous system of crop management, whereby it instructs farmers to produce 
specific quantities of each agricultural commodity." In July 2003, after severe 
winterkill and prolonged spring and summer drought, the government issued a 
decree that established government responsibility for the harvest failure, 
empowering regional authorities to "thoroughly monitor food grain movements and 
prices on regional markets" and "pay closer attention to monitoring staple food 
prices, mark-ups and profitability rates, and undertake measures to keep them from 
rising if there are no reasons for price increases". The decree also authorized 
intervention grain purchases by the State Reserve Committee. Under the terms of 
these decrees, regional authorities were given the power and incentives to interfere 
on commodity markets. The Ukrainian grain market was fragmented into regional 
markets. These interventions magnified the price increases due to the poor harvest.  
The apparent backtracking on reforms in 2003 underlined the need for looking 
beyond agricultural policies and legislation to the state of affairs at the farm and 
local level. Central government agricultural policies in Ukraine are often 
contradictory and unclear so that their combined effect on farms is unpredictable. 
Changes at the farm level can take on a life of their own, often causing far reaching 
impacts that are not apparent by examining policies and legislation. Such changes 
can only be studied through interviews of local officials and farm surveys.   
2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND REFORM IN UKRAINE 
Ukraine embarked on the process of land reform and farm restructuring 15 years 
ago and the process has continued, at times erratically, ever since. As all other 
transition countries, Ukraine quickly realized that land reform and farm 
restructuring in the former Soviet environment was an extremely complex 
undertaking that required strong political will, commitment, and decisiveness to 
achieve any progress. The Ukrainian reforms came in two major waves: The 
cautious first wave that began in 1992 during Kravchuk’s presidency and 
continued with halts and starts through Kuchma’s first term in office; and the much 
more radical second wave initiated by Kuchma in December 1999. The 15 years of 
reform are accordingly divided into two stages: The first-wave reforms of 1990-99 
and the second-wave reforms since 2000. 
2.1  The formative stage 1990-1999 
The need for reorganization of collective and state farms in the interest of 
improved productivity was recognized long before Ukraine’s independence. On 
December 18,  1990, nine months before the declaration of independence, the 
Supreme Soviet of what then was still the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
passed the first resolution "On Land Reform", according to which all land in the 
country (both agricultural and non-agricultural) became subject to reform. 
Exactly one year later, on December 20, 1991, independent Ukraine passed its 
first Law on Peasant Farms, which defined a peasant farm as a form of 
individual entrepreneurship established for commercial agricultural production 
and based primarily on own labor. Since land at that time was still state-owned, 
individuals willing to engage in peasant farming could receive up to 50 hectares 
of agricultural land in lifetime inheritable possession.  
Collective and private forms of land ownership were legalized alongside state 
ownership in January  1992 by the Law on Forms of Land Ownership. In 
March 1992 the Ukrainian Parliament (the Supreme Rada) adopted a new Land 
Code that laid the foundation for privatization of state-owned land and 
distribution of paper certificates of entitlement ("land shares") to the privatized 
land that continued to be held in collective ownership by farm enterprises. Private 
ownership was intended for individuals (e.g., peasant farms and household plots
3), 
while collective ownership was intended primarily for corporations that would 
                                                 
3  A government resolution passed in December  1992 allowed privatization of household 
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succeed the former collective and state farms. Yet even collective ownership 
was defined in the Land Code as ultimately the ownership of the individual 
holders of land shares.  
The goals of land reform, originally formulated in terms of traditional Soviet 
forms of land tenure, such as lifetime inheritable possession for individuals and 
permanent use rights for farm enterprises, were reformulated in May 1993 using 
the following language (LAW, 1993): 
Land reform is a component of the economic reform implemented in 
Ukraine as part of the transition of the economy to market relations. 
The task of this reform is redistribution of land and its transfer to 
private and collective ownership, as well as usership by enterprises, 
with the purpose of creating equal conditions for the development of 
different forms of farming, diverse forms of economic organization, 
and efficient use and protection of land.  
The provisions for land privatization and distribution of land shares set the stage for 
the restructuring of collective and state farms and for the development of private 
farming. The underlying philosophy assumed that the former collective and state 
farms would transform into collective agricultural enterprises (CAEs) or other 
agricultural corporations (joint-stock or limited liability companies, agricultural 
cooperatives) cultivating land privatized into collective, rather than individual, 
ownership. By 1995 fully 37% of agricultural land had been privatized into collective 
ownership of CAEs, but only 3% was privately owned by individuals at that time 
(DERZHKOMZEM, private communication). The acceptance of the notion of private 
land ownership was problematic, as the old Soviet Civil Code, which remained in 
force in Ukraine until January 1, 2004, did not recognize private property and 
entrepreneurial activity was punishable as "illegal speculation" under the Soviet 
Criminal Code (in force until September 1, 2001).  
The privatization of land into collective ownership of farming corporations thus 
became an intermediate stage of Ukrainian land reform. It ended in August 1995 
with the publication of Presidential Decree that established mechanisms for the 
division of the collectively owned land of farm enterprises into individual land 
shares. Rural residents would receive paper certificates of ownership, without 
physically getting a plot of land, and certificate holders would be allowed to 
convert the land share into a private plot when leaving the farm enterprise. The 
right of each member to exit the collective with a physical plot corresponding to 
a share of collective property was a highly important attribute of collective land 
ownership. This provision established a fundamental mechanism for transferring 
land from collective to private ownership, and guaranteed the individual’s 
freedom of choice in the future. A collective was no longer a closed entity, as it 
had been during the Soviet era, and individuals were entitled to leave the 
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By December  1999 more than 6 million rural residents had received paper 
certificates – land shares – confirming their entitlement to a plot of land of a 
specified size but in an unspecified location. The non-land assets (farm 
machinery, buildings, livestock) had been divided into value-based paper shares 
in all 10,800 former collective farms, which had transformed mainly into CAEs 
(or similar forms, such as "peasant unions" that were particularly popular in 
Western Ukraine). The assets of 2,300 state farms (98% of the total number) 
were first privatized and then also divided into asset shares. Nearly two-thirds of 
the corporate farms that emerged during the reforms were organized as CAEs: In 
a single year, from 1992 to 1993, their number jumped from 0 to 7,400 and 
continued to increase to a peak of 8,100 at the end of 1999 (Table 2.1).  
Share-based privatization did not actually allocate land use rights to individuals. 
Very few CAEs distributed land in kind to the shareowners and few farm employees 
left large farms for independent farming. Moreover, share privatization did not 
encourage large farms to change their mode of operation by reducing costs (share 
privatization often resulted in only "changing the sign on the door"), nor did it 
eliminate the soft budget constraints implicit in government policies toward the 
farms. Most importantly, perhaps, it did not resolve the barriers to exit from 
CAEs. Neither farm directors nor shareowners generally supported allowing their 
other members to leave the farm. Many details of the exit procedure (allocation of 
land and property shares, the methodology of identification of concrete plots of 
land and division of large farm assets) were worked out only years after the initial 
decrees authorizing farm exit. The relatively unfavorable conditions for private 
farmers in matters of access to capital, inputs, and markets compared to agricultural 
enterprises dissuaded many from exiting CAEs. This imbalance resulted from 
state agricultural policies that supported agricultural enterprises with subsidies, 
state and bank credits, the authority to "borrow" from their employees through 
non-payment of wages, write-offs or rescheduling of state and bank debt, 
favorable input supply and marketing deals, etc. Finally, regional authorities had 
great influence over the implementation of in-kind privatization of farms by 
design, and they often used their power to effectively slow or stop in-kind 
privatization that was tantamount to dissolution of farms under their authority.  
Perhaps the ultimate barrier to exit from agricultural enterprises was posed by 
the accumulation of overdue debt in CAEs. In Ukraine, neither land nor property 
of agricultural producers with unresolved debts could be distributed because of 
creditor claims on them (CSAKI et al., 2001). The simple reason for the accumulation 
of debt was the inadequacy of farm profits. In  1998, for example, 92%  of 
agricultural enterprises in Ukraine were unprofitable. Behind this accumulation 
of debt were the agricultural policies that determined the willingness of the state, 
the banks, and the input suppliers to forgive or reschedule debt and to extend new 
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budgets that existed for agricultural enterprises in Soviet times continued into 
the post-Soviet period.  
2.2  The 1999 watershed: Presidential decree on reorganization of 
farm enterprises 
The reforms implemented in the 1990s failed to produce the expected 
improvements in agricultural productivity and efficiency, and the second phase 
of agricultural reforms began with Presidential Decree of December  1999 
(DECREE, 1999). The 1999 decree essentially declared that CAEs, based as they 
were on collective land ownership, were incompatible with market conditions and 
had to reorganize into market-compliant forms based on private land ownership: 
Family farms private enterprises, farming corporations, and agricultural cooperatives. 
All CAE members (i.e., collective landowners) had the right to leave the enterprise 
with their land and asset shares. The Decree confirmed that this right did not 
require the approval of the general assembly of the members nor could it be 
limited in any other way. The land received through the conversion of the share 
certificates could be used to establish a new private farm or to enlarge an existing 
household plot. Corporate farms could continue to use the land represented by 
privately owned land shares only if they signed a formal lease contract with the 
landowners. Essentially, each corporate farm was required to conclude contracts 
for leasing the land parcels from its shareowners and pay for the use of their 
land. The lease payments could not be less than 1% of the assessed value of the 
land plot. Farm debt was written off or restructured according to legislation of 
2000 and 2001, which removed a significant obstacle to withdrawal of individuals 
with their land from former collective frameworks (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 
ZORYA, 2001). 
The first impact of the 1999 decree was instantaneous, but purely cosmetic: The 
8,000  CAEs simply disappeared from official statistics within three months, 
between December  1999 and March 2000, as they transformed into other 
corporate forms (including some 3,000 agricultural cooperatives; see Table 2.1). 
Despite the superficiality of these initial changes, the 1999 reform led to the 
emergence of a new wave of "private" corporate farms organized by a single 
entrepreneur. These "private" corporate farms are based primarily on leased land 
and are commonly known as "private lease enterprises", to distinguish them 
from private peasant farms that use mainly owned land. The number of these 
"private" enterprises jumped from 470 to 2,900 during the first three months of 
reform, rising from 4% to 22% of the total number of corporate farms. As of 
2005 there were nearly 5,000 such "private" corporate farms or almost 30% of 
the total number of corporate farms in Ukraine. The total number of corporate 
farms increased substantially after 2000 as the new landowners made 
increasingly diverse choices for the disposition of their land plots (Table 2.1). If 
these new corporate farms behave differently from their predecessors, they could  
 
Table 2.1:  Changes in the number of farm enterprises 1990-2004 
 1990 1992 1993 1995 12.1999 3.2000  12.2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sovkhozes (state farms)  2438  2160  2000  1520 590  590  590  580 570 516 395 386 
Kolkhozes  
(collective farms) 
8354  5750  2680  450  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 
CAE (collective farm 
enterprises) 
0 0  7385  7344  8102  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 
Other corporate farms
*  0  435  697  1600  4598  13487  13718  15307 16003 16741 17293 17285 
Agricultural  cooperatives  0  320  345  486  284  3325  3328  2403 2294 2130 1962 1749 
"Business"  companies  0  125  362  1454  1803  6761  6890  7892 7852 8124 8123 7819 
"Private"  enterprises  --  --  --  --  470  2901  3006  3638 3972 4220 4471 4774 
Other organizational 
forms 
--  --  --  --  2041  500  494  1374 1885 2267 2737 2943 
Total  10792  8345  12762 10914  13290  13487  14308  15887 16573 17257 17688 17671 
Sources: 1990-95  from  LERMAN, CSAKI, 1997, Table  3.4; 12.1999-3.2000 from SHMIDT, PUGACHOV (2000); 12.2000-2005 from tables of 
agricultural land users provided by Land Management Department in DERZHKOMZEM. 
Note: 
* Excluding interfarm enterprises.  
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form a core of competitive market oriented agriculture for the future. The impact of 
the 1999 decree on the individual sector (household plots and peasant farms) is 
discussed in a separate section in Chapter 3. 
The farm structure that emerged following the December  1999 decree showed 
considerable regional variation due to economic, historical, and other reasons. Local 
and regional authorities had a substantial influence on the implementation of reform 
and on the choice of specific organizational forms. Regional officials actively 
participated in the preparation of reform-related regulations and often appeared 
before general assemblies of CAE members forcefully advocating their views.  
The land reform achieved some very important results for rural residents. First, 
nearly 7 million rural residents became owners of physical land plots, not just 
paper shares. The size of the average land share is 4.2 hectares. About 70% of 
agricultural land, or 80% of arable land, is now physically owned by rural 
individuals. Ukraine evolved from exclusive state ownership of land in 1990 to a 
mix of state and collective ownership in 1993-95 and finally to a mix of state 
and private land ownership in 2000-05 (Table 2.2). The land ownership structure 
seems to have stabilized since 2000 with roughly one-half in state ownership, 
one-half in private ownership, and virtually no collective land ownership.  
Table 2.2  Structure of agricultural land ownership 1990-2005 
Land ownership  1990 1995 2000 2005 
State  100 60 50 49 
Collective 0  37  2  0 
Private 0  3  48  51 
Source: DERZHKOMZEM, private communication. 
Second, the Ukraine land reform may provide an important source of income for 
rural residents, as the average landowner should earn about 400 hryvna per year 
by renting out his 4.2 hectares share, the equivalent of two and one half months 
of wages. Third, land titles for specific parcels of land are being issued to the 
owners with financial support from international organizations and bilateral 
donors. As of May 1, 2002, about 40% of eligible residents had received these 
titles. Fourth, the new Land Code passed in 2001 as part of the second-wave 
reforms recognized private landownership, allowed certain land transactions 
(while retaining the moratorium on buying and selling of land until January 2008) 
and eliminated size restrictions for household plots and peasant farms. The new 
Land Code also banned the investment of agricultural land in the equity capital 
of newly created businesses, a precautionary measure to counter pressure from 
farm managers on landowners to transfer their land to the corporate farm, thereby 
losing legal rights to it (OECD, 2003).
4 
                                                 
4  The Land Code did not limit the lease term, however, and very long-term leases may lead 
to a de facto absorption of land in the corporate equity. In practice, most lease contracts are 
short term, with 89% of them for less than 5 years.  
 
3 THE FARM STRUCTURE IN UKRAINE 
The ongoing reforms have not only changed the organizational forms of "farm 
enterprises". They also have had a profound impact on the individual sector, 
accelerating the creation of independent peasant farms and allowing rural 
residents to double the size of their household plots. The post-1999 farm 
structure in Ukraine is totally different from the Soviet model, but it also 
significantly differs from the structure that emerged after 1992 in the course of 
first-wave reforms. 
3.1  Typology of Ukrainian farms 
Ukrainian farms today can be classified into two broad organizational categories: 
Individual farms and corporate farms (the latter are often called "agricultural 
enterprises"). The individual sector is subdivided into household plots and 
peasant farms. These are typical family farms and the main difference between 
them is one of size and commercial orientation. Household plots are generally 
smaller and more subsistence-oriented than peasant farms, although there is a lot 
of overlap between the two groups. Individual farms operate mainly on family-
owned land, although growth is achieved by leasing additional land from other 
owners. In legal terms, household plots are subject to the Law on Household 
Plots passed for the first time in May 2003, whereas peasant farms are now 
subject to the new Law on Peasant Farms, which was passed in June  2003 
replacing the original law from December 1991. Household plots are treated as 
physical bodies, whereas peasant farms according to the new law are required to 
register as legal bodies (formally peasant farms are thus corporations, but they are 
classified as individual and not corporate farms). The corporate sector consists of 
relatively large farms that have replaced the traditional collective and state farms 
(so-called "farm enterprises") in the process of reform since  1992. They are 
organized as private corporations with two or more shareholders that operate 
mainly on leased land and have strong commercial orientation. Legally, the 
corporate farms are subdivided into "business" companies (hospodarski tovaristva 
in Ukrainian, khozyaistvennye obshchestva in Russian), which are incorporated 
as joint-stock or limited liability companies by a group of shareholders investing 
money in corporate equity, and "private" enterprises (privatny pidpriemstva in 
Ukrainian, chastnye predpriyatiya in Russian), which are organized by a single 
entrepreneur on the basis of privately owned assets. Alongside private corporate 
farms there is a special category of "unitary" enterprises that are organized by a Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  24
single institutional shareholder, generally the state or the municipality. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main organizational forms defined in Ukrainian 
legislation (including the new Civil Code and the Business Code adopted in 
January 2003). 
Table 3.1:  Characterization of organizational forms 
A. "Business" companies (hospodarski tovaristva) 
Joint Stock Company: A corporate business entity created by investors (physical or 
legal bodies) who acquire shares in the company by contributing funds or assets to its 
equity capital. A shareholder wishing to leave a joint-stock company has to find a 
buyer for his share. The company has no obligation to redeem the shares for cash or 
assets in kind. The shareholder’s liability for the company’s debt is limited to the 
investment in share capital. The voting power is proportional to the number of shares 
held by the shareholder. In a closed joint-stock company, shares are transferable only 
among members. In an open joint-stock company, shares can be bought by outsiders. 
Joint stock companies are relatively large entities, with nominal equity (the sum total 
of the nominal value of all shares) equal to not less than  1,250 minimum wage 
payments (approximately $80,000). 
 
Limited Liability Company: Similar to a joint stock company, except that when a 
member chooses to leave, the other members redeem his share of investment for cash. 
The nominal equity capital of a limited liability company is not less than 100 minimum 
wage payments ($6,500), much less than in joint stock companies. 
 
Partnership: The partners bear full, unlimited liability for the obligations assumed by 
the partnership. When a partner decides to leave, the partnership is usually dissolved and 
the assets are divided in kind among the partners. The voting power is proportional to 
the investment of each partner. 
 
Agricultural Cooperative: A voluntary association of members (individuals or legal 
bodies) established for the pursuit of a common agricultural activity. Each member 
makes a contribution to the statutory equity capital of the cooperative in the form of 
cash, land, or assets. The ownership of the contributed capital passes to the cooperative, 
as in a joint-stock company. On exit, members receive their share of investment in cash 
or in kind, as prescribed by the cooperative charter. The members bear an unlimited 
liability for the obligations of the cooperative. The voting power is "one man, one vote", 
and is not proportional to the invested capital. The law explicitly distinguishes between 
production cooperatives and service cooperatives. Production cooperatives are based 
on members’ labor, whereas service cooperatives may employ hired labor. Because of 
this distinction, only physical persons may be members in production cooperatives, 
whereas membership in service cooperatives is also open to legal bodies. 
 
Collective Agricultural Enterprise (CAE): An obsolete organizational form eliminated 
by the December  1999 Presidential Decree. Between  1992 and 1999, a variety of 
agricultural production cooperative, typically the successor of a former kolkhoz or sovkhoz 
with ownership of land and assets transferred from the state to the workers. Workers 
became shareholders through distribution of certificates of entitlement to land and assets. 
Exit of members with land and assets usually required approval of the general assembly. 
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B. "Private" enterprises (privatny pidpriemstva) 
Private Lease Enterprise: A corporate farm established by one founding shareholder 
with a high proportion of resources leased from outsiders. Typically created when one 
enterprising individual leases the land and asset shares of a large number of former 
collective farm members in the village. Although a very popular term in the media, it 
is not listed as a legal category in the 2003 Business Code or in any of the preceding 
laws. 
       
Peasant Farm: An incorporated entity created by an individual, a family, or a group 
of individuals on the basis of jointly owned land and assets. Peasant farms by 
assumption rely mainly on family labor and family owned resources, although they 
may employ hired labor and leased resources. Following the adoption of the May 2003 
law, peasant farms must incorporate as legal persons. Although incorporated as a legal 
body, it is classified as an individual farm, not a corporate structure. 
 
Farms of all organizational forms may lease land and assets in addition to their 
privately owned resources. In individual farms the main sources of land are the 
traditional household plot and the land plot obtained through conversion of land 
shares in the former collective enterprise. Individual farms may augment their 
privately owned holdings by leasing land from other owners. Corporate farms 
have two main sources for land and other production assets. One source is 
provided by land and asset shares invested by individuals in the equity capital of 
the enterprise. By investing their land and asset shares in the equity capital of a 
corporation, the individuals exchange their ownership of these assets for a 
promise of a stream of dividends from the profits of the corporate farm. The 
second source consists of land and asset shares that individuals lease to the 
corporate farm for a specified term in return for a contractual lease payment. At 
the end of the lease term, the individual may reconsider the leasing arrangements 
and decide on a different disposition of the assets. 
3.2  Organization of the individual sector 
The two components of the individual farm sector – household plots and peasant 
farms – differ in several substantive respects. For legal purposes, a household 
plot is a farm that operates as a physical person, without incorporation or formal 
registration. It relies on family labor, and its main objective is to satisfy the 
subsistence needs of the household. Surplus products may be sold outside the 
household and the income from sales of farm products from the household plot is 
exempt from taxes. In contradistinction to household plots, peasant farms are 
incorporated legal entities and are subject to taxes on income like corporate farms. 
Their main objective is commercial farming, not subsistence farming. Household 
plots have very limited access to commercial credit and do not receive any 
financial support from the state. Some salient differences between household plots 
and peasant farms are summarized in Table 3.2.  
Given the importance of the household plot for the rural population and for 
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May 2003 guaranteed total tax exemption on income earned from the sale of 
home-grown food products. The new law codified an existing practice, since the 
output from the household plot has never been taxed. The original intention of 
the agrarian lobby was to exempt from taxes also the sales revenue from the 
extension acquired through the conversion of family-held land shares. The purpose 
was to encourage exits from collectives by making straightforward household plot 
augmentation more attractive. However, this provision was blocked by the 
Ministry of Finance, and as of today the sales revenue from the household plot 
remains tax exempt, whereas the sales revenue from the new extension is taxed 
like the sales revenue of a peasant farm. Despite the exemption from income taxes 
on farm output, households still have to pay land tax. 
Table 3.2:  Characteristic differences between household plots and 
peasant farms 
  Household plots  Peasant farms 
Organizational form  Physical body: No registration 
requirements 
Legal body: Incorporated and 
formally registered 
Size  2-10 ha  10-100 ha 
Land   Mostly owned (including land 
share withdrawn from local 
collective) 
Owned (by the family or the 
farm) plus large component of 
leased land 
Size restrictions  2 ha plus land share  No size limits; owned land 
allocated without payment up 
to average land share in the 
district; additional land must 
be purchased 
Production  Mainly subsistence oriented, 
with sale of surplus 
Mainly commercial 
Labor  Family  Family and hired help 
Taxation  No tax on income from 
household plot 
Farm income taxed 
Financial support from 
the state 
None  State Support Fund 
Legal framework  Law on Household Plots, May 
2003 
Law on Peasant Farms, May 
2003 
 
Rural residents whose main occupation is the household plot face considerable 
uncertainty regarding their social insurance. Individuals in this category are 
treated as employed whenever their imputed monthly income is greater than the 
minimum wage. These individuals have to make compulsory monthly payments 
to social insurance to be eligible for health care, old-age pensions, and other 
social services. In practice, however, much of the imputed income comes from 
home-grown products consumed by the family, and there is simply not enough 
cash to make these compulsory payments. Large segments of the rural 
population thus unwillingly jeopardize their old-age security.  
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The basic household plot does not exceed 2 hectares of owned or leased land. 
However, the 1999 Presidential Decree made it possible for many rural residents 
to take their land share out of the former collective and use it to augment the 
traditional household plot (instead of establishing a peasant farm, as originally 
envisaged). This has led to a substantial increase in total land cultivated in 
household plots and their average size since 2000. Figure 3.1 (dark curve) 
shows two distinct jumps in land cultivated by household plots, both clearly 
related to the two waves of land reform in Ukraine. The increase in 1990-1992 
associated with the early reform efforts was followed by a much more robust 
increase associated with the post-1999 reforms. The total land in household plots 
increased from 6 million ha in 1998 to 8.5 million ha in 2000 and continued to 
rise to 14 million ha in 2004. The share of household plots in agricultural land 
accordingly climbed from 6% in 1990 to 14% in 1998 and onward to 33% in 
2004. The number of rural households has remained fairly constant at 5.5 million 
since 1990 and the increase in total holdings is ccordingly reflected in a marked 
increase in the average size of household plots, which grew from 0.5 hectare in 
1990 to about 1 hectare between the two reform waves (1992-99) and up to 
2.5 hectares in 2004 (gray bars in Figure 3.1). This is the national average, but 
in some parts of Ukraine the land shares reached 10 hectares, so that augmented 
household plots created by pooling all family-held shares may be as large as 
several tens of hectares and even larger. 
Figure 3.1:  Land in households plots (curve, million ha) and average pot 
size (bars, ha) 1990-2004 
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The 1999 decree had an immediate impact on both the number and the land 
holdings of peasant farms (Figure 3.2). The number of peasant farms increased 
by nearly 25% between 1999 and 2002, from about 35,000 to 43,000. The land 
in peasant farms more then trebled during this period, from about 1 million hectares 
to nearly 3.5 million hectares. The quantum jump in the number of farms after 1999 
(gray curve in Figure 3.2) was small compared to the rapid growth of land in 
peasant farms (black curve in Figure 3.2). As a result, the average farm size 
increased from 25-30 ha up to 1998 to 70-80 ha in 2003-2004 (Figure 3.3). The 
share of peasant farms in agricultural land doubled from 2-3% in 1995-99 to 6% 
in 2000 and continued to rise to 8% in 2003-2004. 
Figure 3.2:  Growth of private farming 1990-2004: Number of peasant 
farms (gray curve, thousands) and land in peasant farms 
(black curve, million ha) 


















Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
Figure 3.3:  Average size of peasant farms 1990-2004 (ha) 
 









Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004.  
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The two reform waves have produced a significant redistribution of agricultural 
land between the individual and the corporate sectors of Ukrainian agriculture. The 
land holdings of the corporate sector steadily shrunk between 1990 and 2004, while 
the individual sector grew by absorbing land from corporate farms. The transfer of 
agricultural land from corporate to individual farms accelerated markedly in 1999 
(Figure 3.4). Thus, the share of the individual sector (household plots and peasant 
farms combined) in agricultural land increased from 6% in 1990 to 17% in 1998 
and then soared to 41% in 2004 (Table 3.3). The share of corporate farms decreased 
correspondingly from 94% of agricultural land in 1990 to 59% in 2004. The 
increased share of individual farms in land is reflected in increased holdings because 
the total agricultural land in Ukraine has remained constant at 42 million hectares.  
Figure 3.4:  Agricultural land in farms of different types 1990-2004: 
Corporate farms (bottom layer), household plots (middle layer), 
and peasant farms (top layer)  






































1990  42,030  39,357  2,669    93.6 6.4 0.0  6.4 
1991  41,973  38,061  3,864    90.7 9.2 0.1  9.3 
1992  41,930  36,747  4,833   87.6  11.5  0.8 12.4 
1993  41,890  36,260  5,011   86.6  12.0  1.5 13.4 
1994  41,862  35,764  5,357 741 85.4  12.8  1.8 14.6 
1995  41,853  35,442  5,589 822 84.7  13.4  2.0 15.3 
1996  41,840  35,240  5,694 906 84.2  13.6  2.2 15.8 
1997  41,854  35,029 5,789 1,037  83.7  13.8  2.5  16.3 
1998  41,827  34,806 5,919 1,102  83.2  14.2  2.6  16.8 
1999  41,829  34,408 6,243 1,178  82.3  14.9  2.8  17.7 
2000  41,827  30,941 8,543 2,342  74.0  20.4  5.6  26.0 
2001  41,817  29,327 9,736 2,754  70.1  23.3  6.6  29.9 
2002  41,800 27,940 10,939  2,921  66.8  26.2  7.0  33.2 
2003  41,789 25,826 12,799  3,164  61.8  30.6  7.6  38.2 
2004  41,764 24,524 13,819  3,421  58.7  33.1  8.2  41.3 
Source: DERZHKOMZEM (various years).   
 
4 IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE 
Changes in land use patterns wrought by land reform have totally changed the 
face of Ukrainian agriculture: From agriculture with predominant concentration 
of production in collective farms it has evolved into agriculture characterized by 
clear dominance of individual farms. Changes in land use patterns affect 
production through the contribution of individual and corporate farms to gross 
agricultural output (GAO; see Figure 4.1). Against the backdrop of generally 
declining agricultural production, the share of the individual sector increased 
from less than 30% of GAO in 1990 to 65-70% in 2003-2004. The share of 
corporate farms correspondingly shrank from 70% to about 30% of GAO 
(Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.1:  Gross agricultural output by farm type 1990-2004  
(million hrivny in constant 2000 prices): Corporate farms 
(bottom layer), household plots (middle layer), peasant farms 
(top layer) 
 














Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
The changes in the composition of GAO have been gradual and cumulative over 
the entire period of reform since 1990: There are no discernible jumps in 1992 
and 1999 that can be associated with the two reform waves. The individual 
sector overtook the corporate sector by share of GAO in 1996, between the two 
reform markers of 1992 and 1999. Within the individual sector, the main  
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contribution to agricultural production is from household plots, not peasant 
farms, as they also control much more land (33% versus 8%, as noted above). 
Figure 4.2:  Shares of corporate and individual farms in GAO 1990-2004 
(percent)  
 











Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
Figure 4.3:  Change in GAO for individual and corporate farms 1990-2004 
(percent of 1990) 
 














Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
The growing share of individual farms in agricultural production also reflects 
differences in performance between individual and corporate farms. In 1999 
agricultural output from all farms stood at 50% of its 1990 level. After that year, 
production made a spectacular recovery, as it grew by 30% (in constant prices) 
between 1999 and 2004 (Figure 4.3, thin black curve). While corporate farms 
had dropped by 2000 to 30% of the 1990 level and remained roughly unchanged 
after that, the agricultural output of the individual sector in contrast remained Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  32
unchanged during the first decade 1990-99 and then increased by 40% between 
1999 and 2004 (Figure 4.3, thick gray and black curves for corporate and individual 
farms, respectively).Although the second-wave reforms have had a particularly 
beneficial effect on the performance of individual farms, they also have had some 
impact in the corporate sector. The decline in output of corporate farms stopped in 
2000 and the number of unprofitable corporate farms dropped from almost 100% 
in 1997-99 to around 40% in 2000-2004 (although the absolute losses continued to 
climb). Many interpreted the sudden improvement in farm performance as a result 
of the turnaround in government policies. Some believed that an important page 
had been turned in agricultural policy that would allow development of agriculture 
and rural areas to go forward (ASLUND, 2002; OECD, 2003). 
4.1  Partial productivity of land and labor 
GAO growth is only one, albeit very important, dimension of agricultural 
performance. Productivity is another dimension that plays a central role in 
determining competitiveness. In this section we consider two partial measures of 
productivity based on national-level data: Partial productivity of agricultural land 
(output per hectare) and partial productivity of agricultural labor (output per worker). 
Partial productivity of land is calculated as the ratio of gross agricultural output 
(GAO) in constant (2000) prices to agricultural land. The land productivity 
decreased over time from 2,000 hrivny/ha in 1992 to 1,200 hrivny/ha in 1999, 
and then recovered to about 1,500  hrivny/ha in 2000-2004 (thin curve in 
Figure 4.4). As in previous instances, it is tempting to attribute this productivity 
improvement to the second-wave reforms begun in 1999. 
Figure 4.4:  Partial productivity of land for individual and corporate farms 
1992-2004 (‘000 hrivny/ha in constant prices) 
 














Source:  Authors’ calculations based on AGUKRAINE, 2004.  
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Table 4.1:  Gross agricultural output and land productivity for farms of 
different types
* 
GAO (2000 prices), million hrivny  Productivity, ‘000 hrivny/ha 












1990 75,682 28,779    1.92 10.77   
1991 62,684 27,978    1.65 7.15   
1992 52,264 30,845    1.42 5.95   
1993 51,335 32,986    1.42 5.86   
1994 40,446 29,550  389 1.13 4.91  0.52
1995 36,905 30,454  458 1.04 4.82  0.56
1996 29,366 31,618  366 0.83 4.85  0.40
1997 28,091 31,671  510 0.80 4.71  0.49
1998 23,645 30,387  436 0.68 4.39  0.40
1999 21,383 28,806  547 0.62 3.96  0.46
2000 20,095 34,539  1,056 0.65 3.27  0.45
2001 23,449 36,046  1,902 0.80 3.04  0.69
2002 22,770 37,166  2,170 0.81 2.84  0.74
2003 17,318 36,484  1,465 0.67 2.38  0.46
2004 23,742 39,930  2,585 0.97 2.47  0.76
Source: GAO from AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
Notes: 
* Agricultural land for productivity calculations from Table 3.3.  
GAO and agricultural land data are available since 1992 for farms of the three main 
organizational types: Corporate farms, household plots, and peasant farms. The 
partial productivity of land calculated from these data is presented in Table 4.1. 
Figure 4.4 shows the land productivity for the period 1992-2004 for corporate 
farms (gray curve) and individual farms (thick black curve), aggregating household 
plots and peasant farms into one series. Although the land productivity of 
individual farms decreased over time as they acquired more land (a decreasing 
returns to scale effect), it remained consistently higher than the land productivity 
of corporate farms. The gap between the two series is very substantial: The mean 
productivity for individual farms for the period 1992-2004 is around 4,000 hrivny/ha, 
whereas the mean productivity for corporate farms is less than 1,000 hrivny/ha. 
It is interesting to note that the land productivity of peasant farms taken on their 
own is very low, about 50% of the productivity of corporate farms (see Table 4.1). 
This may be attributed to problems with statistical data for the new sector of 
peasant farms. 
The partial productivity of agricultural labor (ALP) is calculated as the ratio of 
GAO (in hrivny) to an estimated number of workers employed in agriculture. 
No full labor data are available for individual and corporate farms separately, so 
that it is only possible to calculate ALP for all farms in aggregate. Unfortunately 
the methodology of agricultural labor statistics was changed in 2001 and the 
data for 2002-2004 are inconsistent with the previous time series for 1990-2001. 
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disjoint sections at 2001. The agricultural labor series based on the old 
methodology is fairly constant at about 5 million workers for 1990-2001. The 
labor productivity estimates based on the old labor series (gray curve) decline 
from 1990 to 1999 and then turn upward. The productivity estimates for 2002-2004 
follow an even stronger upward trend, because the new labor series shows a decline 
in agricultural employment after 2002 compared with constant employment up to 
2001. The ALP calculations again seem to suggest that the 1999 second-wave 
reform has produced certain productivity improvements. 
Figure 4.5:  Agricultural labor (black curve, million workers) and partial 
productivity of agricultural labor (gray curve, ‘000 hrivny/ 
worker in constant prices) 1990-2004 
 
















'000 hrivny/worker (2000 prices) 
 
Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
 
Figure 4.6:  Agricultural labor productivity in corporate farms 1990-2004 
(percent of 1990)  
 















Source: Authors’  calculations.  
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Though it is impossible to calculate ALP for farms of different types, the 
Ukrainian agricultural yearbook for 2004 (pp. 49-50) presents some information 
on labor productivity for corporate farms. Unfortunately neither the calculation 
details nor the underlying labor data are given. It is reasonable to assume that 
the labor data used in these productivity calculations for corporate farms suffer 
from the same change of methodology in 2001 that affects the national data in 
Figure 4.5. The labor productivity of corporate farms reproduced in Figure 4.6 
is therefore spliced from two time series: 1990-2001 based on old labor methodology 
and 2002-2004 based on new methodology. The new methodology with its sharp 
downward adjustment of labor statistics produced a steeply rising productivity 
segment in 2002-2004. Yet even if we ignore this latest segment, the consistent 
series based on old labor methodology (1990-2001) still shows a clear upturn in 
1999, essentially repeating the national picture from Figure 4.5.  
  
 
5 UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
The watershed changes in farm structure and performance in Ukraine precipitated 
by the 1999 Presidential Decree require a rethinking of the results of agricultural 
reform in Ukraine. On the one hand, Ukraine has always been "Little Russia". But 
the structure of farming in Ukraine has now moved sharply away from the Russian 
model of large corporate farms toward agriculture dominated by individual farms. 
This structure resembles more that in Moldova than in Russia. On the other hand, 
Ukraine – especially since the "Orange Revolution" of December 2004 – has 
outward looking aspirations pointing in the direction of the European Union. In this 
section we accordingly compare Ukraine with Russia, Moldova, and some new EU 
members from Central Eastern Europe. The comparison is essentially limited to a 
small subset of variables and is only intended to give preliminary indications. 
5.1 Ukraine,  Moldova, and Russia 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia pursued similar reform paths until 1998-99, when 
Ukraine and Moldova embarked on their own separate strategies and began to 
convert paper land shares into physical plots. In Ukraine the breakthrough came 
with the December 1999 Presidential Decree, whereas Moldova achieved its 
political and institutional breakthrough with the launching in 1998 of its USAID-
sponsored National Land Program. In both countries the new course of action was 
a response to a political crisis caused by the mounting debt of the traditional 
collective farms (CSAKI et al., 2001). The governments of Moldova and Ukraine 
addressed the farm "debt crisis" by strengthening the family farm sector through 
distribution of land and other assets in physical form to rural residents.  
Table 5.1:  Selected measures of reform outcomes: Ukraine, Moldova, and 
Russia 
2003 1990   
Ukraine Moldova Russia Ukraine Moldova Russia
Land in individual use, %  38  42  16  7  9  2 
Share of individual farms 
in GAO, % 
70 70  60  27 18  24 
Share of agricultural 
labor, % 
23 43  11  23 39  15 
Share of agriculture in 
GDP, % 
12 18 5  22 30  15 
Sources:    AGUKRAINE, 2004; AGRUSSIA, 2004; AGMOLDOVA, 2004; LERMAN et al., 2004. 5. Ukrainian agriculture in comparative perspective  37
These policies moved the structure of Ukrainian and Moldovan agriculture away 
from the Russian model with its predominance of large corporate farms toward 
an agrarian structure with a significant and growing individual farm sector. Land 
in individual use and the share of individual farms in GAO in Ukraine and 
Moldova differ markedly from these indicators in Russia. Ukraine and Moldova 
today have 40% of agricultural land in individual use compared with only 16% 
in Russia (Table 5.1). The share of individual farms in gross agricultural output 
(GAO) is also higher in Ukraine and Moldova: 70% to Russia’s 60%.  
Comparison of agricultural growth during the entire period 1990-2004 shows that 
GAO experienced similar declines in all three countries until 1998 (Figure 5.1). of 
the ruble and the changes in relative prices in the wake of the 1998 financia 
Agricultural recovery began in 1998 in Russia, 1999 in Ukraine, and 2000 in 
Moldova. While in Russia agricultural recovery was probably driven by the devalua-
tion l crisis, the resumption of agricultural growth in Ukraine and Moldova appears 
to be linked with the adoption of new reform strategies in these countries. The 1999 
Presidential Decree in Ukraine and the 1998 National Land Program in Moldova 
both accelerated the transition from corporate to individual agriculture. Agricultural 
recovery in Ukraine and Moldova is thus consistent with theoretical considerations 
that associate definite performance advantages with individual farming. 
Figure 5.1:  Gross agricultural output: Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia 
1990-2004 (percent of 1990) 
 













Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004; AGMOLDOVA, 2004; AGRUSSIA, 2004. 
All three countries became much less agrarian since 1990 when characterized by 
the share of agriculture in GDP (Table 5.1). Agricultural employment, on the other 
hand, has proven much stickier. The share of agricultural labor in Russia decreased 
between 1990 and 2003 much less than the share of agriculture in GDP, while the 
share of agricultural labor in Ukraine practically did not change and in Moldova it 
even increased slightly. The difference in agricultural labor behavior between Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  38 
Russia on the one hand and Ukraine and Moldova on the other is probably also 
attributable to individualization of agriculture: The larger individual agriculture in 
Ukraine and Moldova acts as a "labor sink" for rural residents, offsetting the effect 
of other factors that tend to reduce agricultural employment (as in Russia).  
5.2  Ukraine and the new EU members 
It is part of the most people’s thinking on Ukraine that agricultural performance 
there is worse than in the CEE countries. We compare Ukrainian performance with 
that of the new EU members – Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary 
using figures from World Bank’s World Development Indicators databases and 
FAOSTAT. The raw data on partial agricultural productivity are indeed worse in 
Ukraine (Table 5.2), which also lags by growth of crop yields (Table 5.3).  
Table 5.2:  Selected comparative economic indicators for Ukraine and the 
new EU members 
  Ukraine  Hungary  Czech Rep.  Slovak Rep.  Poland  
GDP per capita, 2004  
(US$ at PPP) 
6,317 16,639  19,381  14,519  12,88
1 
Agriculture value added per 
worker, 2003 (2000 US$) 
1,400 3,991  4,444  n.a.  1,397 
Cereal yield, average 2001-03 
(tons/ha) 
2.4 4.0  4.3  3.8  n.a. 
Sun flower seed yield, average,  
2001-03 (tons/ha) 
1.2 1.8  2.2  2.0  n.a. 
Rural population  
(% of total, 2003) 
33 34  26  42  38 
Food exports  
(% of merchandise exports, 2002) 
13 7  3  4  8 
Employment in agriculture  
(% of total, 2001) 
20 6  5  7  19 
Agriculture value added,  
(% of GDP, 2002) 
15 4  4  4  3 
Source: WDI,  2006. 
Table 5.3:  Changes in crop yields in Ukraine and the new EU members 
between the average for 1992-94 and the average for 2001-03 
(percent) 











Czech Rep.  3.1  3.7  -4.5  -1.1  8.1  14.6  3.8 
Hungary 10.9  25.3  10.2  12.1  53.6 70.0  18.2 
Poland 18.7  21.9  16.5  --  12.6  14.2  16.2 
Slovakia -8.2  -0.7  6.5  3.7 10.7  -16.7  -7.0 
Ukraine -18.4  -16.0  5.9  0.2  -9.2  -3.5  -13.1 
Source: FAOSTAT,  2006. 
Notes: 
* Average of the yields for five major crops: Cereals, sunflower seeds, other oil crops,  
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Instead of looking at absolute values, which are influenced by differences in 
initial conditions across countries, it is advisable to focus on index numbers 
representing rates of change over time. The behavior of index numbers is free 
from the effect of initial conditions and better reflects the impact of reform. In 
comparing the index numbers (such as GDP or GAO in percent of some base 
year) across different countries we need to make an adjustment for the different 
starting point of reforms in CEE and CIS. For the CEE countries we assume that 
the reforms started in 1990, whereas for CIS we take 1992 as the starting year 
for reforms (thus, on the time axis, R=1990 for CEE and R=1992 for CIS).  
Figure 5.2 shows the GDP index (in percent of GDP in year R) for Ukraine and 
two new EU members from CEE: Hungary and Poland. The GDP index is 
commonly used as a measure of a country’s overall economic performance. The 
two CEE reform-minded countries (a) dropped less and (b) began to recover 
earlier than Ukraine. When assessed by the World Bank Agrarian Policy Reform 
Index (CSAKI, KRAY, 2005), Hungary and Poland are judged to be much more 
reform-oriented than Ukraine. The GDP curves in Figure 5.2 thus clearly illustrate 
the impact of reforms. 
Figure 5.2:  GDP for Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland during 12 years since 
the start of reforms (in percent of R, where R=1990 for Hungary 
and Poland, R=1992 for Ukraine) 
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The corresponding diagram for GAO (a measure of agricultural performance) 
is shown in Figure 5.3. Poland’s GAO remained fairly stable over time, 
perhaps because Poland with its traditionally individualized agriculture did not 
have to apply the same painful land reform measures as its "collectivized" 
neighbors. Hungary’s GAO at first dropped, obviously due to the initial shock 
of transition, and then began recover in R+3 as the reforms kicked in. In 
contrast to the two CEE countries, Ukraine’s agriculture continued its 
downward slide until R+7. Recovery in Ukraine begins in 1999 – either as a 
result of the 1998 "financial crisis", as in Russia, or (more hopefully) due to 
the second round of reform. Comparison of Figure 5.2 (GDP) and Figure 5.3 
(GAO) seems to suggest that the macroeconomic reforms were stronger, more 
profound, and more far reaching than agricultural reforms (judging by their 
impact in the two figures). 
Figure 5.3:  Gross agricultural output for Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland 
since the start of reforms  
 








Hungary Poland Ukraine  
 
Source: LERMAN et al., 2004. 
Note:  In percent of R, where R=1990 for Hungary and Poland, R=1992 for Ukraine. 
 
In Chapter 4 we have used GAO per agricultural worker as a measure of labor 
productivity. Figure 5.4 shows the agricultural labor productivity (ALP) for 
the three countries.
5 There was no change in agricultural labor productivity  
in Poland (for the same reasons as for GAO), a steep increase in Hungary (up 
to R+6, due to extreme labor shedding), and a steady decline in Ukraine   
(up to R+7). The pattern up to R+7 already provides an excellent illustration of the  
                                                 
5  The cross-country comparisons in Figures 5.2-5.4 are based on respective national statistics 
summarized in LERMAN et al. (2004). 5. Ukrainian agriculture in comparative perspective  41
Figure 5.4:  Agricultural labor productivity for Ukraine, Hungary, and 
Poland since the start of reforms (in percent of R, where 
R=1990 for Hungary and Poland, R=1992 for Ukraine) 
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Source: LERMAN et al., 2004. 
 
differential impact of reforms across countries, but the picture becomes even 
clearer for R+8 (2000) and later in Ukraine: The 1999 reforms are producing a 
noticeable increase in agricultural labor productivity (but see the detailed discussion 
in Chapter 4). 
We conclude from these comparisons that Ukraine declined more and recovered 
less than the CEE countries during the 15 years of transition. This is probably a 
reflection of the lagging and sometimes halfhearted reforms in Ukraine. Recent 
years (after R+7 = 1999) show a clear upward trend by the three main indicators, 






ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
The following chapters present the findings of the questionnaire-based survey 
conducted in the winter of 2005 with the objective of gaining additional insights 
on the progress and impacts of land reform. This part is organized around the 
following topics: 
 
6. Survey design 
7. Farm reorganization  
8. Land and land markets 
9. The business environment  
10. Rural social sphere 
11. Farm production and sales 
12. Credit and investment 
13. Human capital 
14. Farm productivity 
15. Rural family incomes 
 
Each topic is analyzed in a comparative framework for farms of different organi-
zational forms – corporate farms, peasant farms, and household plots. 





6 SURVEY DESIGN 
Five levels are relevant to the monitoring of changes in agricultural and land 
policy in Ukraine: (1) the central government level, (2) the regional authority 
level, (3) the corporate farm level, (4) the peasant farm level, and (5) the rural 
household level. The record of central government policies has been well 
elucidated in recent publications, and the present study focuses accordingly on 
levels (2), (3), (4) and (5), i.e., the regional authorities and the three components 
of the farming structure in Ukraine. The views of the regional authorities were 
explored through a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with district-
level agricultural officials. The information about corporate farms, peasant 
farms, and rural households was collected through a questionnaire-based survey 
of three interrelated samples of respondents.  
The survey was carried out in eight provinces (oblasts) across the country: 
Ivano-Frankivsk, L’viv, Rivno (west), Vinnitsa, Chernigov, Mikolaev (center), 
Sumy, Poltava (east). The oblast selection procedure involved cluster analysis 
based on 6 variables (2003 values). The procedure grouped the 24 oblasts in 
Ukraine (excluding Crimea) into 4 (unequal) clusters and two oblasts were then 
selected (arbitrarily) from each cluster for a total of 8 sample oblasts (see map in 
Figure 6.1).  
The following 6 variables were used for clustering: 
1) Share of agricultural land in individual use (importance of 
individual agriculture); 
2) Share of agricultural output produced by individual sector 
(importance of individual agriculture); 
3) Share of national agricultural output produced by oblast (agrarian 
nature); 
4) Share of national individual farming output produced by oblast 
(agrarian nature); 
5) Share of rural employment as a proxy for agricultural employment 
(agrarian nature); 
6) Share of agricultural land distributed in shares as a proxy for 
land "privatization" (measure of land reform since 2000). 
These 6 variables represented two groups of oblast characteristics: The agrarian 
nature of the oblast and the progress of land reform since 2000. Variables 3-5 Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine  46
were basically measures of the agrarian nature of the oblasts, whereas variables 
1-2 and 6 were related to land and policy reform on the oblast level as measures 
of farm individualization and land privatization. 
Table 6.1 characterizes the four clusters based on the mean values of the variables. 
The clusters show sufficient substantive differences to be used as a basis for 
representative sample selection. The two oblasts selected from each cluster for 
inclusion in the survey are shown in bold letters. 
A look at the map in Figure 6.1 might create the impression that the survey 
ignored most of the eastern oblasts. In fact, Table 6.1 shows that the six eastern 
provinces not included in the survey are classified in clusters 1 (Zaporozhska, 
Lugansk), 2 (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Khar’kov) and 3 (Kherson) and are 
therefore represented (at least from statistical considerations) by other oblasts 
participating in the survey. Oblast selection decisions were inevitably influenced 
by travel cost considerations, which gave preference to cluster representatives 
closer to the center.  
Table 6.1:  The clustering of 24 oblasts by agrarian and reform-related 
variables 













1 Zaporozhska,  Lugansk, 
Mikolaev, Sumy, 
Kirovohrad (Crimea) 
East Low  Low  High 





Center/East Low  Medium  High 




West Medium  Medium  High 





High High  Low 
Note:  The specific variables are identified by numbers in parentheses; the oblasts included 
in the survey are shown in bold letters. 
The first stage of the sampling procedure ended with the selection of 8 oblasts 
based on cluster analysis. The second stage involved random selection of raions 
(districts), roughly in proportion to the actual number of raions in each oblast:  
3 raions per oblast in Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivno, and Sumy; 4 raions per oblast in 
L’viv, Chernigov, and Mikolaev; 5 raions per oblast in Vinnitsa and Poltava.  
A total of 31 raions were thus randomly selected in the 8 oblasts. The third stage  
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included random selection of villages in each raion. The target number of 
villages was around 25% of the total number of villages acting as management 
centers for large corporate farms in each raion. Approximately 6-7 such villages 
were selected in each raion (closer to 5 in Ivano-Frankivsk) for a total of 208 villages 
in the entire sample. The fourth stage involved random selection of individual 
respondents in each village: 
a) One large corporate farm was selected in each village and all the 
corporate farm managers (208 in number) were interviewed. 
b) Four households were selected at random in each village hosting a 
corporate farm for a total of 852 rural households. 
c)  Ten peasant farms were selected at random in each raion (irrespective of 
the number of villages selected). In raions with fewer than 10 peasant 
farms, all peasant farms were surveyed. This selection procedure gave 
310 peasant farms.  
The total sample included about 1,400 respondents. The sample structure is 
summarized in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2:  Sample structure (number of respondents) 






1. Chernigov  4  26  40  106  172 
2. Sumy  3  22  30  92  144 
3. Poltava  5  30  48  124  202 
4. Vinnitsa  5  33  51  123  207 
5. Ivano-Frankivsk  3  21  28  97  146 
6. L’viv  4  26  39  99  164 
7. Rivno  3  23  33  99  155 
8. Mikolaev  4  27  41  112  180 
    Total  31  208  310  852  1,370 
 
The representativeness of the survey was checked by comparing the distribution of 
Ukrainian farms by size in the sample with the official data published for the first 
time in 2005 by the Department of Statistics in Kiev. The survey-based distribution 
is shown in Figure 16.10 in the last chapter in this volume (the thick black curve 
marked 2005). The "official" distribution was constructed by combining informa-
tion from two sources. The first source was AGUKRAINE (2006), where Table 1.30 
gives the number and land area of some 58,000 corporate and peasant farms by 
size groups ranging from less than 5 hectares to more than 10,000 hectares. The 
second source was HOUSEHOLDS (2006), where Table 1.2 gives the number and 
land area of some 5.8 million households plots by size groups ranging from less 
than 0.50 hectares to more than 10 hectares. The "official" distribution curve was 
virtually identical to the sample curve in Figure 16.10, which provided strong 
evidence in support of the representativeness of the survey sample.  
 
Figure 6.1:  Map of Ukraine showing the eight sample oblasts for the 2005 FAO survey 
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7 FARM REORGANIZATION 
The reforms of 1999-2000 were designed to change the Ukrainian farm structure 
through reorganization of existing corporate farms (mostly CAEs) and accelerated 
creation of peasant farms. The rationale for this change was the need to bring the 
organization of Ukrainian agriculture more in line with the prevailing practice in 
market economies, where family farms are the dominant organizational form and 
production cooperatives (i.e., CAEs) hardly exist among the corporate farms. It 
was hoped that this type of farm reorganization would help to eliminate the 
inefficiency that plagued the traditional socialist agriculture.  
The formal reorganization goals were achieved. There are no CAEs in the survey, 
and agricultural production cooperatives (the form closest to the traditional 
collective farm) account for only 8% of the sample. The corporate farms in the 
survey are represented by new legal organizational forms with market-sounding 
names. The corporate farms are mainly organized as limited-liability companies 
or partnerships (39% of all respondents), followed in similar numbers by private 
lease enterprises (34%). Joint stock companies occur much less frequently in the 
survey (9%). The distribution of corporate farms of different organizational forms 
in the survey is shown in Table 7.1.  
Peasant farms, as distinct from corporate farms, exist in a single organizational 
form. The 2003 Law of Peasant Farms requires incorporation of peasant farms 
as legal bodies. There is general compliance with this legal requirement among 
the peasant farms surveyed, but some still continue as unincorporated physical 
bodies – probably a carryover from the pre-2003 period, when incorporation was 
optional. Thus, 78% of the peasant farms surveyed are organized as legal bodies 
and only 22% are physical bodies (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1:  Organizational forms among corporate and peasant farms in 
the survey 
Corporate farms  Percent of 
respondents
Peasant farms  Percent of 
respondents 
All corporate farms surveyed  100  All peasant farms surveyed  100 
Limited liability companies and 
partnerships 
39 Legal  bodies  78 
Private lease enterprises   34  Physical bodies  22 
Joint stock companies (JSC)  9     
Agricultural production cooperatives  8     
State enterprises  7     
Other 3     Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Peasant farms are generally organized by a small number of family members or 
partners. The number of members in peasant farms ranges from 1 to 32 with 
median of just 2 and mean of  3.6. There is practically no difference in the 
number of members for peasant farms organized as legal or physical bodies. 
Corporate farms, on the other hand, show a much wider range: Here the number 
of members ("founding shareholders") ranges from 1 to 1,600 with median of  
8  and mean of 127. Fully 16% of corporate farms surveyed are single-
shareholder farms and 31% have from 1 to 3 shareholders. Farms with more 
than 500 shareholders constitute 10% of the sample. There is a certain relationship 
between the number of members and the organizational form of the corporate 
farm: Private enterprises and limited-liability partnerships generally have a 
significantly smaller number of members than joint stock companies and 
agricultural cooperatives (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2:  Number of members in farms of different organizational forms 





Peasant farms  3.6  2  1-4  1-32 
Corporate farms  127  8  3-103  1-1,600 
    Private enterprises and limited liability
       companies 
90
* 6
* 2-28  1-1,600 
    Joint stock companies and cooperatives  278* 104
* 12-434  1-1,200 
Notes: 
*  Differences between the two groups of farms significant at p = 0.01 by standard tests. 
 **  The interquartile range brackets 50% of all observations. 
7.1  Creation time and mode 
The creation of corporate farms in the sample shows a single sharp peak in 2000 
(Figure 7.1). The three years 1999-2001 associated with the start of the second-
wave reform account for the creation of 52% of the corporate farms surveyed. 
Prior to 1999 the creation rates ran below 5% of the sample farms per year, and 
they dropped roughly to the same level after 2001.  
Peasant farms are a new type of farm in Ukraine that practically did not exist 
before 1992. Unlike the pattern observed for corporate farms, there were two 
distinct peaks of peasant farm creation in the survey: The first wave in 1992-93  
(36%)  and the second wave in 2000, immediately after the December 1999 
presidential decree (13%). In each of the other years after 1993 the farm creation 
rate was 3%-5% of the sample (Figure 7.2). The dual peaks observed in the 
survey are consistent with the national picture presented in Figure 3.2, which 
shows two waves in the process of creation of peasant farms: The first wave in 
1991-93 and then the second wave in 1999-2001. 
Most corporate farms in the survey (nearly 80%) were created through 
reorganization of a former CAE, either in one-to-one restructuring or as a result of 
the splitting of the former farm into several fragments (Table 7.3A). Only 19% of 7. Farm reorganization 
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respondents characterized their enterprises as new farms. Among peasant farms 
the situation is reversed: Fully 65% were organized as a new farm, while 23% 
were created through reorganization of a former CAE, including fragmentation 
(when the collective farm split into a number of new entities) or liquidation 
(Table 7.3B).  
Figure 7.1:  Creation of corporate farms over time in the survey 
 









percent of respondents 
 
 
Figure 7.2:  Creation of peasant farms over time in the survey 
 







percent of respondents 
 
 
There is a fairly clear relationship between the creation time and the creation 
mode, especially for peasant farms. In the pre-1999 period peasant farms were 
mostly created as new entities (77%) and the rate of farm creation through 
reorganization of collectives was relatively low (Table 7.3B). The situation Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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reversed in the post-1999 period: Here a much higher percentage of peasant 
farms than in the previous period were created through reorganization of former 
collectives (30% compared with 19% in the pre-1999 period), although new 
farm creation also continued at a high rate. The differences are less sharply 
pronounced for corporate farms, yet we see that one-to-one reorganization was 
the dominant form for the pre-1999 period, while new farm creation and 
fragmentation became more prominent in the post-1999 period (Table 7.3A).  
Table 7.3:  Creation modes of corporate and peasant farms  
(percent of respondents) 
 All  farms  Pre-1999  Post-1999 
A. Corporate farms     
New farm  19  15  20 
Created through reorganization of collective 
farm 
79   
   One-to-one reorganization  60  69  55 
   Collective farm split into several new farms  15  13  17 
   Collective farm liquidated  4 
Created through reorganization of peasant farm  1 
Other 1 
4 7 
B. Peasant farms     
New farm  65  77  61 
Created through reorganization of collective 
farm 
23 19 30 
   Separated from reorganizing collective farm  8     
   Collective farm split into several new farms  9     
   Collective farm liquidated  6     




7.2  Disposition of land and asset shares 
The driver for farm reorganization is the distribution of land and farm assets in kind 
based on previously assigned paper shares. The emphasis on distribution in kind is 
the new feature that distinguishes the 1999-2000 reform from the first-wave 
reforms begun in 1992, when the main efforts focused on the assignment of paper 
certificates of entitlement. The new policy has been largely successful in accompli-
shing the distribution of land plots to the rural population. Thus, households report 
receiving more than 80% of their land entitlement in physical form, whereas 
farmers have received practically their entire entitlement (96%). The distribution of 
non-land farm assets has been much less sweeping (Table 7.4), but, as with land, 
farmers report having received a larger share of their allocation than households.  
Two-thirds of the rural households reported that they had received their land shares 
at least in the form of paper certificates and more than half had received them in the 
form of a physical plot (Table 7.4). To get a sense of progress over time it may be 7. Farm reorganization 
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useful to compare these share-distribution results for 2005 with the corresponding 
data from earlier surveys in Ukraine. Thus, the percentage of corporate-farm 
employees that had received land shares in the form of paper certificates was 27% 
in the 1994 World Bank survey, going up to 42 in the 1996 World Bank survey 
(Figure 7.3). Among farm managers in the 1996 World Bank survey, 29% reported 
that the land shares had been officially registered with the district authorities, and 
nobody even thought about actual distribution of land plots against shares. The 
numbers observed in previous surveys are substantially below the 66% of 
respondents who report holding land shares in the 2005 FAO survey.  
Table 7.4:  Distribution of land and assets as reported by households and 
farmers 
Households Farmers   
Land Assets Land  Assets 
Received shares, % 
respondents 
66 28  45  21 
Received in kind, % 
respondents 
53 15  43  14 
















Received as % of allocated  82  36  96  74 
Disposition, %         
Own use  19  36  93  96 
Lease to corporate farm  66  42  --  -- 
Lease to farmer/private 
individual 
13 15  7 2 
Other 2  7    0  2 
Figure 7.3:  Progress with distribution of land share certificated to rural 
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Farmers report that they have predominantly kept the land and the assets 
received during reorganization for their own use (Table 7.4). Households, on 
the other hand, mainly lease out the land and the assets to the local corporate 
farms, and keep only a relatively small portion for own use (19% of land, 
36% of farm assets). This finding is consistent with the answers of farm managers, 
who report that their corporate farms lease 91% of the land shares and 78% of the 
asset shares distributed to the rural population during reorganization (Table 7.5). 
In the opinion of the managers, own use of land and asset shares by the rural 
population is negligible.  
Table 7.5:  Disposition of land and asset shares as reported by managers 
  Land shares  
(% of total shares) 
Asset shares  
(% of total shares) 
Invested in corporate equity  4  14 
Leased to corporate farms  91  78 
Sold to corporate farm  0  3 
Own use  4  3 
Other 1  1 
Number of farms reporting  148 farms  108 farms 
Total number of shares  71,000 shares  57,300 shares 
 
In terms of relations between corporate farms and shareowners, there is a clear 
preference on the part of the rural population for leasing their shares, not 
investing in corporate equity (Table 7.5). There is, however, a difference in 
the pattern observed for land shares and asset shares: A much higher percentage 
of shareholders invest asset shares in equity or even sell their asset shares to the 
corporate farm. 
Table 7.6:  Forms of payment by the corporate farm to landowners for 
leased land 
  Percent of farm managers* (n=208) 
Agreed annual payment in cash  36 
Agreed annual payment in kind  64 
Provision of services to household plot  22 
Share of profit (in cash or in kind)  16 
Other 0 
Note: 
* Add up to more than 100 because multiple answers are allowed. 
The leasing arrangements with the corporate farm are usually formalized in a 
lease contract. This is reported by 71% of farm managers; another 20% report 
that the leasing arrangements are part of the farm charter. In terms of payoffs to 
landowners, the most popular form is payment in kind, either as commodities or 
in the form of farm services to the household plot (Table 7.6). Fully 70% of 
farm managers report that they compensate lessors either by fixed annual 
payments in kind or by provision of farm services. Despite the prevalence of in-
kind arrangements, the practice of fixed cash payments is not negligible: It is 7. Farm reorganization 
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reported by 36% of farm managers (sometimes as a supplement to in-kind 
payments).  
7.3 Changing  employment  structure 
Second-wave reforms have brought a dramatic change in the employment 
structure of the rural population. In 1996, 67% of the adult population (in the 
ages between 18 and 60) worked in the local farm enterprise (1996, WORLD BANK 
SURVEY). In 2005, only 21% of the adults report that their main employment is 
with the corporate farm (Table 7.7). Among seniors older than 60, employment 
by the local corporate farm dropped from 9% in 1996 to practically zero. Close 
to 30% of adults report work on the family farm (i.e., the household plot) as 
their main occupation. Among seniors this group encompasses 62% of 
respondents. The secondary job (for those who have it) is practically always 
work on the family farm.  
Table 7.7:  Occupation structure of family members 







Work on the family farm  29  28  62 
Work on a corporate farm  14  21  0 
Self-employed outside agriculture  4  6  0 
Hired worker outside agriculture  17  27  1 
Student  14 6 0 
Other  (incl.  unemployed)  22 12 37 
 
Table 7.8 shows the distribution of family members by primary and secondary 
occupation. The dominant occupation on the family farm (as both the main and 
the secondary job) is supplemented with significant off-farm occupation (mainly 
employment in industry). Self-employed activities outside agriculture are highly 
undeveloped.  
Table 7.8:  Primary and secondary occupation among household members 
Head of household  Spouse  Other members   
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Family  farm  44  49 42  50 15  47 
Other  farm 20 2  20 3  8 1 
Self-employed 
off-farm 
3  0 3  1 6  1 
Hired  off-farm 33  10 35  8 71  9 
No secondary 
occupation 
--  39 --  38 --  42 
Total  100  100 100  100 100  100 
 
The impression of reduced dependence on the local corporate farm is strengthened 
by the responses of the heads of households, who were asked to characterize their 
relations with the former collective. Fully two-thirds of respondents have no Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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relations with the corporate farm. One-third work at the corporate farm or are 
(passive) shareholders (Table 7.9). These findings are consistent with the prevailing 
opinion among Ukrainian scholars and officials that "only one-third of the able-
bodied rural population work in corporate farms."  
Table 7.9:  Relations of heads of households with the local corporate farm 
 Percent  of  respondents 
No relations with corporate farm  68 
Permanently employed by corporate farm  17 
Temporary employment by corporate farm  5 
Shareholder of corporate farm  10 
Total 100 
 
The proportion of respondents reporting no relation with the local corporate 
farm is slightly higher than in the entire sample for the over 60 age group and 
somewhat lower than in the entire sample in the 45-60 age group (Table 7.10). 
The differences are significant by the chi-square test (given the large sample), 
but visually the relationship with age is not very pronounced.  
Table 7.10:  Age distribution of respondents reporting no relation with the 
local corporate farm 
Age group  Respondents reporting no 
relations with enterprise, %
All respondents in the 
survey, % 
<16 --  -- 
16-25 0.7  0.8 
25-45 28.3  28.8 
45-60  34.1 38.6 
>60  36.9 31.8 
Total 100  100 
 
The occupation structure for those with and without relations with the local 
corporate farm is shown in Table 7.11 for heads of households and their 
spouses. Among those who have no relation with the local farm a higher 
percentage work on the family farm and in nonagricultural occupation (mainly 
as hired workers). The difference in nonagricultural employment is more 
pronounced for the spouse: The spouses appear to be the main contributors 
to employment diversification in families that have disengaged from the 
local corporate farm. 7. Farm reorganization 
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Table 7.11:  Occupation structures in families with and without relations 
with the local corporate farm 
Head of household  Spouse   








Work on the family farm  51  42  39  35 
Other agricultural 
employment 
6 25  9 21 
Nonagricultural 
employment 
25 18  28 12 
Other (incl. unemployed)  18  15  23  22 
 
7.4  "Agroholdings" in Ukraine 
In a recent discussion of the post-2000 recovery in Ukraine, ASLUND (2002) has 
noted:  
Big new businessmen are going into agriculture with a vengeance, 
and commercial banks are happy to provide loans to farms, as they 
perceive this as profitable and secure business.  
The view of "big new businessmen going into agriculture" is reminiscent of 
certain developments that are taking place in Russia, where investors with 
interests primarily outside agriculture (financial institutions, energy companies, 
input manufacturers and suppliers) purchase failing collective farms and 
accumulate huge holdings by leasing land shares from thousands of individual 
rural landowners. The super-large farming structures created in this way are 
provisionally called "agroholdings".
6 Taking the cue from Aslund, we tried to 
find evidence for the emergence of similar structures in Ukraine.  
One of the characteristics of an "agroholding" is the existence of a large 
stockholder that controls all (or at least the majority of) the equity in the 
corporation. The managers’ questionnaire accordingly contained a subset of 
questions intended to elicit the existence of large stockholders as evidence of 
"agroholdings". One-quarter of the corporate-farm managers (50 out of 208) 
reported the existence of a single investor controlling more than 50% of the 
farm’s equity capital (Table 7.12). However, most of these investors (37) were 
physical persons (individuals), and only 13 were legal persons (corporations). 
These 13  are potential instances of farms that belong to a larger corporate 
organization, or in other words an "agroholding". 
Among managers of the 50 farms with a majority stockholder, more than one-
third (19 respondents) indicate that the large investor stepped in with the purpose 
of securing a raw material base or expanding the market for own products. A 
similar contingent of respondents (20 out of 50) suggest that the investor was 
                                                 
6  For a discussion of the agroholding phenomenon in Russia see RYLKO, JOLLY (2005).  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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attracted by profitability (or potential profitability) of agriculture. Land 
accumulation or land ownership is not viewed by managers as a motive for 
investment in their farms. Considerations of securing the raw material base or 
expanding the market for products are also among common reason for the creation 
of agroholdings in Russia. Contrary to the situation in Ukraine, land definitely 
plays a role in the creation of Russian agroholdings, while farm profitability is not 
mentioned explicitly as a relevant factor in Russia. 
Table 7.12:  Characteristics of the majority stockholder  
(number of respondents) 
Individual  n=37 Corporation  n=13 
Worker or pensioner  1  Input supplier  2 
Manager or specialist  27  Processor  3 
Outsider 8  Trader  --   
Other 1  Diversified  agriculture  4 
   Non-agricultural  business  2 
   Other  2 
 
One-quarter of the managers in this category indicate that the entry of a large 
stockholder has led to some new investments on the farm. More than 40% of 
respondents, however, do not believe that the development has had any effect on 
farm operations or farm performance.  
The key question is, do farms in this category demonstrate any performance 
advantages? The number of such farms in the sample is too small to make any 
firm conclusions. Meanwhile we can only say that the potential "agroholding" 
members (i.e., the 13 farms with a corporate majority stockholder) do not show 
a greater tendency for radical internal reorganization (as measured by the 
creation of independent subdivisions inside the farm) than the average. The issue 
of "agroholdings" in Ukraine deserves further study with the aim of establishing 
if such organizations exist at all in this country. 
  
 
8 LAND AND LAND MARKETS 
National-level statistics record a massive shift of agricultural land from 
corporate to individual farms (see Part I). We now use survey data to examine 
the impact of these changes on farm sizes and especially on the development of 
land markets, which in theory provide a medium for the transfer of land from 
less efficient to more efficient land owners. 
8.1 Farm  sizes 
There are huge gaps in size between the three main categories of farms: 
Corporate farms, peasant farms, and household plots. Corporate farms are an 
order of magnitude larger than peasant farms, which in turn are an order of 
magnitude larger than household plots (Table 8.1). The interquartile ranges   
(i.e., the range of sizes bracketing 50% of all farms) do not overlap for the 
three farm types (Figure 8.1). We thus conclude that if there is some overlap in 
sizes between different categories, it involves less than 25% of farms in each 
group.  
Table 8.1:  Size distribution characteristics for farms of different types 






Mean size  1.7  146  1,711 
Median size  0.6  35.4  1,360 
Interquartile  range:     
      Lower limit  0.3  18.5  500 
      Upper limit  1.2  80.6  2,200 
Lower 10%  0.2  8  190 
Upper 10%  3.0  251  3930 
Mode <1  50-500  1000-2000 
Farms  at  mode  72% 31% 30% 
 
Figure 8.2 shows the clear separation of the size distributions for farms of 
different types: The mode for household plots falls below 1  hectare (72%  of 
respondents), the mode for peasant farms is between 10 and 100 hectares (65% 
of farms), while 95% of corporate farms are larger than 100 hectares, with 43% 
falling between 1000-3000 hectares. There is an overlap between the three size 
distributions, but it is minimal. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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8.2  Land in household plots 
In the interest of comparability with sizes of corporate and peasant farms, the 
size data for household plots in Table 8.1 and Figures 8.1, 8.2 reflect the land 
actually used by the family for farming. The survey shows that households lease 
out nearly two-thirds of their land and the land used for farming (1.67 hectares 
on average) is just a small part (36%) of the family’s total land holdings 
(Figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.1:  Median size and interquartile range for farms of different types: 
Household plots, peasant farms, and corporate farms 
 













Figure 8.2:  Size distribution of farms of different types: Household plots, 
peasant farms, and corporate farms 
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More than half the respondents lease out at least some of their land; leasing in is 
marginal and there is virtually complete dichotomy between leasing in and 
leasing out: Only 10 respondents (1%) report both leasing in and leasing out. On 8. Land and land markets 
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the other hand, 45% of household plots neither lease out nor lease in and farm 
their entire owned land (Table 8.2). Families who lease out land start off with 
much larger holdings than families who farm their entire (or almost entire) 
owned land (6.2 hectares compared with 2.0 hectares on average). There are no 
other significant differences between the families in these two groups (same 
family size, same age structure). The few families who lease in land cultivate 
much larger holdings than families in either of the two other groups (nearly 
16 hectares compared with 1-2 hectares, respectively). These families are also 
larger with significantly younger heads of household and spouses (Table 8.2). In 
terms of the ownership structure of their holdings, they use a much smaller share 
of owned land than households in the other two categories. The absolute area of 
owned land is around 2  hectares, roughly the same as for the other rural 
households, and the entire difference in holdings (16 hectares compared with 
1-2 hectares) is attributable to the leased component. 
Figure 8.3:  Allocation of land holdings by rural households  
(percent of average holding of 4.6 ha in 2004) 
  Leased out 
64% 
Used by family 
36%  
Table 8.2:  Three cohorts of rural families with different land leasing 
strategies: Those who farm their entire owned land, those who 
lease out, and those who lease in 
  Farm all owned land  Lease out  Lease in 
Number of respondents  382  436  24 
Percent of respondents  45%  51%  3% 
Available, ha  2.0  6.2  15.7  
Used, ha  1.8  0.8  15.6 
Percent owned land  91%  92%  14% 
Wish to enlarge, ha  0.7  0.2  8.4 
Family members  3.4  3.5  4.2 
Age of head of 
household 
52 54  46 
Age of spouse  46 (n=353) 49  (n=411) 46 Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
 
62
Table 8.3 summarizes the main reasons given by respondents for leaving some 
of their land uncultivated. Here the respondents include those who lease out land 
and those among others who cultivate only part of their available holdings. 
Shortage of purchased inputs and land quality do not appear to be a significant 
obstacle. Lack of machinery and working capital, as well as low profitability are 
cited among the main reasons. Labor shortages are also an important obstacle, 
which is consistent with the observation in Table 8.2 that smaller families lease 
out land, while larger families lease in. 
Table 8.3:  Reasons for not cultivating the entire available land in household 
plots 
  Percent of respondents with some 
uncultivated land (n=510) 
Not enough labor  33 
Not enough machinery  26 
Not enough fuel  6 
Not enough fertilizer and other inputs  6 
No cash, working capital  19 
Poor land  6 
Not profitable  22 
Other 10 
 
Table 8.4:  Holdings of rural families 1990-2004 
Year  Ave holdings, ha  Total, %  Own, %  Use rights from 
the state, % 
Leased, 
% 
1990 1.0  100  83  16  1 
1995 1.3  100  86  13  1 
1998 2.2  100  85  12  3 
2004 4.6  100  84  7  9 
 
The two waves of land reform in Ukraine have had a significant impact on the 
land available to rural families. The average land holdings increased from 1 hectare 
in 1990 to 2.2 hectares at the end of the first-wave reforms (1998) and further to 
4.6 hectares during the second-wave reforms. Despite the increase of holdings 
between 1990 and 2004, the ownership structure has remained steady (Table 8.4): 
More than 80% of the holdings is land owned by the family (in all years), while 
land in use rights from the state – a carry-over from the pre-privatization era – 
decreases and the component of leased land – presumably leased from other 
individuals and enterprises – increases. The continuing presence of a significant 
component of land in use rights from the state indicates delay in the 
implementation of the legal provisions for the transfer of household plots into 
private ownership or alternatively signing of formal lease contracts with the state 
for this land.  8. Land and land markets 
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8.3  Land in peasant farms 
The holdings of peasant farmers typically consist of two components: The 
peasant farm proper acquired through special administrative procedure 
(including conversion of land shares into a physical plot) and the household plot 
that has been in the family since the early 1990s or even before that. The 
average peasant farm is 144 hectares, while the average household plot in this 
group of respondents is 2.8 hectares, so that its contribution to total holdings is 
negligible. While the small household plot is mostly owned land, the peasant 
farm on the other hand is mostly leased land, with only 18% represented by 
family owned land (Table 8.5). A small proportion of land in peasant farms is 
still reported in use rights from the state, although legally this component is 
required to be converted into leased land. In peasant farms, as in household plots 
of the rural population, the reality on the ground has not caught up with the legal 
requirements.  




Total, %  Own, %  Use rights, 
% 
Leased, % 
Peasant farm  
n=309 
144 100  18  8  74 
Household plot 
n=208 
2.8 100  98  1  1 
 
Table 8.6:  Effect of leasing on farm size 










Farms with leased land 
(n=163) 
53 227
* 12  4 84 
Farms without leased land 
(n=143) 
47 53
* 61 39  0 
All sample (n=309) 100  144  18  8  74 
Note: 
* Difference significant by t-test (p=0.000). 
Peasant farms, unlike household plots, use all the available land and do not lease 
anything out. On the contrary, more than half the farms report leasing in land, 
and the average size of these "lessee farms" is much larger than the size of farms 
without leased land (Table 8.6). In this respect, we observe a repetition of the 
same pattern as for household plots: Those who lease in land achieve much 
larger farm sizes than those who do not. Growth in farm size is again entirely 
attributable to the leased component: Regression analysis shows that one hectare 
of additional leased land produces a one hectare increase in farm size (regression 
coefficient 1.02, R
2=0.94). Figure 8.4 demonstrates this tight linear relationship 
between farm size and leased land (the vertical axis is total farm size, the 
horizontal axis is the leased land component, in hectares).  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Figure 8.4:  Total land in use vs. leased land in peasant farms 
 
8.4  Land in corporate farms 
The average corporate farm in the survey manages 1,711 hectares of agricultural 
land. Most of this land is leased: Land owned by the corporate farm as a legal 
entity is less than 7% of the total. The structure of sources from which corporate 
farms lease land is shown in Table 8.7.  
Table 8.7:  Structure of sources of leased land for corporate farms 
Source  Percent of leased land 
Members (shareholders)  42 
  Of which: Work in the corporate farm  16 
Other private individuals  47 
  Of which: Work in the corporate farm  8 
State, municipality, regional government  6 
Other corporate farms  3 
Other sources  2 
Total leased land  100 
 
The main sources for land leasing are individuals: Members and shareholders of 
the corporate farm as well as other individual landowners in the area. Individual 
lessors account for almost 90% of the land leased by corporate farms. The 
remainder comes from the state and from other marginal sources. It is interesting 
to note that in the present situation only a small minority of the shareholders and 
other lessors actually work in the corporate farm: Most shareholders and lessors 
appear to be passive landowners who entrust their land to the corporate farm 
without demanding in return the security of a wage job on the farm.  8. Land and land markets 
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8.5  Plans for farm enlargement 
Rural families generally do not utilize all their land and only a small percentage 
augment their holdings by leasing in. Accordingly, only 9%  of respondents 
among household plot operators wish to enlarge their land, more than doubling 
the plot size from 3.5 hectares to 7.8 hectares. Peasant farmers, on the other 
hand, utilize all the land that they have: There is practically no unutilized land 
and no leasing out among peasant farmers in the survey. Accordingly, 35% of 
peasant farmers desire to enlarge their holdings, adding 178 hectares to their 
current 182 hectares. Among corporate farm managers, fully 38% indicate that 
they wish to enlarge their farms by about 50%: From 1,950 ha to 2,930 ha.  
Table 8.8:  Potential sources for acquiring land for farm enlargement 
(multiple answers allowed) 
 Households  Farmers  Corporate  farm 
managers 
Lease from state/municipality  34  39  35 
Lease from corporate farm  12  13  22 
Lease from private individual  17  28  44 
Lease land shares from 
individuals 
15 26  46 
Buy land  29  12  10 
 
Possible sources of additional land as reported by the three cohorts of respondents 
are shown in Table 8.8. A major source for all respondents is leasing additional 
land from the state. Remarkably, nearly 30% of household plot operators think 
they will be able to buy more land for their plot, whereas peasant farmers and 
farm managers are much less optimistic with regard to the possibility of buying 
land. Farmers and even more so farm mangers expect to rely more on leasing 
from private individuals (either in the form of physical plots or land shares).  
Table 8.9:  Profiles of farming families wishing to enlarge their farm 
Households Peasant  farms   
Wish to 
enlarge 
No Wish  to 
enlarge 
No 
Percent of respondents  9  91  35  65 
Land holdings, ha  3.5
* 4.9
* 178 126 
Family size  4.1
* 3.6
* 4 4 










* Differences statistically significant at p = 0.1. 
The profiles of farming families (both those operating household plots and 
peasant farms) who wish to enlarge their farms are compared in Table 8.9 with 
the profiles of families who are satisfied with their present land holdings. In those 
cases when the respondent wishes to enlarge the family farm, both the head of 
household and the spouse are younger than among those who do not desire more Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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land. This is of course consistent with the need to ensure sufficient human 
capital for a larger farm. Another component of human capital – family size – is 
statistically significant among household plot operators, where the wish to enlarge 
is associated with larger families, but not among peasant farmers. Similarly, 
differences in physical capital as manifested in smaller land holdings drive the 
desire to enlarge the farm among household plot operators, but not among peasant 
farmers (for corporate farms, the differences in farm size between those intending 
to enlarge and the rest are not statistically significant either). 
8.6  Lease payments and lease term 
While rural households primarily lease out land, peasant farmers and corporate 
farms primarily lease in land. Table 8.10 summarizes the information on land 
leasing transactions of both kinds as reported by the three groups of respondents.  
Table 8.10:  Frequencies and average size of land leasing transactions 









Households 4  9.9 52  5.4 
Peasant farms  53  190 4  11.5 
Corporate 
farms 
100  1,580 8  170 
 
Lease payments could be estimated with a fair degree of reliability using 
information on the predominant transactions for farms of different types (i.e., 
leasing in for peasant farms and corporate farms; leasing out for households). 
The median lease payment is 90-95 hrivny per hectare per year (Table 8.11). 
The mean lease payment is 110-125 hrivny per hectare per year, and as always it 
is more sensitive to outliers than the median.  
Table 8.11:  Lease payments for farms of different types 






% leasing  52  53  100 
Average leased, ha  5.4  190  1,580 
Payment, hrivny/ha       
 Mean  125  109  126 
  Median   92   90  95 
 
One would normally expect corporate farms to exercise their market power in 
local land markets, driving the payments to their lessors to substantially lower 
levels. No such phenomenon is observed in the survey: The lease payments 
reported by corporate farms are not less than for the other groups of respondents. 
It is actually peasant farmers who appear to pay somewhat less, but the differences 
are not statistically significant (Figure 8.5). 8. Land and land markets 
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Lease payments add about 9% to the cash income of families that lease out land 
(see Chapter 15). This is neither negligible nor very important: The contribution 
of lease payments to household well-being is at best marginal. Land leasing 
certainly cannot be regarded as a safety net for the rural population.  
Figure 8.5:  Median lease payments for farms of different types:  





















The estimated lease payments show considerable regional variability, ranging 
from around 60 hrivny per hectare per year in Chernigov to around 200 hrivny 
per hectare and higher in Vinnitsa and L’viv. The ranking of the oblasts by 
lease payments is generally consistent for the three types of farms, with some 
exceptions (Table 8.12). However, we do not observe a particularly strong 
correlation with the administratively prescribed normative land prices. This is 
surprising, because the normative prices are supposed to reflect the productivity 
of soil in each oblast and can thus be expected to be positively associated with 
lease payments across regions. It is quite possible that the low correlation is a 
reflection of the inadequacy of the normative prices as judged by market 
agents. 
The lease term is predominantly 3-5 years for farms of all types (Table 8.13). 
Corporate farms do not report leasing for terms shorter than 1 year or longer 
than 10  years. Peasant farms also lease seldom for very short terms, but they 
report fairly frequent leasing for terms longer than 10 years (14% of respondents). 
Short-term leasing for less than 1 year is characteristic of household plots only. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 8.12:  Lease payments and normative land prices across Ukraine’s 
oblasts 










L’viv High  High  High   Low  6,860 
Vinnitsa High  High  High    High  10,205 
Poltava Medium  Medium    High  High  9,525 
Rivno  Medium  Medium   Low   Medium  8,322 
Sumy  Medium  Medium   Medium   Medium  7,706 
Mikolaev  Medium  Low   High   Medium  7,348 
Chernigov  Low  Low   Low   Low  6,572 
Ivano-Frankivsk  Low  Low   High   Low  6,996 
Notes:  Categorization of lease payments: 
  High – 150 hrivny/ha and higher. 
  Medium – 100-150 hrivny/ha. 
  Low – less than 100 hrivny/ha. 







<1 year  16  3  0 
1-3 13  13  15 
3-5 42  53  65 
5-10 19  17  19 
>10 years  10  14  1 
 
8.7  Buying and selling of land 
Contrary to the active development of markets for leasing, buying and selling of 
land is still a rare phenomenon in Ukraine. Practically nobody in the survey 
reported selling land (less than 0.5%); among peasant farmers 17 respondents 
(5.5%) report buying land during the last 5 years (compared with only 1.4% for 
households). Peasant farmers who bought land appear to have larger farms with 
a higher share of owned land compared with those who did not buy land 
(Table 8.14; the differences are not significant, however, as the number of 
buyers is too small). Buying, like leasing, has a positive impact on farm sizes 
and the overall impression is that land market transactions are conducive to farm 
enlargement. 
There is still considerable resistance to the very notion of buying and selling 
land among the rural population. The resistance is particularly strong among 
managers of corporate farms and household plot operators. Half the respondents 
in these two categories expressed negative opinion of the possibility of conducting 
buy-and-sell transactions in agricultural land (Table 8.15). Among peasant 8. Land and land markets 
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farmers, on the other hand, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of 
buy-and-sell transactions is higher than the percentage of those with a negative 
view. This is another manifestation of the greater demand of peasant farmers for 
additional land. 
Table 8.14:  Farm size and ownership structure for peasant farmers who 
bought land in the last five years 
 Percent  of 
respondents 
Farm size, ha  % of owned land 
Bought land  5.5  189  24 
Did not buy land  94.5  142  17 
All sample  100  144  18 
 
Table 8.15:  Opinions concerning buying and selling of agricultural land 
(percent of respondents) 






Positive: Support buying and  
               selling of land 
33 45  31 
Negative: Object to buying and  
                 selling of land 
46 43  53 
Undecided 21  12  16 
 
8.8 Land  fragmentation 
The 2005 FAO survey provided information that could inform the discussions 
on land fragmentation and land consolidation among Ukrainian policy makers. 
According to the survey findings, the land holdings of the average rural 
household (4.6 hectares) are divided into 2.7 parcels. The highest percentage of 
households surveyed (32%) report two parcels – one around the house (the 
traditional household plot) and the other parcels in the fields at the village 
perimeter (Figure 8.6). Another 44% of households are evenly divided between 
those with 1 parcel and those with 3 parcels; the remaining 24% report 4 parcels 
and more. In Georgia, for comparison, the average household has 2.4 parcels of 
land, very close to the corresponding number in Ukraine (2.7 parcels), whereas in 
Moldova the average household has 4 parcels, and fully 53% of households report 
4 parcels and more – compared to only 24% in Ukraine (MOLDOVA, 2005). The 
fragmentation of household plots is thus much more pronounced in Moldova 
than in Ukraine (see Figure 8.6).  
The land holdings in Ukraine generally increase with the increase in the number 
of parcels, but the positive correlation is very weak (although statistically 
significant). The average size of a land parcel definitely decreases with the increase 
in the number of parcels held (Table 8.16). Although land fragmentation is not 
dramatic among rural households in Ukraine, consolidation programs would have Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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a certain (but probably very slight) effect on about 25% of the households with 4 
parcels and more.  
Figure 8.6:  Distribution of the number of parcels in household plots: 
Ukraine and Moldova 
 
1 2 3 4-5 more  than  5 













Source:  FAO 2005 survey for Ukraine; World Bank 2003 survey for Moldova (see MOLDOVA, 
2005). 
Table 8.16:  Number of parcels and land holdings for household plots in 
Ukraine 
Land holdings, ha, 
Number of parcels 
Frequency of 




1 23  3.0  0.6  3.0 
2 32  4.8  3.5  2.4 
3 21  5.1  2.9  1.7 
4-5 18  5.6  3.8  1.3 
more than 5  6  5.0  3.1  0.7 
Coefficient of correlation 
with number of parcels 
 +0.0
97 
  −0.203 
 
Across the sample oblasts, fragmentation is most pronounced in Ivano-Frankivsk 
(3.9 parcels per household, compared with 2.7 in the entire sample) and least 
pronounced in Mikolaev (1.8 parcels per households). In Chernigov and Rivno 
the average number of parcels per households is somewhat above the average 
(3.1 parcels), whereas in Poltava, Vinnitsa, and Sumy it is below the average 
(2.3-2.6 parcels per household). In L’viv the number of parcels per household 
matches the sample average (2.7). The regional variability of fragmentation 
(Table 8.17) should be taken into consideration in any discussion of land 
consolidation programs, as only Ivano-Frankivsk appears to have some potential 
for benefits from consolidation of fragmented plots.  8. Land and land markets 
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Table 8.17:  Fragmentation of household plots across sample oblasts 









Average for the entire sample  2.7 
 
Peasant farms, as distinct from household plots, consist on average of 2.6 parcels 
(in addition, farmers have another parcel that represents their household plot). 
Fully 60% of respondents report holdings in 1 or 2 parcels and about 25% of the 
farmers have 4 parcels or more. The fragmentation of land in peasant farms is thus 
very close to that in household plots. In peasant farms, however, a greater number 
of parcels is a reflection of the farmers’ willingness to lease in land from other 
owners (such as household plots): The average share of leased land increases from 
49% in single-parcel farms to 65% in farms cultivating 4 parcels or more.  
  
 
9 THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Land reform and farm restructuring are both necessary but not sufficient for 
overall improvement of productivity and efficiency. In addition to changes in 
these two dimensions, farms require an environment with functioning market 
services to support their daily operations. In this chapter we discuss the survey 
findings that relate to changes in the business environment, including development 
of market channels for the supply of farm inputs. Market channels for product 
sales are discussed in Chapter 11. 
9.1  Changes in farm environment 
Representatives of the individual sector – peasant farmers and heads of rural 
households – are much more positive in their evaluation of the overall effect of 
the changes associated with the second-wave reforms since 2000. Only 18% of 
corporate farm managers indicate that the changes have had a positive effect on 
farm operations, compared with around 30% for individual farmers (Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1:  Effect of changes since 2000 (percent of respondents) 
 Managers  Peasant  farmers  Households 
Positive 18  30  27 
No effect  20  27  35 
Negative 37  31  25 
Don’t know  25  12  13 
 
Table 9.2:  Changes in production variables since 2000 as reported by 
corporate farm managers 
  Decrease  Increase  No change  Don’t know
Total number of workers  64  13  14  9 
Workers in livestock production  59  7  13  21 
Workers in crop production  64  9  14  13 
Administrative staff  69  6  15  10 
Farm production  43  30  13  14 
Farm profit  40  30  13  17 
 
Corporate farm managers may be less than enthusiastic about the changes since 
2000 because they are witnessing labor force shrinkage, reduction of output, and 
erosion of farm profits (Table 9.2). The decrease in the number of workers, and 
especially decrease in the administrative staff, may be objectively a good sign, 9. The business environment 
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as it acts to alleviate over-employment in agriculture and may potentially increase 
the productivity of labor. Yet from the manager’s point of view this is obviously a 
depressing situation, with growth changing to attrition or at best entrenchment. 
The unfavorable situation with farm production notwithstanding, farm managers 
give quite positive assessments of the changes in the behavior variables among 
farm workers. Nearly 40% of managers report that the traditionally problematic 
behavioral attributes, such as work discipline, motivation, theft and pilfering, or 
drinking, are all better today than in the past (Table 9.3). In contrast, only 20% 
of managers are of the opinion that there has been deterioration in the behavioral 
variables.  
Table 9.3:  Changes in behavioral variables since 2000 as reported by 
corporate farm managers 
  Better  Worse  No change  Don’t know 
Work  discipline  38 23 24 15 
Motivation  38 22 19 21 
Theft  and  pilfering  39 18 21 22 
Drinking  on  the  job  39 14 23 24 
 
Changes in the external business environment have not been all bad either 
(Table 9.4). Managers feel less dependent on the directives of the regional 
authorities: They now have more freedom in making economic and business 
decisions than before 2000. Access to credit is also reported to have improved 
(though marginally), which probably indicates that credit is not a major problem 
for corporate farms. The reason for this is not necessarily objective improvement 
in the system of rural financial institutions: This may be due to persistence of 
soft-budget constraints and writeoffs at the regional level, reinforced by special 
relations cultivated by farm managers with officials. On the other hand, access 
to purchased inputs and options for sale of farm products are worse now than 
before 2000. The tax burden has also increased in the opinion of most managers. 
Table 9.4:  Changes in the outside business environment since 2000 as 
reported by corporate farm managers 




Freedom in making business decisions  53  11  19  17 
Access  to  credit  38 32 17 14 
Access  to  purchased  inputs  31 44 13 12 
Possibilities for sale of farm products  20  37  19  14 
Importance  of  barter  transactions  17 47 20 16 
Tax  burden  51 14 22 13 
 
Access to purchased inputs was explored in more detail in the survey by asking 
the respondents – both managers and peasant farmers – to indicate if they were Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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actually buying all that they needed in a list of 15 specific inputs. Table 9.5 
presents the frequency scores averaged over all 15 inputs and also the frequency 
scores for a subset of 8 inputs that were perceived as high-priority inputs (these 
are inputs identified as needed by more than 50% of respondents). About 20% of 
respondents in both categories cannot buy the inputs that they need. When the 
answers are restricted to high-priority inputs, the percentage of respondents who 
cannot buy what they need drops to 12-15%. Around 80% of both managers and 
peasant farmers manage to buy inputs, and roughly half of this number actually 
buy all that they need. There are no sharp differences in the patterns of access to 
inputs for managers and peasant farmers. Among peasant farmers, however, the 
proportion of those who are able to buy all that they need (without restrictions) 
is somewhat higher than among farm managers. This is another reflection of the 
greater optimism and perhaps aggressiveness of peasant farmers compared with 
farm managers. 
Table 9.5:  Access to purchased inputs: Corporate farm managers and 
peasant farmers
*  
All inputs (15)  Inputs perceived as  
high priority (8) 
 
Managers Farmers Managers Farmers 
Buy all we need  37  44  43  48 
Buy subject to constraints  42  35  44  36 
Cannot buy needed input  21  21  12  15 
Note: 
* Frequency scores averaged over inputs for respondents reporting that they need the  
   specific input (in percent). Unique answer required in each category for each input. 
Table 9.6:  Supply channels for farm inputs: Corporate farm managers and 
peasant farmers
* 
All inputs (15)  High priority inputs (8)   
Managers Farmers Managers Farmers 
State suppliers  16  14  18  15 
Commercial suppliers  44  36  58  50 
Private individuals  8  13  10  17 
Own production  4  3  4  3 
Other farms  5  7  6  9 
Other sources  1  1  1  2 
Note: 
* Frequency scores averaged over inputs for respondents reporting that they need the  
   specific input (in percent). Multiple answers allowed for each input. 
Private trade – commercial suppliers and private individuals – are the main 
channel for farm inputs among managers and peasant farmers alike (Table 9.6). 
State suppliers continue to play an important role, but they are now far behind the 
commercial trade channels. Moreover, the role of state suppliers has declined 
dramatically over time: In the 1996 World Bank survey 60% of peasant farmers 
reported purchasing inputs through state-owned channels, compared with around 
15%  in 2005. The reliance on private trade is particularly pronounced for the 9. The business environment 
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group of 8 high-priority inputs. Peasant farms tend to rely more than corporate 
farms on purchase of inputs from other farms. In general, other farms are a 
significant source of three kinds of inputs: Seeds and seedlings, young animals, 
and mechanized field works ("custom farming"). This is true for both corporate 
farms and peasant farms. In addition, peasant farms rely heavily on other farms 
for the purchase of machinery and equipment, often second-hand.  
Table 9.7 demonstrates the changing roles of state and commercial suppliers 
during the last decade. The responses of both corporate farm managers and peasant 
farmers in two surveys separated by more than 10 years – the 1994 World Bank 
survey and the 2005 FAO survey – reveal a sharp decrease in the importance of 
state supply channels and a sharp rise in the importance of commercial suppliers. 
The reliance on other corporate farms as a source of inputs also declined 
dramatically over time. In 1994, the state and corporate farms dominated the 
markets for farm inputs in Ukraine; by 2005 the private commercial sector had 
captured the leading role among supply channels. 











All inputs (15)      
State  channels  45 16 42 14 
Commercial  suppliers  7 44 14 36 
Other  farms  49 5  22 7 
High priority inputs (8)      
State  channels  65 18 61 15 
Commercial  suppliers  7 58 19 50 
Other  farms  56 6  29 9 
 
9.2  Access to farm machinery 
Availability of farm machinery is reported with fairly high frequency among all 
farm types in the survey (Table 9.8). Availability among corporate farms is 
practically universal; peasant farms are not far behind; and even among 
household plots 70% report some machinery and around 50% report tractors or 
light machinery (such as plows, tillers, and seeders). Vehicles, and especially 
trucks, are comparatively less accessible to household plots and peasant farms. 
Table 9.8:  Availability of farm machinery (percent of respondents) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Household plots 
Any farm machinery  95%  89%  70% 
Heavy machinery  94  85  49 
Light machinery  92  83  57 
Vehicles 91  52  19 
Note:  Heavy machinery – tractors, harvester, combines; light machinery – plows, tillers, 
seeders, trailers, etc.; vehicles – trucks, cars. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Corporate farms report the largest average number of units of machinery per farm. 
They are followed at a considerable distance by peasant farms, and household 
plots trail far behind with only three pieces of machinery on average (Table 9.9). 
Across all farm types, heavy machinery (tractors, harvesters) account for about 
one-third of the total machinery count, with light machinery making up another 
40%-60%. The number of vehicles is relatively small in all farms. It is notable that 
the share of tractors and harvesters in household plots is roughly the same as in 
other farms. Nevertheless, judging by average unit costs, corporate farms employ 
larger and more expensive machinery than peasant farms (Table 9.9). 
Table 9.9:  Average number of machinery units and value of machinery 
for respondents with any machinery (balanced sample) 
  Corporate farms 
(n =155) 
Peasant farms 
(n = 213) 
Household plots 
(n = 599) 
Number of units  67  11  3 
  Heavy machinery  32%  32%  31% 
  Light machinery  43%  53%  58% 
  Vehicles  25%  15%  11% 
Value, hrivny  903,000  94,000  -- 
Average value per unit  13,500  8,500  -- 
 
Corporate and peasant farms use primarily own machinery, which is 
supplemented with some rental equipment (Table 9.10). Corporate farms rent 
more readily than peasant farms, among which only 12% report using rented 
machinery. Most of the rented equipment originates from private sources: Access 
to state leasing programs is virtually nonexistent in the survey. Contrary to 
peasant farms, household plot operators show a very high willingness to rent or 
share equipment with others. Own farm machinery accounts for only 37% of the 
total machine count among household plots, and fully 50% is rented for farm use 
as needed (Table 9.11). These findings provide a definite indication of the 
existence of machinery rental markets, which clearly act to alleviate machinery 
constraints among farms of all types. 
Table 9.10:  Sources of farm machinery in corporate and peasant farms 
(percent of respondents, averaged over all types of farm 
machinery) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms 
Owned 65  88 
Rented 35  12 
 
Table 9.11:  Sources of farm machinery in household plots 
  Percent of machinery units reported 
Owned by the family  37 
Owned jointly with others  13 
Rented as needed  50 9. The business environment 
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9.3  New role for regional authorities 
Interviews with more than 40 raion-level agricultural officials in four oblasts 
(Poltava, Rivno, Sumy, Chernigov) essentially confirmed the picture that 
emerges from the survey. The main conclusion is that regional authorities no 
longer intervene in farm production decisions. Contrary to anecdotal rumors, 
they do not persuade the producers to increase the livestock herd. In the best 
market-oriented tradition, the raion officials maintain that livestock production 
is bound to pick up once the relative prices improve. In those rare cases when 
the regional department of agriculture makes business recommendations 
concerning a potentially profitable commodity (e.g., rape seed) or product mix, 
the local farms do not necessarily follow this advice.  
The new role of the raion officials is to provide market information and advisory 
services to the farms. They distribute copies of new legal documents and 
regulations; identify the best suppliers of fuel and fertilizer; provide information 
on input prices; organize professional seminars on farm management, 
accounting, and finance. They do not intervene in the contractual negotiations 
between the producers and the suppliers; nor do they act as guarantors for credit. 
Thus, in one of the raions the local authorities acted as facilitators in integration 
of fertilizer shipments from the suppliers to several local producers. The 
purchase terms, however, were negotiated directly by the producers, who 
prepaid the shipment without any guarantee from the authorities. To the extent 
that raion officials issue specific guidelines or directives, these relate to legally 
binding provision of labor law or contract law and are intended to prevent 
decisions that might break the law.  
Raion authorities have no influence over the allocation of agricultural credit. 
These issues are handled directly by the commercial banks, which lend against 
collateral (mainly livestock, grain, machinery, or future harvest) at  18-21% 
annual interest rates. The interest rates are considered exorbitant, and producers 
always try to be admitted into various subsidized interest rate schemes. 
Consistent with responses in the main survey, the interviewees indicated that the 
access to credit had improved significantly in recent years as many of the "new 




10  RURAL SOCIAL SPHERE 
During the Soviet era, large-scale farm enterprises were directly entrusted with 
maintaining the entire range of social services in the village. The village council 
was almost totally dependent for its budget on the local farm enterprise. The 
farm enterprise took over the functions normally fulfilled by local government, 
building roads, supplying water, gas, and electricity, and providing housing. It 
traditionally provided access to a comprehensive range of services and benefits 
for its members and employees, as well as for other rural workers, including 
teachers, doctors, postal employees, etc., who in fact were on the state payroll 
and not employed directly by the farm. These social services ranged from daily 
necessities, such as house maintenance and repairs, heating fuel, and various 
consumer goods at subsidized prices, to culture and recreation, such as clubs and 
sports facilities. School buildings, clinics, shops, and other public facilities in 
the village were maintained and often built by the farm enterprise, with or 
without reimbursement from the government. The budget for all these benefits 
and services came from the operating revenues of the farm enterprise, and the 
farms in effect combined production functions with overall responsibility for 
social services in rural areas. 
The reform agenda attempted to focus the large-scale farms on business and 
profits, which necessitated relinquishing their responsibility for rural social 
services. As part of their reorganization, farm enterprises were required to shed 
their social assets and transfer the responsibility for the social service infrastructure 
to local councils. Initially, this process moved very slowly and haltingly, because 
the government failed to provide local councils with the requisite budgets. As late 
as 1998, a World Bank study found that reorganized farm enterprises continued 
to provide a wide range of social services and benefits to the rural population 
(LERMAN, CSAKI, 2000).  
The situation seems to have changed quite radically since 2000. Fully 73% of 
farm managers surveyed reported that their social assets had been transferred to 
the local municipality. Of these, only 26% of farm enterprises had transferred 
their social assets prior to 2000; the remaining 47% transferred the social assets 
more recently (Figure 10.1). These findings are consistent with the results of the 
1998 World Bank survey, where only about 20% of farm enterprises had transferred 
their social assets to the village council prior to 1998 (see reference in previous 
note).  10. Rural social sphere 
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The social assets were universally transferred to the local municipality or the 
state free of charge. Among those 27% who did not transfer their assets, one-
third claim that the municipality has no budget and thus cannot accept the 
responsibility, while the remaining two-thirds regard the free transfer of social 
assets as an economically unacceptable option and prefer to continue maintaining 
the social infrastructure themselves.  




26%  Not transferred 
27%  
 
Support of household plots has always been a traditional social function of 
large-scale farm enterprises. It is virtually impossible to imagine production on 
small household plots without assistance from the farm enterprise with 
mechanized field works (plowing, harvesting), with farm inputs, and with 
marketing of farm products. Given the importance of the household plot as a 
source of income for rural families, the availability of this support is often more 
than enough to explain why rural workers stay on the corporate farm despite low 
salaries and persistent wage arrears. In the 2005 survey, 84% of farm managers 
reported that they regularly provided support with household plot production to 
their workers and other rural residents in the village. This level of support is 
practically unchanged since before 2000 (see reference in previous note).  
The support with the household plot is no longer free, however. Survey estimates 
indicate that farm managers spend 57,000  hrivny per enterprise per year on 
household plot support. Of this amount, 43,000 hrivny, or 76%, is reimbursed by 
the household (generally in the form of labor input or farm products) and the net 
cost to the farm enterprise is only 14,000 hrivny, or 24% of the total. This net 
amount equals about 0.5% of the total annual expenditure of the average farm. 
Since there are around 700 households per farm enterprise in the survey, the net 
cost per household is a mere 20 hrivny per year.  
The structure of support to rural households in the average enterprise is shown 
in Figure 10.2. Assistance with household plot cultivation using machinery and Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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operators from the farm enterprise is the largest item, accounting for 42% of the 
total. Support with farm inputs and sale of farm products accounts for an 
additional 30%.  
Figure 10.2: Structure of support extended by corporate farm to rural 
households (in percent of total support expenditure of 57,000 
hrivny per year per corporate farm) 












Table 10.1:  Services provided by farm enterprises to the rural population: 
Responses of farm managers, household members, and peasant 






Farm services     
Assistance with plot cultivation  94  47  23 
Transport 53  18  10 
Feed, seeds  35  20  5 
Veterinary services  22  22  5 
Machinery maintenance and repairs  15  10  10 
Fuel 7  9  8 
Fertilizers, plant-protection chemicals  6  15  6 
Assistance with sale of farm products  8  8  3 
Consumer services       
Subsidized school services  29  9  4 
Stipends to students  10  7  2 
Housing construction and repairs  10  7  3 
Subsidized consumer services  9  8  3 
Medical care  10  13  7 
Note: 
* Percent of those who report providing services to the rural population (n = 175,  
   84% of the full sample). 
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Table 10.1 presents an inventory of services provided by farm enterprises to the 
rural population. The first column is based on the responses of corporate farm 
managers; the other two columns are based on the responses of heads of rural 
households and peasant farmers. Assistance with household plot cultivation and 
provision of transport services are the two most important items according to farm 
managers. Farm inputs, including veterinary services and machinery maintenance, 
are also provided by most farm enterprises. Among non-farm consumer services, 
support to schools remains the only significant item. Comparison of the responses 
in the last two columns shows that employee households generally enjoy a much 
higher level of support from the farm enterprise than peasant farmers.   
 
11  FARM PRODUCTION AND SALES 
The commercial farms in Ukraine – both corporate and peasant farms – mainly 
concentrate on primary agriculture (crops, livestock, orchards and vineyards), 
with relatively little diversification into nonagricultural activities (Table 11.1). 
This is especially true of peasant farms, where only 13% report any non-agri-
cultural activities. Non-agricultural activities are almost always in addition to 
primary agriculture. 
Table 11.1:  Diversification between agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities (percent of farms) 




Only agricultural activities  74  87 
One non-agricultural activity   15  11 
Two non-agricultural activities  6  1 
More than two non-agricultural activities   5  1 
 
Primary agriculture typically involves diversified crop and livestock production 
(Table 11.2). Alongside these mixed farms, a significant proportion of farms 
specialize in crop production, without any livestock, especially among peasant 
farms. The reverse specialization – livestock without any crops – is negligible. 
The main non-agricultural activities for both corporate and peasant farms include 
input supply, product marketing, and provision of mechanized field services 
(custom farming). Processing is quite widespread among corporate farms, but 
much less for peasant farms. The low emphasis on livestock and processing 
among peasant farms apparently points to reluctance or inability to expand into 
capital-intensive activities. 
Table 11.2:  Activity mix in corporate and peasant farms  
(percent of respondents in multiple answers) 




Crops and livestock  67  43 
Crops, no livestock  30  55 
Livestock, no crops  1  1 
Vineyards, orchards  9  3 
Farm machinery, mechanized services  9  7 
Input supply and marketing  12  5 
Processing 13  3 
Transportation services  5  1 11. Farm production and sales 
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Given the differences in crop/livestock specialization, peasant farms have more 
crops in their product mix than corporate farms (Table 11.3). Household plots, 
on the other hand, continue to produce the perfectly balanced mix of crop and 
livestock products that traditionally characterized Ukrainian and Russian agri-
culture during the Soviet period. The differences in product mix are illustrated in 
Figure 11.1.  
Table 11.3:  Product mix in farms of different types (averages per farm) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Household plots 
Value of production, hrvn  2,240,000  118,000  5,700 
Crops,  %  70 80 49 
Livestock,  %  30 20 51 
 
Figure 11.1: Crop-livestock production mix in farms of different types: 
Corporate farms, peasant farms, and household plots 
 
 












The crop bias in commercial farms persists since before the second-wave 
reforms, but there has been a definite convergence of product mix since 1998: In 
the 1998 World Bank survey the product mix gap between corporate and peasant 
farms was much larger, with crop production accounting for 60% of output in 
corporate farms and 90% in peasant farms. Since that time corporate farms have 
increased the share of crop production, while peasant farms have reduced it. The 
shift of peasant farms toward livestock production may reflect capital accumulation 
in this sector as a result of generally favorable performance since 1998. 
The order-of-magnitude differences in value of production across farms of 
different types (millions of hrivny for corporate farm, hundreds of thousands for 
peasant farms, and thousands for household plots; see Table 11.3) are clearly 
related to differences in land areas cultivated by these farms. Thus, corporate Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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farms control on average 1,700 hectares of agricultural land compared with 150 
hectares in peasant farms and 1.7 hectares in household plots. Figure 11.2 shows 
that the value of production increases with the area of farmland (in log-log 
coordinates). Land on its own explains 78% of the variability in the value of 
production. The effect of other scale factors (such as labor, machinery, and 
livestock) will be examined in Chapter 14 dealing with productivity. Among 
corporate farms, mixed producers are significantly larger (by both the value of 
production and the available land) than those specializing in crops only; among 
peasant farms the scale differences between mixed and crop-specialized farms 
are not statistically significant. 
Figure 11.2: Value of production vs. farm size for farms of all types  
(in logged variables) 
 
 
11.1   Cropping pattern 
In farms of all types cereals – primarily wheat and barley – are the main crops in 
terms of land use (Table 11.4). There is practically no difference in the cropping 
pattern of corporate and peasant farms. Household plots show two distinctive 
features: Here the share of land cropped to cereals is lower (40% compared to 
60%-70% in corporate and peasant farms) and the share of land under potatoes 
and vegetables is much higher (nearly 30% compared with less than  5% in 
corporate and peasant farms). These differences in the cropping pattern are also 
reflected in the frequency of farms that produce different crops: Cereals are 11. Farm production and sales 
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produced by 90% of corporate and peasant farms and by only 50% of household 
plots; potatoes and vegetables, on the other hand, are produced by 90% of 
household plots and only 20% of corporate farms (among peasant farms 50% 
produce potatoes and vegetables). 
Figure 11.3 shows the detailed structure of the component of land cropped to 
cereals. It is practically identical in corporate and peasant farms. Household 
plots allocate to wheat and barley roughly the same share of their land under 
cereals as the commercial farms, but they have very little rye and much more 
corn than the commercial farms.  
Table 11.4:  Cropping structure in farms of different types 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Household plots 
Wheat 32  27  17 
Barley 18  18  13 
Other cereals  17  15  10 
Cereals (all combined)  67  60  40 
Buckwheat 3  3  1 
Sunflower and oil seeds  9  10  7 
Sugar beet  5  7  3 
Potatoes and vegetables  2  5  29 
Grapes and fruits  2  1  2 
Feed crops  13  14  19 
Total cropped per farm  1,157  114  1.51 
 
Figure 11.3: Cropping structure of land under cereals in farms of different 
types 
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11.2   Livestock  
As noted previously in the context of Table 11.2, farms do not specialize in 
livestock (with very rare exceptions): Livestock production is typically always 
mixed with crop production in Ukraine. There are striking differences in the 
patterns of livestock production across farms of different types (Table 11.5). 
Practically all households keep some livestock, although the average "herd" is 
very small: 1.6 standard head. Farmers are the other extreme of the livestock 
scale, with less than half the respondents reporting any animals. The average 
herd, however, is much larger than in households: Close to 50 standard head. 
Finally, among corporate farms, two-thirds have livestock, with the herd 
averaging 500 standard head. The frequency of poultry among households and 
peasant farms generally repeats the livestock frequency, with flocks averaging 
25 birds in households and 260 birds in peasant farms that report poultry. Among 
corporate farms, only 4% report poultry, but the scale of poultry operations is 
huge, with 26,000 birds on average in those few farms that have poultry.  
Table 11.5:  Livestock in farms of different types 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Households 
Keep livestock, %  67  44  94 
Keep poultry, %  4  37  87 
Animals, st head  500  47  1.6 
Poultry, birds  26,000  260  25 
 
Feed from own production plays an important role for livestock in farms of all 
types (Table 11.6). In fact, corporate farms rely almost entirely on own feed, with 
very little outside purchases. Peasant farms and households purchase concentrated 
feed and hay in small quantities, but they also rely on communal pastures and hay 
meadows for as much as 30%-40% of their feed. The use of communal pastures is 
more widespread among the households (Table 11.7), which also end up paying 
less per head of grazing cattle than peasant farmers. 
Table 11.6:  Source of feed  
(structure of feed quantity in % for those with livestock) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Households 
Communal pastures  --  17  30 
Communal hay meadows  --  10  9 
Feed from own production  93  53  43 
Purchased coarse feed  3  8  12 
Purchased concentrated feed  4  12  6 
Total feed  100  100  100 
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Table 11.7:  Use of communal pastures by peasant farms and households 
 Peasant  farms  Households 
Use, % of those with animals  41  61 
Payment per head in 2004, hrivny  –  Mean  26
* 15
* 




* Difference statistically significant by t-test, p = 0.05. 
 
# Difference statistical significant by Wilcoxon test, p= 0.1. 
A substantial proportion of managers and peasant farmers with livestock express 
their intention to increase livestock production (Table 11.8). Households, on the 
other hand, are not very keen on expanding their already high share of livestock. 
There seems to be some correlation between feed availability and the expressed 
intention to increase livestock production. This is evident from the comparison 
of lines 1 and 2 in Table 11.8: The percentage of respondents with enough feed 
who want to increase their herd (line 2) is substantially higher than the percentage 
of those who want to increase their herd in the sample (line 2). Freedom to decide 
on herd size and composition also seems to be positively related with the 
decision to expand, but only for corporate farm managers: The percentage of 
managers in line 3 is higher than in line 1. 
Table 11.8:  Intention to expand livestock production in relation to feed 
availability and freedom of decision (percent of respondents 
with livestock) 





1. Want to expand livestock production  66  54  18 
Feed availability:       
   Less than optimal  26  13  38 
   Optimal for existing animals  54  62  47 
   Enough to increase the herd  17  20  6 
2. Enough feed to increase and want to  
     increase 
88 70  34 
Free to decide on herd size  67  81  -- 
3. Free to decide and want to expand  77  55  -- 
 
What determines the intention to increase livestock production? Following the 
cue of Table 11.8, we used a simple logistic model to check how the existing 
herd, feed availability, and freedom of decision vis-à-vis regional authorities 
affect the intention to increase livestock production in corporate farms. The 
results are summarized in Table 11.9. While the number of animals does not 
have a significant effect on the decision to enlarge livestock production, feed 
availability and freedom of choice are both significant constraints: Respondents 
with sufficient feed who feel that they are not coerced by the regional authorities 
are more likely to show an inclination toward greater livestock production. This 
is consistent with the view expressed by raion officials that the corporate farms Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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will increase livestock production when they are ready, without any intervention 
from the authorities. 
For peasant farms all the coefficients in this model were statistically not significant. 
This basically means that a different set of factors determines the decision of 
peasant farmers to expand livestock production. Alternative regression models 
were tried, including milk yields (as a measure of performance in livestock 
enterprises) or a profitability score equal to the number of livestock products 
reported to be profitable. The coefficients of these profitability proxies are positive 
and statistically significant (when they are included separately in the logistic 
regression), which suggests that peasant farmers attach more importance to 
profitability considerations than other factors. Unfortunately the inclusion of these 
profitability variables halves the number of valid observations used in model 
estimation and makes the model less robust.  
In general, livestock appears to have a negative impact on farm profitability. 
Corporate farms that keep livestock achieve average profit margins of 8% of 
sales, compared to 23% for farms without livestock (the difference, however, is 
not statistically significant). Since livestock is not profitable in corporate farms, 
it is not surprising that profitability is not a major consideration in the decision 
to keep livestock.  

























1=enough for a 
larger herd 
0=not quite enough 
(optimal for existing 
herd and less) 






1=free to decide 
2=not free to decide 
1.72 (0 vs. 2) 







*  Logistic regression modeling with dependent variable representing yes/no answers  
    to the question "Do you intend to increase livestock production?". 
 ** Significant at 5%. 
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11.3  Sales and on-farm consumption 
Corporate farms and peasant farms sell around 60% of their output (mainly for 
cash, not barter), while the share of output sold in household plots is  20% 
(Table 11.10). The remainder is used as intermediate inputs in farm production, 
stored for future uses, or consumed by the members (i.e., the family in case of 
peasant farms and household plots, or the village households in case of corporate 
farms). This justifies the designation "commercial producers" for corporate and 
peasant farms, as distinct from the "subsistence oriented" household plots. It is 
noteworthy that among peasant farmers there is a sharp difference between the 
commercial orientation of the peasant farm proper (where sales constitute 64% of 
output) and the subsistence orientation of the traditional household plot that the 
farmers still cultivate (where sales are a mere 19% of output). Peasant farmers, 
like the rest of the rural population, use the products from their household plot 
mainly for family consumption, while it is the commercial peasant farm that 
drives the sales. 
Table 11.10:   Distribution of farm output by uses 
  Corporate 
farms 
Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Household plot 
in peasant farms 
Sold  
(cash and barter)  57 64  21  19 
Intermediate 
inputs  19 16  23  14 
Stored 14  11  7  6 
Consumed for 
subsistence  10 9  48 62 
 
Table 11.11:   Share of output sold by household plots 
Share of output sold  Percent of household plots  Percent of peasant farms 
No sales  38  15 
1-10% sold  18  1 
10-20% 12  5 
20-30% 10  5 
30-40% 6  4 
40-50% 6  10 
More than 50% sold  10  60 
 
The stigma of subsistence farming attached to household plots is not entirely 
justified. Fully 62% of household plots in the survey report some farm sales and 
10% sell more than half their output. The percentage of sellers in the 2005 FAO 
survey is practically the same as in the 1996 World Bank survey. Table 11.11 
shows the distribution of household plots by sales. The distribution of peasant farms 
shown in the same table is of course shifted to much higher commercialization 
levels, with 60% of peasant farmers selling more than half their output.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Figure 11.4:   Share of output sold as a function of farm size 
 












Among household plots, the share of output sold clearly increases with plot size 
(Figure 11.4). Household plots of up to 1 hectare sell less than 20% of their 
output, while plots larger than 5 hectares sell around 30% of output (the differences 
across categories are statistically significant). This is consistent with the patterns 
of sales versus consumption observed for other transition countries. The level of 
commercialization is generally observed to increase with farm size: Larger farms 
produce a marketable surplus, while very small farms need everything they 
produce to feed the family. Looking at it from a different angle, we observe that 
the average size of "sellers" (i.e., household plots reporting any sales of farm 
products) is 2.1  hectares compared with 1.1  hectares for "non-sellers" (i.e., 
households without any farm sales). 
Table 11.12:   Sales channels (percent of sales) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Household plots 
State procurement  15  13  10 
Privatized processors  21  19  21 
Private traders, 
processors 
38 40  34 
Marketplace 9  17  34 
Sold to workers  14  8  -- 
Other 3  3  1 
Total 100  100  100 
 
Sales revenue is derived primarily from sale of agricultural products. Corporate 
farms derive 8% of their sales revenue from processing and non-agricultural 
activities, while the corresponding percentage for peasant farms (and household 
plots) is around 1%. This is a reflection of the greater diversification of production 
activities in corporate farms (see Table 11.1). Reflecting the differences in agri-
cultural product mix (Table 11.2), corporate and peasant farms sell mainly crops, 11. Farm production and sales 
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while household plot sales are more biased toward livestock. Livestock products 
account for 70% of sales revenue in household plots compared with  25% in 
corporate and peasant farms.  
All farms sell mainly through private channels, including commercial traders 
and privatized processors (Table 11.12). The pattern of sales channels is fairly 
similar for all producers. Among the notable differences is the significantly 
higher share of direct sales by household plots to consumers in the marketplace. 
Corporate farms direct a relatively large share of sales to their workers and the 
village population, while peasant farms, similarly to household plots, sell relatively 




12  CREDIT AND INVESTMENT 
Credit, and especially working capital financing, is conventionally regarded as 
one of the major factors for normal functioning of farmers everywhere in the 
world, and especially in the imperfect market environment of CIS countries. In 
this chapter we examine the survey evidence on the availability and use of credit 
by managers of corporate farms, peasant farmers, and farming households in 
Ukraine.  
12.1  Use of credit 
There are large differences in both the frequency and the level of borrowing 
between the three cohorts of agricultural producers (Table 12.1). One-third of 
the farmers surveyed and more than two-thirds of managers have debt. Among 
farming households, on the other hand, only 15% have any debt. The level of 
outstanding debt in corporate farms is around 1.5 million hrivny; peasant farms 
carry around 50,000 hrivny in debt; while household debt is an order of magnitude 
less (around 2,000 hrivny).  
Table 12.1  Outstanding debt and new borrowing in the survey 






Farms with debt, %  71  33  15 
Amount of outstanding debt, hrivny  1,564,000  46,200  2,300 
Farms that borrowed in 2004, %  56  24  n.a. 
Amount borrowed in 2004, hrivny  1,200,000  52,000  n.a. 
Sources (multiple answers)      
Relatives   29  37 
Other private individuals    27  29 
Banks    58 35 
Other sources    Less than 10   Less than 10  
 
Both corporate and peasant farms have a perception of significant access to 
credit (Table 12.2): 63% of corporate farm managers and 34% of peasant farmers 
report that they actually borrow. Recalculated in relation to respondents reporting 
that they need credit, these numbers indicate that 71% of corporate farms and 
42% of peasant farms that need credit in fact manage to borrow (at least partially). 
Corporate farms apparently enjoy better access to credit than peasant farms. This 
conclusion is strengthened by the observation that among peasant farmers 45% 
need credit, but cannot borrow, while the corresponding percentage among corporate 
farms is 26%.  12. Credit and investment 
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Table 12.2:  Perceived credit situation (percent of respondents) 
  Farmers (n=310) Managers  (n=187) 
Do not need credit  19  11 
Borrow all that is needed  24  38 
Borrow less than needed because of restrictions 10  25 
Need credit, but cannot borrow  45  26 
12.2  Sources of credit 
Table 12.1 shows that banks today are a very important source of borrowing in 
the individual sector (farmers and rural households). Although the incidence of 
borrowing is relatively low among rural households (only 15%), more than one-
third of them actually report bank loans. Formal credit is thus gradually 
replacing informal borrowing from relatives and other private individuals among 
peasant farmers and households. The state has practically disappeared as a 
source of credit for peasant farms: The State Farmers Support Fund no longer 
supports credit for peasant farmers. In contrast, 15% of peasant farmers cited the 
Support Fund as their source for borrowing in the 1992 World Bank survey, 
whereas in the 1994 World Bank survey 24% of peasant farmers borrowed 
through the Support Fund and 40% used it as a guarantor for bank loans.  
Table 12.3:  Structure of debt and uses of credit 
Structure  
of debt, % 
Managers  Farmers Why did you 






Fuel and power  8  3  Purchase inputs  87  76 
Other inputs 
(working capital) 
47 19  Buy  livestock  4  7 
Banks 29  57  Long-term 
investments 
9 7 
Overdue wages  1  2  Repay loans  3  1 
Taxes 2  4  Pay  wages  7  0 
Pensions and 
social deductions 
0 5  Other  5  7 
Other creditors  12  11       
Total 100  100       
 
Detailed information on the structure and uses of debt is available only for the 
major borrowers, namely corporate farms and peasant farms. Table 12.3 suggests 
that both banks and input suppliers are the main sources of credit for corporate 
farms and peasant farmers. Banks appear to be more important for peasant 
farmers, while supplier credit is more prominent among corporate farms. This 
may be a reflection of the better networking of farm managers within the 
existing economic establishment. Among both farmers and managers, more than 
three-quarters of the respondents indicate that the new credit raised in 2004 went 
to purchase inputs (Table 12.3). Contrary to popular belief, wage arrears or debt Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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for taxes and social deductions do not appear to be a problem for either peasant 
farms or corporate farms.  
Another common claim in all CIS countries is that commodity credit from 
regional authorities, suppliers, and marketers is an important source of funds in 
agriculture. In fact, commodity credit or credit in kind plays a marginal role 
in the survey. Among peasant farmers, commodity credit is truly negligible. 
Only 17 of 310 respondents (5%) report receiving any commodity credit. This is 
primarily fertilizer, which is reported by 4% of the respondents (36 ton of 
fertilizer or 31,000 hrivny per farmer). Farmers receive the fertilizer and the other 
commodity credits from marketers (both state and private). Regional authorities 
do not deliver any commodity credits to peasant farmers. For all peasant farmers 
who borrowed in 2004 (n= 75), commodity credit added 3,000 hrivny to average 
monetary credit of 49,000 hrivny.  
Corporate farm managers report receiving commodity credits with somewhat 
higher frequencies (16%). Fuel is the main commodity credit for corporate farms 
(11% of managers), followed by fertilizer and plant-protection chemicals (9% 
and 6%, respectively). Marketers are the main source of commodity credit, 
although fuel also comes from input suppliers and even from regional authorities 
(Table 12.4). Regional authorities have absolutely no role in any of the commodity 
credits other than fuel. Despite its higher frequency, commodity credit makes a 
miniscule contribution to the total borrowing in corporate farms: For all corporate 
farms that borrowed in 2004 (n = 116), commodity credit added 20,000 hrivny 
to the average credit of 1.2 million hrivny per farm.  
Table 12.4:  Commodity credits in corporate farms (percent) 











Fertilizer 9  4  4  1  -- 
Chemicals 6  1.5  3  1.5  -- 
Fuel 11  2  3  4  2 
Seeds 3  --  3  --  -- 
Other 5  3  1  1   
All commodity 
credits 
16       
 
The corporate farms also receive larger quantities of commodity credits than 
peasant farmers. This is quite understandable given the much larger size of 
corporate farms (see Chapter 8). Table 12.5 lists the average quantities and values 
of commodity credits in corporate farms and peasant farms (the averages are 
calculated for the farms that report receiving the specific commodity credit). The 
credit term appears to be slightly more advantageous for corporate farms: 8-9 
months compared with 6-7 for peasant farms. Unfortunately, the small number of 
observations makes it impossible to test this difference for statistical significance. 12. Credit and investment 
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Table 12.5:  Quantities and values of commodity credits for corporate 
farms and peasant farms (averages for farms receiving the 
specific credit) 
Corporate farms  Peasant farms   
Ton Hrivny  Months Ton Hrivny  Months 
Fertilizer 110  118,000  9  36 31,000  7 
Chemicals 19 85,000  8  --  --  -- 
Fuel 91  210,000  9  24  40,000  6 
 
12.3  Interest rates and credit terms 
Agricultural producers face interest rates of around 19% annually, with half the 
respondents reporting annual interest rates in a tight range between 17% and 21% 
(Table 12.6). These survey findings are consistent with the information obtained 
in a series of interviews with regional officials, who indicate interest rates of  
"18-21%, sometimes as high as 25%". There is practically no difference between 
the interest rates paid by peasant farmers and corporate farms. Contrary to some 
anecdotal evidence, peasant farms do not have to pay more for credit. The credit 
term is also practically the same for both categories of producers (Table 12.6): 
loans are typically for 12 months, although among farmers 10% report loans for 
24 or 36 months (practically no such "medium-term" loans are reported for 
corporate farms). The credit term appears to have shortened significantly over 
time, in parallel with the petering out of the State Farmers Support Fund. In the 
1992 World Bank survey around 30% of the farmers obtained long-term loans 
(for terms longer than 3 years), while in the 1994 World Bank survey 25% of the 
loans were for periods of 2 to 5 years.  
Table 12.6:  Interest rates and credit term among farmers and managers who 
borrowed in 2004 
Farmers  
(24% borrowed in 2004) 
Managers  











Amount borrowed in 2004  49  18  1,206  200 
Interest rate (annual)  19  19  19  20 
Term, months  14  12  12  12 
 
As we shall see below in the discussion of obstacles to borrowing, the respondents 
generally complain that the interest rates are too high and the credit term too short 
(see Table 12.11). A possible explanation of the dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
interest rates and credit terms was obtained from a separate question that explored 
the future credit needs of farmers and households (Table 12.7). The respondents 
indicated than an acceptable interest rate for future borrowing would be  8% 
(compared with 19% that they actually pay) and that credit was needed for a term 
of 3 to 4 years (compared with 1 year at present). Under these conditions, the Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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respondents would be willing to borrow amounts several times larger than what 
they currently owe (compare Table 12.7 with Table 12.1). 
Table 12.7:  Acceptable interest rate and term for future borrowing 
  Farmers Households 
Need credit next year  55%  21% 
Amount, hrivny  181,400  19,400 
Term, months  46  39 
Annual interest rate, %  8  8 
 
Given inflation rates of around 9% in 2004, the real cost of agricultural borrowing 
in Ukraine is 9-10% annually, which is quite high by world standards. On the 
other hand, the interest rates that farmers would like to pay (8%) are in fact 
equivalent to zero (or even negative) real interest, which is of course not attainable 
economically. 
12.4  Level of indebtedness  
The level of indebtedness is not particularly high for both corporate and peasant 
farms, with mean debt running at around 6-7 months of sales (Table 12.8). In other 
words, the entire farm debt can be paid off with 6-7 months of sales revenue. A rule 
of thumb suggests that with indebtedness at less than 12 months of sales there is 
generally no cause for concern. For corporate farms, the situation in 2005 appears 
to be a significant improvement compared with 1998, when debt-to-sales ratios 
were around 2 years (1998, WORLD BANK SURVEY) and farm indebtedness was 
correspondingly a major concern. Of course, debt is repaid from net profits, not 
from gross sales revenue. A previous World Bank study of farm debt in CIS 
(CSAKI, LERMAN, SOTNIKOV, 2001) identified the lack of profitability as one of 
the main reasons for high indebtedness. In the present survey, we did not detect 
any statistically significant relationship between the volume of debt and profit 
(see the discussion of debt and profitability in a separate section below). 
Table 12.8:  Indebtedness of agricultural producers in relation to sales 
(credit-months)
* 
 Farmers  (n=65) Managers  (n=119) 
Sales, hrivny  68,000  1,950,000 
Debt, hrivny  42,000  1,020,000 
Debt to sales ratio  7.4 months  6.3 months 
Note: 
* Calculation based on a subsample with both debt and sales observations. 
Both managers and farmers are prompt with their payments and lax with 
collections (Table 12.9). Supplier bills are generally paid on time, but collection 
of accounts receivable may be a potential problem, especially for corporate 
farms, where only 25% of managers report that customer debt is collected on 
time. Overall, however, nonpayments do not appear to be a serious problem. 
Among farmers, only 22% report any accounts receivable; among corporate 
farms accounts receivable are reported by two-thirds of the respondents. The 12. Credit and investment 
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structure of receivables looks quite normal by market standards, with private 
traders exceeding state procurement by a significant margin (Table 12.10). For 
comparison, in the 1992 World Bank survey, state procurement accounted for 
71% of accounts receivable and private trade for 6%. 
Table 12.9:  Timeliness of payments and collections: Managers and farmers 
(percent of respondents providing answers) 
Payment Collection 
 
Managers Farmers Managers  Farmers 
On  time  60 81 25  47 
Delay 1-2 months  24  16  38  31 
Delay 3-6 months  11  1  19  9 
Delay longer than 6 months  5  2  17  13 
 
Table 12.10:  Structure of accounts receivable 
 Farmers,  %  (n=68) Managers,  %  (n=136) 
Processors   36  24 
Private traders  24  33 
State procurement  16  7 
State budget  2  13 
Local government   0  2  
For services to enterprises and farms  4  11 
Other  18  11 
Total account receivable  100  100 
12.5   Obstacles to borrowing 
Around 80% of respondents among both farmers and managers complain of some 
obstacles to borrowing (Table 12.11). The overall ranking of the perceived 
obstacles is almost the same for farmers and managers. Further analysis shows 
that there are practically no differences between the perceptions of those who 
actually borrowed in 2004 and those who did not borrow. High interest rates, 
short credit terms, and lack of collateral are the three main factors most often 
identified as obstacles to access to credit. These factors consistently recur as 
obstacles to borrowing in all surveys in Ukraine and other CIS countries. It is 
curious to note that the interest rate and the credit term are practically the same for 
those who complain about high interest rates and short-term loans as they are for 
the rest of the respondents.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 12.11:  Perceived obstacles to borrowing  
(percent of respondents identifying each obstacle) 
  Farmers (n=310) Managers  (n=208) 
Outstanding debt  1  12 
High interest rate  57 51 
Credit term too short  26  28 
Lack of collateral  23 19 
Complex application procedures  18  17 
Banks ration credit  16 15 
High risk of default  12 19 
No accessible banks for agriculture  12 6 
Shortage of information on borrowing   5 1 
Poor credit history  2 2 
Other  3 1 
Any obstacles  80 76 
 
One of the factors on which farmers and managers clearly differ is the importance 
of outstanding debt as a barrier to borrowing: Farmers do not attach any importance 
to this factor, whereas managers of corporate farms rank it as moderately 
important (Table 12.11). This may be attributable to different indebted-ness of 
corporate and peasant farms: While peasant farms have relatively little debt and 
therefore outstanding obligations are not a deterrent to further borrowing, corporate 
farms are much more highly indebted and their outstanding debt may influence 
access to new credit. Factors such as absence of banks for agriculture or lack of 
credit-related information are not viewed as very important by either managers or 
farmers. Another bogey of credit markets in CIS – complex application procedures – 
is perceived as only moderately important in Ukraine. This factor, however, is 
assigned greater importance among farmers (but not managers!) who actually 
borrowed in 2004: One-third of this subgroup of respondents rank complexity of 
application procedure as an important obstacle to borrowing (compared to 18% 
overall). 
Poor credit history, a universally important factor for both borrowers and lenders in 
market economies, has a very low ranking in our survey (Table 12.11). This result 
is consistent with a recent study of Russian corporate farms (SUBBOTIN, 2005), 
where credit history was not found to be a statistically significant determinant of 
access to credit. It may be that the whole notion of credit history is still too 
strange and exotic for the financial system in all CIS countries, and the agents 
(whether lenders or borrowers) are unable to assess its true role in default. 
Interviews with regional officials shed some light on the structure of rural banking. 
The large commercial banks (Aval’, Prominvestbank, Privatbank, Praveksbank) 
have a fairly wide network across the country, with 3-6 branches in each raion. 
Of these, 2-4 branches work directly with agricultural producers. Borrowers are 12. Credit and investment 
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free to choose their favorite bank and to negotiate loan contracts directly with 
bank officers. Raion authorities may act in an advisory role to the producers and 
sometimes also to the banks in the loan negotiation stage.  
12.6   Collateral 
Collateral for credit is widely used by farmers and managers, much less so by 
households (Table 12.12). This may reflect the higher reliance of the households 
on informal borrowing from relatives and private individuals (Table 12.2). 
Indeed, Figure 12.1 shows that rural households borrow from informal sources 
virtually without collateral, while 50% of those borrowing from banks have to 
collateralize their loans. Among peasant farmers, formal borrowing also requires 
collateral in a higher proportion of cases than informal borrowing, although the 
gap is not as pronounced as for households. 
Table 12.12:  Use of collateral 
 Managers  Farmers  Households 
Collateral? Yes     
  All sample  75  53  4 
  Those who borrowed in 2004  96  73  23 
What kind of collateral?(multiple answers)     
  Land  10  12  0 
  Animals  48  12  20 
  Machinery  52  51  10 
  Crops in the field  54  23  0 
  Buildings  12  37  27 
  Enterprise guarantee  1  2  13 
  State guarantee  1  1  0 
  Private guarantee  --  3  7 
  Other  3  2  27 
Number of different kinds of collateral:     
 1  43  50  77 
 2  38  31  13 
 3  17  6  -- 
Will you agree to use land as collateral if no 
other option? 
n.a. 36 24 
 
Farm machinery and crops in the field are the main forms of collateral reported 
by managers and farmers. Livestock is a popular collateral with corporate farms 
and households, but not with peasant farmers, who generally have very little 
livestock. Buildings are widely used as collateral by households (who probably 
mortgage the family home) and also by peasant farmers. Land is used very seldom, 
and the individual landowners (peasant farmers and households) are not particularly 
enthusiastic about the option of mortgaging land in the future. In this respect, the 
situation did not change in 2000.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Figure 12.1: Use of collateral for formal and informal credit by peasant 















Lack or insufficiency of collateral was perceived as one of the three main obstacles 
to borrowing (Table 12.11). In reality, however, collateral users among farm 
managers are equally distributed between those who perceive collateral as a difficulty 
and the rest. The situation is even more curious among peasant farmers: Here 87% 
of those who complain about collateral being a difficulty actually offer collateral to 
the lenders, while only 66% among the non-complainers do that. Perhaps another 
indication that collateral is not really a problem is provided by the fact that 55% of 
managers and 37% of peasant farmers use more than one kind of collateral.  
12.7   Taxes and banking 
Managers and farmers interact with the tax authorities on a monthly basis 
(Table 12.13). This close scrutiny by the tax authorities has led regional officials 
to comment in their interviews that today tax inspectors (as well as health and 
sanitary inspectors) are the only organs of government capable of influencing 
decisions in agriculture or imposing their demands on producers. 
Systematic bookkeeping and conduct of financial transactions through bank accounts 
are naturally one of the attributes that minimize friction with tax authorities. All 
corporate farms have bookkeeping and 98% report that they have bank accounts. 
Among peasant farmers 89% have bookkeeping and 71% have bank accounts 
(68%  report both). Bookkeeping in peasant farms is handled primarily by the 
farmer himself or by a member of the family (46% and 23% of respondents, 
respectively). A professional bookkeeper or an accounting firm are hired by less 
than one-third of the respondents.  12. Credit and investment 
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Table 12.13:  Frequency of tax reporting 
 Managers  (n=208) Farmers  (n=310) 
Monthly   81  52 
Quarterly  14  32 
Semi-annually  0  0 
Annually  1  4 
Other --  -- 
No reply  3  12 
 
Despite the widespread practice of keeping bank accounts, a fairly high proportion 
of farmers (30%-40%) do not use their bank account for making payments or 
collecting receivables (Table 12.14). This is generally explained by the farmer’s 
reliance on cash or barter transactions (17% of all farmers in the survey) or by the 
fact that their customers or suppliers do not use banks (5%; see Figure 12.2). 
Corporate farms, on the other hand, conduct most of their transactions through 
bank accounts. Overall we do not find evidence of a massive shift to an extra-
bank cash economy, as is often claimed for CIS countries. 
Figure 12.2: Use of bank account by peasant farmers 
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Table 12.14:  How often do you use your bank account for payments or  
 collections? (percent of respondents) 
Payments Collections 








Everything through the bank  64  25  55  23 
More than half through the bank  23  24  24  20 
Less than half through the bank  6  16  9  15 
Do not use banks for 
payments/collections 
7 35  12  42 Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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12.8   Investment plans 
The majority of respondents in all three cohorts have plans for investment in the 
near future. Two-thirds of commercial producers (corporate farms and peasant 
farms) plan to invest in production assets, with purchase of farm machinery and 
livestock at the top of the list of priorities (Table 12.15). The frequency of 
potential farm investments among rural households is lower (they also tend to 
focus on machinery and livestock). Instead they are evenly divided between 
those planning farm investments and those planning consumption investments 
(i.e., build a house, buy a car, buy household durables). The overall investment 
plans are summarized in Figure 12.3. Common wisdom tells us that widespread 
investment plans are typically a sign of optimism and expectations of economic 
security. In this sense, the results in Table 12.15 and Figure 12.3 are most 
encouraging for rural Ukraine.  
Table 12.15:  Investment plans among managers, farmers, and rural  
 households (percent of respondents in multiple answers) 
  Managers Farmers  Rural 
households 
Farm investment     
Purchase farm machinery  60  54  10 
Purchase livestock  32  22  25 
Erect farm buildings  17  17  8 
Plant orchards or vineyards  6  5  3 
Acquire processing equipment  13  9  2 
Other farm investments  12  9  3 
Any farm investment  67  67  36 
Consumption investment     
Build a house  n.a.  9  6 
Buy a car  n.a  8  6 
Buy consumer durables  n.a.  7  21 
Other n.a.  2  2 
Any consumption investment  n.a.  22  32 
Any investment  67  72  56 
 
The estimated cost of future farm investments is 33% of sales revenue for 
corporate farms and 53% of sales revenue for peasant farms. By all standards, these 
are very ambitious investment plans. The high degree of optimism concerning 
future investment is also clearly seen from the comparison of estimated future costs 
and actual investments in 2004 (Table 12.16). The percentage of respondents 
planning to invest in the future is much higher than the percentage of those who 
actually invested in 2004; the total estimated investment costs in the entire sample 
are 5 to 8 times the actual amounts invested in 2004 by all the respondents. 
Farmers generally appear to be much more optimistic in their investment plans 12. Credit and investment 
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than farm managers, probably because of lack of experience. Rural households 
also give very high estimates of their investment plans, which reach 110% of total 
household income (both farm and consumption investment). 
Figure 12.3: Plans for farm investment and consumption investment as 
reported by different categories of respondents  
 











Managers and peasant farmers plan to finance their investment with a mix of own 
funds (savings) and bank credit (Table 12.17). Rural households, on the other 
hand, intend to rely mainly on family savings, with little access to bank loans. In 
general, informal loans from relatives are mentioned by very few respondents 
among peasant farmers and households as an option for financing investments. 
Managers list leasing as one of the options for financing investment (primarily 
for machinery, but also for livestock and processing equipment). The 
expectations to finance future investments with bank credit are on the whole 
consistent for the three categories of respondents with the observed frequency of 
borrowing in the sample (see Table 12.1).  
Table 12.16:  Actual and planned investments for managers and peasant  
 farmers 




Planned to actual, 
times 
Respondents, %       
Managers 30  61  2 
Farmers 12 64  5 
Amount,  
mln hrivny 
   
Managers 21  102  4.9 
Farmers 3.6  27.5 7.6 
Note:  Percent of respondents represents those who provided answers on actual investment 
in 2004 and on planned farm investment in the future; amounts (in million hrivny) 
are totals summed over the entire sample. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 12.17:  Sources for financing planned investment  
(percent of respondents across all investment options) 
 Own 
funds/savings 
Bank credit  Loans from 
relatives 
Other loans 
Managers (n=208) 35  38  --  17
* 
Farmers (n=310) 39  35  7  2 
Households (n=852) 43  12  4  2 
Note: 
* Includes 12% leasing. 
12.9  Profit and debt in corporate farms 
Corporate farms participating in the survey provided profit and loss information 
based on annual financial reports. Given the partial response of the respondents 
to financial questions, profit analysis could be conducted for at most 142 out of 
208 farms surveyed. Of these, 70% are profitable (positive gross profit) and 30% 
are loss-makers. This constitutes a dramatic improvement compared with the 
situation in 1997, when 84% of farms surveyed reported losses (1998, WORLD 
BANK SURVEY). The increase in the frequency of profitable farms was accompanied 
by a marked increase in profitability levels (Table 12.18). The overall profit 
margin in the sample (the ratio of gross profit to sales) increased from a loss of 
−24% in 1997 to a profit of +12% in 2005. The profit margin of the profitable 
farms as a subgroup rose from 11% in 1997 to 25% in 2005.  
Table 12.18:  Profitability of corporate farms in 2005 compared with 1997
* 
Percent of farms  Profit margin, % of sales   
2005 1997 2005 1997 
All farms  100  100  +12  −24 
Farms reporting profits  70  16  +25  +11 
Farms reporting losses  30  84  −21  −39 
Note: 
* Data for 1997 are from the 1997 World Bank survey. 
There does not seem to be any relationship between profitability and the 
reorganization mode or reorganization time of the corporate farms. The ratio of 
70% profitable farms to 30% loss-makers observed in the entire sample persists 
both among the new reorganized structures (i.e., farms created as new organizations 
or through the splitting of former collectives) and the legacy structures (i.e., 
farms that are one-to-one successors of former collectives). The same ratio is 
also obtained for corporate farms created before and after 1999. The "new wave" 
farms are thus not doing any better than their older counterparts, and the 
improved profitability is a general feature of the economic system. Nor is there a 
relationship between profitability and farm size: Although the average size for 
the group of profitable farms is somewhat larger than for the loss-makers 
(2,000 hectares compared with 1,700 hectares), the difference is not statistically 
significant (p = 0.25). The lack of relationship between profitability and farm 
size is clearly demonstrated in Figure 12.4, where profit margins remain steady 
at the average level of 12% regardless of the land area. 12. Credit and investment 
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Figure 12.4: Profit margin vs. land in use for corporate farms 
 
 
Table 12.19:  Debt and profitability 
  Mean profit,  
‘000 hrivny 




Farms without debt  690
* 24
* 27 




* Differences statistically significant at p = 0.10. 
Farms reporting debt on the whole have lower levels of both profit and 
profitability than farms without debt (Table 12.19). This statistically significant 
difference in profits cannot be attributed to size effects, as farms in both debt 
categories control 1,600-1,800 hectares of land. Regression analysis, however, 
does not reveal any statistically significant relationship between the volume of 
debt and profit (or profit margin). Nor is there a significant difference in the 
frequency of non-profitable farms between those with and without debt: The 
same proportion of 30% of loss-making farms is observed in both debt 
categories. To the extent that there is some relationship between profitability and 
debt, it is apparently very weak (especially due to the small number of observations 
in our sample). 
  
 
13  HUMAN CAPITAL 
Human capital is one of the essential production inputs. Two dimensions need to 
be considered in analyzing human capital: The quantitative dimension, which 
characterizes the labor inputs by the number of people employed or the number of 
work days spent on the job; and the qualitative dimension, which characterizes the 
education, the skills, and the age structure of the labor resources. In this chapter 
we review both the quality and the quantity of labor in the farms surveyed. 
13.1  Quality of human capital 
For peasant farms and household plots fairly detailed information is available 
about the individual family members and we can assess the entire pool of human 
capital available in these units. In corporate farms, human capital information is 
available only for the manager; with respect to other members or workers we 
only have overall information on labor inputs to the farm. 
Table 13.1:  Profiles of peasant farmer families and rural households 
  Peasant farmers  Rural households 
Family size
* 4.0  3.5 
Age of head
* 48  53 
Age of spouse
* 45.6  47.4 
Average family age
* 37  43 
Dependents: <16  14%  15% 
                     >60  9%  19% 
Education – head     
 Higher  52  21 
 Vocational  34  40 
 Secondary  12  24 
 Elementary  2  15 
Education – spouse     
 Higher  33  21 
 Vocational  47  39 
 Secondary  15  29 
 Elementary  5  11 
Education score for head and 
spouse
* (1=lowest, 4=highest) 
3.2 2.6 
Note: 
* Difference statistically significant at p < 0.1. 
Peasant farmers and their families are definitely younger than rural families 
operating household plots, with a lower share of over 60s (Table 13.1). Farmer 
and spouse have higher educational attainments than their counterparts operating 13. Human capital 
 
107
household plots. Larger family size, younger age composition, and higher 
educational attainments all combine in aggregate to produce a larger pool of human 
capital for families of peasant farmers compared with other rural households.  
 Figure 13.1:  Educational attainment for respondents of different categories  












education score (1=lowest, 4=highest) 
 
 
Table 13.2:  Experience record: Managers and peasant farmers 
  Farm managers  Peasant farmers 
Education score  
(1=lowest, 4=highest) 
3.9 3.4 
Years in agriculture  23  14 
Years in present occupation  8  8 
Previous occupation:    
Farm manager, farm chief 
specialist 
55 21 
Non-managerial job on a 
corporate farm 
28 41 
Peasant farmer  1  -- 
Regional agricultural official  2  2 
Managerial job outside primary 
agriculture 
2 3 




Student 1  4 
Other 1  3 
Total 100  100 
 
The educational attainment of corporate farm managers is even higher than that of 
farmers (Figure 13.1; the ordinal ranking by educational attainment managers 
> farmers > heads of households is statistically significant by the Bonferroni test).  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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In this cohort, 87% of respondents report higher education. The manager’s average 
age is 48, like the farmer’s age, and the manager has 23 years of experience in 
agriculture. The managers’ agricultural record is much longer than that of the 
peasant farmers, who have 14 years of experience in agriculture. Both corporate 
farm managers and peasant farmers have been for around 8 years in their present 
occupation (for peasant farmers this is counted since the creation of their farm 
Most farm managers previously held a top managerial position in a corporate 
farm and another 30% came from a non-managerial position in a corporate farm 
(Table 13.2). In total, 84% of farm managers have experience in primary 
agriculture. Among peasant farmers, on the other hand, only 62% came to 
farming with direct agricultural experience and a relatively high percentage 
(20%)  had worked as rank-and-file hired employees outside agriculture. No 
doubt, most peasant farmers have relevant experience for their new occupation, 
but their agricultural record is clearly less than that of corporate farm managers.  
13.2   Employment diversification 
Peasant farmers work primarily on the family farm and only 12% are hired off-
farm (Table 13.3). It is the spouse who is generally the source of income 
diversification in peasant farmer families, with 21% of spouses holding hired jobs 
and another 5% reporting self-employment outside the household. Heads of rural 
households and their spouses diversify to a much greater extent: Less than half list 
the family farm as their main occupation and fully 40% have an off-farm job as 
their main occupation. The occupation profile is largely identical for heads of 
rural households and their spouses (Table 13.3). The secondary occupation for all 
respondents is mainly the family farm (Table 13.4). There is clearly a stronger 
tendency among rural households to hold a secondary job than among peasant 
farmers: Around half the respondents in rural households report a secondary 
occupation, compared to 30% in peasant farmer families.  
Table 13.3:  Occupation profile of peasant farmers and rural households: 
Main job 









Family  farm  85 67 44 41 
Another  farm  11  8 20 20 
Self-employed  (non-ag)  1 5 3 3 
Hired  (non-ag)  1 13 17 20 
Not  employed  2  7 16 16 
Total  100 100 100 100 
 
In terms of time allocation people tend to report that they work full time on the 
main job (90% of peasant farmers and their spouses; 70% of respondents in rural 
households). In reporting the time allocation to the secondary job the respondents 13. Human capital 
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in all cohorts are evenly split between "full time" and "less than half time". About 
15% of the people surveyed in effect report that they put more than 1.5 full work 
days into their main and secondary jobs combined. Another 10-15% work more 
than one day but less than 1.5 days in their various occupations. Among heads of 
rural households, work on the family plots averages 8.6 hours per day for 295 
days a year. Those who also work in the corporate farm (20% of respondents) 
devote "only" 7.6 hours per day to their household plot for 301 days a year 
(compared to 247 days that they give to the corporate farm).  
Table 13.4:  Occupation profile of peasant farmers and rural households: 
Secondary job 









Family  farm  20 27 49 50 
Another  farm  1 1 2 3 
Self-employed  (non-ag)  2 0 0 1 
Hired  (non-ag)  2 1 1 0 
Not  employed  75 71 48 46 
Total  100 100 100 100 
13.3   Farm labor 
The average corporate farm in the survey employs between 120 and 130 permanent 
workers, of which more than 80% are in agricultural production (Table 13.5). In 
addition to the core permanent labor, corporate farms employ some seasonal 
labor, also primarily in agricultural production. On average, the seasonal labor 
adds about 16% to the permanent labor force. Corporate farms report on average 
250,000 man-hours per year, or 31,500 work days. Given the average number of 
workers, this represents around 240-250 work days per person. 
Table 13.5:  Labor in corporate farms 
  Number of workers per farm 
(n=204) 
Percent 
Administrative staff  16  13 
Agricultural production  101  81 
Other (incl. processing,  
social sphere) 
7 6 
Total permanent workers  124  100 
Seasonal 20  +16% 
 
Peasant farms employ on average less than 9 people, of which 3 are family 
members. Virtually all peasant farms report work inputs from family members, 
but only 57% of peasant farms surveyed engage hired labor. The average time 
input of the family members is more than 300 work days a year, whereas hired 
workers are engaged on average for 160 days a year (Table 13.6). As a result, the 
family members contribute 55% of the total labor input, whereas hired workers Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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contribute 45%. The average number of days per worker per year in peasant farms 
is 224. The overall average is somewhat less than the average number of work 
days estimated above for corporate farms. However, family members work much 
more than the average for corporate farms, while hired workers are employed on 
peasant farms for substantially shorter periods of time during the year than in 
corporate farms.  
Table 13.6:  Labor in peasant farms 











Farmer  1.0 11  387 20 387 
Family and 
relatives 
2.3 26  703 35 306 
Hired  workers 5.5 63  884 45 161 
Total 8.8  100  1974  100  224 
 
Figure 13.2: Labor vs. land in corporate and peasant farms  
(in logged variables) 
 
The differences in the number of employed in corporate and peasant farms are 
mainly attributable to differences in farm size. Figure 13.2 shows the relationship 
between the total number of workers and the land used in corporate and peasant 
farms (in logged variables). Land explains 67% of the variability in labor. On 13. Human capital 
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average, the farms in the sample employ one worker for 5-10 hectares. Peasant 
farms employ more labor per hectare than corporate farms (Table 13.7). This is 
consistent with the general view of individual farms as a "labor sink" for the rural 
population. 
Table 13.7:  Labor intensity in corporate and peasant farms  
(workers per hectare) 
 Mean  Median  Interquartile 
range 
Corporate farms (n=201) 0.19  0.08  0.05-0.12 
Peasant farms (n=303) 0.28  0.14 0.06-0.32 
All sample  0.24  0.10  0.05-0.22 
 
13.4  Demand for farm labor 
Labor shortages do not appear to be a serious problem among the farms surveyed. 
About 40% of respondents in both corporate and peasant farms complain that they 
face shortages of labor (Table 13.8). The differences in the total number of 
workers between farms with and without labor shortages are not very big, although 
overall it is farms with a larger labor force that complain of shortages (the difference 
is significant only for peasant farms). It is noteworthy that farm managers generally 
do not feel they have surplus labor. Only 2% of respondents indicate that there are 
redundancies on the farm, while 51% are of the opinion that their labor force is 
"just right".  
Table 13.8:  Labor shortages and demand for labor in corporate and peasant 
farms 
  Peasant farms  Corporate farms 
Farms experiencing shortages, %  36  44 
Total number of workers  8.8  142 
  Farms reporting labor shortage 10.0
* 144 
  Farms without labor shortage  8.1
* 140 
Workers needed  6.7  33  
Note: 
* Difference significant at p = 0.1. 
Table 13.9:  What labor is needed 











Farms experiencing shortage  36  6.7  44   33 
Of these:         
Skilled labor  52  1.6  63  11 
Unskilled labor  66  5.1  48  21 
Both skilled and unskilled labor  21  --  32  -- 
Note: 
* Compare to total work force of 10 in peasant farms and 144 in corporate farms (see  
   Table 13.8). Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Most peasant farms experience shortage of unskilled manual labor, whereas 
most corporate farms need more skilled labor (machine operators, farm specialists). 
The number of unskilled workers needed, however, is greater than the number of 
skilled workers for farms of both types (Table 13.9) 
Table 13.10:   Farms experiencing labor shortages: Obstacles to hiring  
  needed labor (percent of those with labor shortages) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms 
Pay not competitive   38  26 
No money to pay    6 
No supply of labor (qualification, age, 
motivation to work) 
42 30 
No workers without bad habits  15  33 
No housing  5  5 
Total 100  100 
 
Non-competitive low pay is an important factor in the inability to hire, but the 
main obstacle seems to be labor supply difficulties (Table 13.10). There is lack 
of sufficiently qualified labor, there are problems with the age structure of labor, 
and finally people simply have no motivation to work (they register at the labor 
exchange, but do not accept farm jobs). In the labor supply category respondents 
identify "bad habits" (i.e., drinking, unreliability) as a special problem. Peasant 
farmers are much more sensitive to this problem than corporate farm managers. 
  
 
14  FARM PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity is the output produced per unit of resource used, and it is accordingly 
a measure of the efficiency with which producers use available resources. 
Productivity measures are at the core of the discussion of the impact of reforms in 
transition countries, as efficiency improvement was the main motivation for the 
shift from the centrally controlled socialist economy to the market economy.  
We distinguish between partial productivity measures, when output is measured 
in relation to a single input (land, labor, machines) and total factor productivity 
(TFP), when output is measured in relation to a whole bundle of inputs used. In 
partial productivity measures the resource inputs are typically in physical units 
(hectares of land, number of workers, number of tractors or harvesters), whereas 
in TFP the different inputs are aggregated into a single bundle in money units. 
Aggregate output (the sum total of commodities produced) is also expressed in 
units of value, whereas specific commodity outputs (wheat, milk, etc.) may be 
expressed in physical units for productivity calculations (mainly partial productivity). 
When both output and input are expressed in money units, the productivity is 
calculated as the value of output per unit of input costs (hrivny of output per 
hrivny of input). When output is expressed in money units and inputs are expressed 
in physical units, the productivity is calculated as value of output per physical 
unit of input (hrivny per hectare, hrivny per worker). When both output and 
input are expressed in physical units, the result is a partial productivity measure 
usually called yield (kg of wheat per hectare of land, kg of milk per cow).  
In this chapter we use the survey data to calculate various productivity measures of 
corporate and individual farms. Our prior hypothesis, suggested by the available 
literature and theory, is that individual farms achieve higher TFP than corporate 
farms. 
14.1  Partial productivity measures 
Calculation in physical units: Commodity yields 
Yields expressed in physical units of output per physical unit of (a single) input 
provide the most basic and yet the crudest measure of productivity. Milk yields (in 
kg per cow per year) reported by respondents are lower for corporate farms than for 
individual farms (Table 14.1). The differences in milk yields within the individual 
sector, i.e., between peasant farms and household plots, are not statistically significant.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 14.1:  Milk yields by farm type 
 Mean  Median 
Corporate farms (n=113) 2,609  2,555 
Peasant farms (n=96) 3,775  3,600 
Household plots (n=555) 3,725  3,580 
Note:  Statistically significant differences in means and medians (p = 0.00 by Anova and 
Wilcoxon tests) between corporate farms and individual farms (peasant farms and 
household plots combined). Differences between individual farms are not statistically 
significant. 
Table 14.2:  Crop yields in farms of different types (centner/ha)  
  National yields  Corporate 
farms 
Peasant farms  Household 
plots 
Cereals (all)  28.3  28.2 27.4  40.4
^& 
Wheat  31.7  31.1 30.0  36.6
^& 




Corn (grain)  38.6  40.7 36.7 47.0 
Rye  22.2  23.7 25.1  -- 
Buckwheat  7.6  10.3
# 12.1
# -- 
Technical  crops      
Sunflower  8.9  11.5 11.6  -- 
Other oils  14.0  13.6 14.5  -- 




Horticulture     








Grapes  45.2  19.2
# 75.6
# 53.6 
Fruits  58.1  --  137.6 65.4
^& 
Feed  crops      
Feed roots  282.2  271.0 1171.4  246.4 
Silos corn  145.5  155.4 -- -- 
Grasses, hay  87.2  50.5   54.6   80.6
^&  
Notes:  Double dash: Mean not calculated because less than 10% of respondents produce the 
commodity. 
  Differences between corporate and peasant farms: 
 
* Significant by t-test with unequal variances (p< 0.1). 
 
# Significant by Wilcoxon test (p < 0.1). 
  Differences between household plots and peasant farms: 
 
^ Significant by t-test with unequal variances (p< 0.1). 
 
& Significant by Wilcoxon test (p < 0.1). 
The picture with crop yields is less clear, already because we are dealing with a 
fairly wide range of commodities. The actual yields (in centners/ha) are given in 
Table 14.2 for farms of all three types. Visual comparison with the national 
average yields taken from AGUKRAINE (2004) shows that the sample means are 
quite reliable. Table 14.3 presents the results of the pairwise comparisons of 
mean (and also median) yields for farms of different types: Corporate farms 14. Farm productivity 
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compared with peasant farms, corporate farms compared with household plots, 
and household plots compared with peasant farms. Inequalities are shown in the 
table for those cases when the differences in yields are statistically significant (at 
least by one of the two statistical tests used: The parametric t-test for means and 
the nonparametric Wilcoxon test for medians).  
Table 14.3:  Pairwise differences in crop yields 
  Peasant farms and 
corporate farms 
Household plots 
(HH) and peasant 
farms 
Household plots 
(HH) and corporate 
farms 
Cereals (all)    HH > farmers 
*#  HH > corporate 
* 
Wheat    HH > farmers 
*#  HH > corporate 
* 
Barley  Corporate > farmers 
*#  HH > farmers 
*#  HH > corporate 
*# 
Corn (grain)       
Rye   n.a.  n.a. 
Buckwheat Farmers>corporate 
# n.a.  n.a. 
Sunflower   n.a.  n.a. 
Other oils    n.a.  n.a. 
Sugar beet  Corporate > farmers 
*  HH > farmers 
*  
Potatoes  Farmers > corporate *  Farmers > HH 
#  HH > corporate 
* 
Vegetables  Corporate > farmers 
#  Farmers > HH 
*#  Corporate > HH 
*# 
Grapes  Farmers > corporate 
#    HH > corporate 
*# 
Fruits  n.a.  HH > farmers 
*# n.a. 
Feed roots       
Silos corn  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Grasses, hay    HH > farmers 
#  HH > corporate 
# 
Notes:  Blank cells – differences not statistically significant at p = 0.1; n.a. – mean yields not 
calculated because less than 10% of respondents produce the commodity. 
 
* Significant by t-test with unequal variances (p< 0.1). 
 
# Significant by Wilcoxon test (p < 0.1). 
 
Table 14.4 summarizes the pairwise comparisons from Table 14.3. Judging 
overall ("by majority"), household plots seem to be doing better than both corporate 
and peasant farms. In 6 out of 10 (or respectively 11) cases household plots achieve 
higher yields than corporate or peasant farms. In 3 more cases in either comparison 
category the differences in yields are not statistically significant. The yields 
achieved by household plots are lower only in 1 case compared with corporate 
farms and 2 cases compared with peasant farms. The picture between farmers 
and enterprises, on the other hand, is very mixed. It seems that corporate and 
peasant farms overall achieve comparable crop yields.  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 14.4:  Summary of pairwise comparisons of crop yields for farms of 
different types 








Higher yields in farms of first type  3  6  6 
Lower yields in farms of first type  3  2  1 
No significant difference  8  3  3 
 
Intuitively, one would expect the large corporate farms and commercial farmers 
to have an advantage in scale crops, such as cereals, while household plots are 
usually hypothesized to have a yield advantage in horticultural crops (potatoes 
and vegetables). This is definitely not the situation that we observe in Table 14.3. 
Household plots achieve outstanding results in wheat and barley, significantly 
better than corporate or peasant farms. On the other hand, household plots seem to 
lose their advantage in crops that are grown practically by everyone. Thus, 
potatoes and vegetables are produced by 85-95% of household plots in the survey, 
compared with 20% among corporate farms and 50% among peasant farms. We 
may speculate that when a relatively small number of respondents choose to 
produce a particular commodity (e.g., cereals among household plots, horticultural 
crops among corporate and peasant farms), a positive selection effect ensures that 
these producers achieve higher yields. 
Calculation using aggregated value of output 
The partial productivity measures in this category are calculated as value of 
output per hectare of land (partial productivity of agricultural land) and value of 
output per worker (partial productivity of agricultural labor).  
Our prior hypothesis is that individual farms (household plots and peasant farms 
combined) achieve higher productivity of land and lower productivity of labor 
than corporate farms. Higher productivity of land is usually attributed to greater 
incentives in the individual form of organization, while lower productivity of 
labor is associated with the tendency of individual farms to absorb labor (the 
"labor sink" effect of individual farms).  
We expect the three organizational forms to be ranked by output per hectare in the 
order household plots > peasant farms > corporate farms. The actual results for the 
productivity of land in farms of different types are presented in Table 14.5. 
Household plots outperform both peasant farms and corporate farms by partial 
productivity of land (parametric t-test for means, nonparametric Wilcoxon test for 
medians). The differences between enterprises and farmers are not statistically 
significant (both tests). The survey thus produces the ranking household plots > 
peasant farms ≈ corporate farms by partial productivity of land. 
 14. Farm productivity 
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Mean Median  Mean  Median 
Corporate farms  4.4  0.9  17.4  12.5 
Peasant farms  4.8  1.0  11.7  5.9 
Household plots  11.8  5.0  --  -- 
All sample farms  8.8  2.3  14.0  8.1 
 
Partial productivity of agricultural labor was calculated only for corporate and 
peasant farms, as the number of farm workers could not be reliably estimated for 
household plots. While the productivity of land is comparable for corporate and 
peasant farms, the productivity of labor (Table 14.5) is significantly higher for 
corporate farms (as expected). This is consistent with the "labor sink" effect of 
individual farms observed in Chapter 13, where peasant farms were shown to 
employ nearly 30 workers per 100 hectares compared with less than 20 workers 
per 100 hectares for corporate farms (see Table 13.7). 
The partial productivity of land decreases with farm size (Table 14.6). The 
decrease is particularly strong for the small household plots and it levels out for 
the larger peasant farms and corporate farms. Yet for these larger farms also the 
size coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Thus, in a regression 
framework, large farms have significantly lower land productivity than smaller 
farms even when the comparison excludes household plots and is restricted to 
peasant farms and corporate farms only. The partial productivity of labor, on the 
other hand, increases with farm size, rising significantly from the smaller 
peasant farms to the larger corporate farms.  
Table 14.6:  Regression coefficients for land productivity and labor 
productivity versus farm size 






Land productivity  −0.292  −0.508  −0.092 
Labor productivity  --  --  +0.265 
Note:  All coefficients statistically significant at p < 0.01. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
 
118
Figure 14. 1:  Output per hectare as a function of farm size  
 (in logged variables) 
 
Figure 14.1 shows the output per hectare as a function of size for all three farm 
types. It visually demonstrates the results of Table 14.5, where household plots 
> peasant farms ≈ corporate farms. On average household plots have higher land 
productivity than peasant and corporate farms, but the regression results in 
Table 14.6 show that land productivity decreases with size also in the subsample of 
peasant and corporate farms. 
14.2  Total factor productivity (TFP) 
The two partial productivity measures for land and labor do not give a consistent 
picture: Individual farms have a higher productivity of land and a lower 
productivity of labor. This ambiguity can be resolved by switching from partial 
productivity measures (each calculated for a single input) to total factor 
productivity (TFP), which is calculated as the ratio of the aggregated value of 
output to the aggregated cost of input use. The theoretical formula for the 
aggregated cost of input use calls for multiplying the quantity of each input by its 
market price and summing all the input cost components. This is a truly formidable 
undertaking in most cases, and a naïve method equates input costs to production 
costs as reported in the farm’s financial statements. The ratio of sales to costs is a 
TFP proxy that provides a strictly accounting measure of productivity and is in 
fact equivalent to profit margin.  14. Farm productivity 
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Nevertheless, the accounting valuation biases can be avoided even in the absence 
of market prices for valuing the cost of inputs (such as the price of land). A 
theoretically more sound approach is to determine TFP by estimating a production 
function and then using the estimated input coefficients as the weights to calculate 
the value of the bundle of inputs. The ratio of the observed output to the estimated 
bundle of inputs is the TFP. This measure does not use accounting data and does 
not require knowledge of market prices.  
In principle, the production function should be estimated for all the relevant inputs. 
In farm surveys, however, the proliferation of missing values dramatically reduces 
the number of valid cases that can be used for estimation as the number of inputs is 
increased. The problem is especially acute because the standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function is estimated in logarithms, which are undefined whenever 
the corresponding input is zero. In total, there are 518 observations of corporate 
and peasant farms in the survey database. Of these 507 observations have valid 
data on agricultural land and agricultural labor, but only 399 cases have data for 
the value of production – the dependent variable in production function estimation. 
This maximum number of observations (399) is actually available for estimating 
two-input production functions with land and labor as the only inputs. However, 
the number of valid observations is reduced from 399 to 371 if in addition to 
land and labor we also include farm machinery, to 302 if we add fertilizers to the 
list of inputs, and to 283 if both fertilizers and diesel fuel are included. Thus, 
with merely 5 inputs – land, labor, machinery, fertilizer, and diesel fuel – we 
lose 30% of the potential number of observations (399). Data shrinkage is even 
more dramatic if we include the number of animals as an input: Production 
function estimation using land, labor, farm machinery and animals is based on as 
few as 207 observations. 
In the general economic literature, TFP is typically calculated assuming two 
inputs: Capital and labor. We have decided to follow the same approach from 
considerations of data availability and reliability. In our estimations labor is 
taken as the physical number of agricultural workers reported in the survey (in 
preferences to salaries) and capital is proxied by two physical variables: 
Agricultural land (in hectares) and the aggregated number of pieces of farm 
machinery (in preference to the highly uncertain balance sheet value of machinery). 
The livestock herd was excluded from the capital component because of the 
large number of farms without animals. We thus estimated the production 
function with three inputs: labor, land, and farm machinery. A separate estimation 
was additionally carried out for the subgroup of farms with animals. The 
physical variables were judged to be much more reliable and consistent than the 
accounting figures reported for other factors of production, such as the cost of 




The survey provided fairly detailed accounting information on production costs 
for both corporate and peasant farms. Corporate farms reported the production 
costs from their profit-and-loss statement (which also provided the gross profit 
for profit margin calculations in Table 12.18). Total production costs in corporate 
farms included the cost of material inputs, labor costs, depreciation, and other 
costs. Peasant farmers, on the other hand, reconstructed mainly their material 
costs (including lease payments and taxes), but did not show labor costs or 
depreciation. To achieve comparability of the cost figures, the costs for corporate 
farms were adjusted to reflect only the cost of material inputs plus other costs.  
Table 14.7:  TFP estimated by ratio of output to accounting costs 
  Peasant farms  Corporate farms* 
Value of output/production costs  1.51 (n = 223)  1.29 (n = 122) 
Sales revenue/production costs  1.53 (n = 248)  1.22 (n = 143) 
Calculated from profit margin:     
 12%  (Table 12.18)   1.14 
  15% (weighted average, n = 132)    1.18  
Note: 
* Costs for corporate farms do not include depreciation and labor. 
Table 14.7 presents the accounting-based TFP proxies calculated using these 
costs and two output variables: The value of production and the sales revenue. 
The results are weighted averages, obtained by taking the ratio of the sum total of 
outputs to sum total of input costs in the entire sample (the number of observations 
for each sum is shown in parentheses). The accounting TFP is somewhat higher for 
peasant farms than for corporate farms. However, there is no way to decide if 
the difference is significant, because weighted averages do not lend themselves 
to statistical significance testing.
7 
Production function approach: TFP by dummy variable estimation 
Differences in TFP between categories of farms can be captured by estimating 
appropriate production functions with a dummy variable for different farm 
types. If the dummy coefficient for type A farms is found to be greater than for 
type B farms, this implies that type A farms produce a greater value of output at 
any given bundle of inputs and essentially means that type A farms have higher 
TFP than type B farms. This procedure enables us to assess differences in TFP 
without actually calculating the TFP in absolute values.  
A three-input Cobb-Douglas production function, relating the aggregated value 
of output to agricultural land, agricultural labor, and the number of farm 
machinery, was estimated on 371 observations from the survey dataset classified 
into corporate and peasant farms (Table 14.8, Model 1). Another model (Model 2) 
                                                 
7  Accounting-based TFP measures have been previously calculated in several studies for 
other transition countries. For a calculation of TFP as the ratio of output to the reported 
cost of inputs see DUDWICK et al. (2005). 14. Farm productivity 
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was estimated with the number of animals also included in the capital component, 
but at the cost of using a much smaller sample of observations (207 farms with a 
nonzero herd). 
Table 14.8:  Estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function for corporate 
and peasant farms 
Dependent variable:  
Value of output (‘000 hrivny, logged) 
Model 1: Labor, 
land, machinery
* 
Model 2: Labor, land, 
machinery, animals
** 
Explanatory variables:     
Labor (workers, logged)  0.542  0.548 
Land (ha, logged)  0.512  0.367 
Farm machinery (pieces, logged)  0.175  0.067 
Livestock (standard head, logged)  --  0.187 
Farm type (dummy): Corporate relative  
to peasant farms 
−0.249  −0.318 
R
2 0.815  0.848 
Number of observations  371  207 
Notes: 
*  All coefficients significant at p = 0.05. Farm dummy marginally significant with p  
    = 0.18. 
 
** Labor, land, and livestock significant at p = 0.05; farm machinery (p = 0.54) and  
    farm type (p = 0.24) not significant. 
In the three-input production function (Model  1), labor, land, and farm 
machinery have a highly significant positive impact on the value of production. 
In the four-input production function with livestock (Model 2), land and labor 
remain highly significant, but livestock takes over from farm machinery as the 
third significant factor of production in farms that have animals. The farm type 
dummy has a negative coefficient in both models (and in models with many 
other combinations of inputs that we have tried). This coefficient is only 
marginally significant (at p = 0.20) in Model 1 and not statistically significant by 
any acceptable measure in Model 2. Nevertheless, its consistently negative sign 
provides an indication that, for every given bundle of inputs, corporate farms 
achieve a lower value of output than peasant farms.
8 However, even without 
drawing this (statistically weak) conclusion in favor of the performance of 
peasant farms, we can definitely say that the results do not support the inherited 
socialist conviction regarding the superiority of large farm enterprises: The 
statistical analysis shows that corporate farms certainly do not outperform 
peasant farms. The performance of large corporate farms at best is comparable 
to the performance of the much smaller peasant farms. 
                                                 
8  The mathematics of the Cobb-Douglas production function translates the negative dummy 
variable coefficient of −0.249 in Model 1 into a difference of 22% in output between corporate 
farms and peasant farms for each bundle of inputs (1 − exp(−0.249) = 1 − 0.78 = 0.22). For 
Model 2 the difference is 27%. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Production function approach: TFP calculated from factor shares 
The estimated production function provides another technique for calculating the 
TFP in absolute values for different groups of farms. As we move from the 
relatively small peasant farms to the large corporate farms, the agricultural product 
increases, but so do the labor force, the land endowment, and the machinery pool 
(see Chapters 13, 8, 9). The production function is a mathematical relationship that 
links the increase in agricultural product with the increase in aggregated input use. 
The inputs are aggregated by applying the weights (or factor shares) from the 
corresponding production function to specific values of the inputs. TFP is 
calculated as the aggregated value of output divided by the aggregated value of 
inputs. In this sense it is similar to the standard partial productivity measures, in 
which the aggregated value of output is divided by the quantity of a single input 
(land or labor).  
Table 14.9 presents the estimated production function coefficients and the weights 
used in TFP calculations (to calculate the weights the regression coefficients are 
divided by the sum of the coefficients). Model A corresponds to Model 1 in 
Table 14.8, but without the farm type dummy. This is a three-input production 
function estimated for the pooled sample of corporate and peasant farms (n = 371 
observations). Model B corresponds to Model 2 in Table 14.8, but it is also a three-
input model with labor, land, and livestock: Farm machinery has been omitted from 
the regression because its coefficient is not statistically significant. In both three-
input production functions agricultural land accounts for nearly 50% of input use 
and labor for around 40% (see the columns for input weights in Table 14.9). The 
third factor (machinery or livestock) accounts for less than 15% of input use. The 
aggregated value of inputs is obtained for each observation as the sum of the 
relevant inputs (labor, land, machinery or labor, land, livestock) multiplied by the 
respective weights from Table 14.9. The TFP is then calculated for each observation 
as the ratio of the value of output to the aggregated value of inputs. 
Table 14.9:  Regression coefficients and input weights in alternative 
production functions 










Labor  0.511  0.44 0.538 0.50 
Land  0.488  0.42 0.403 0.37 
Farm machinery  0.168  0.14  --  -- 
Livestock  --  -- 0.142 0.13 
Sum of coefficients  1.167  1.00  1.083  1.00 
R
2 0.814    0.843   
Number of 
observations 
371   215   
Note:  The estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero (p< 0.01); all sums of 
coefficients significantly greater than 1. 14. Farm productivity 
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The mean and median TFP values obtained by this method for corporate and 
peasant farms are presented in Table 14.10. The numbers are very close for the 
two categories and the differences between farms of different types are not 
statistically significant. This result is fully consistent with the previous observation 
that the dummy variable coefficient did not produce a statistically significant 
shift in production functions between corporate and peasant farms. The TFP 
calculations do not provide positive evidence in support of our hypothesis that 
individual (peasant) farms are more productive than corporate farms. On the 
other hand, these results establish convincingly that corporate farms are not 
better than peasant farms, and both farm types should be allowed to evolve on a 
level playing field.  
Table 14.10:   TFP (‘000 hrivny per aggregated unit of inputs) 









Model A: Labor, land, machinery  2.70  2.46  1.64  1.85 
Model B: Labor, land, animals  2.97  3.01  1.92  2.21 
Note:  None of the pairwise differences in TFP are statistically significant. 
Regression of TFP on farm size as a continuous variable (measured in hectares of 
agricultural land) failed to detect any statistically significant relationship either. 
TFP was found to be at the same average level for farms of all sizes. These results 
are somewhat surprising, because they contradict some recent findings for both 
Moldova (MOLDOVA, 2005) and the United States (AHEARN et al., 2002), where 
smaller farms achieved higher TFP than larger farms, providing an indication of 
diseconomies of size. Our conclusions for Ukraine are limited to a more modest 
conclusion, namely that we do not observe economies of size operating among 
Ukrainian farms.  
  
 
15  RURAL FAMILY INCOMES 
Two distinct categories of rural families are represented in the survey – families 
of peasant farmers operating an independent family farm outside collective or 
corporate frameworks, and other rural families operating a traditional household 
plot in addition to wage employment or reliance on social insurance. We will 
refer to the first category as farmer families (or in short farmers) and to the 
second category as employee families (or in short employees), although many of 
them are just pensioners (i.e., former employees).  
15.1  Structure of family income 
Farmers earn much more than employees both per family and per capita 
(Table 15.1). The numbers in Table 15.1 reflect cash income, and do not include 
the value of own farm products consumed by the household, but the inclusion of 
own consumption (see estimation in Section 15.2) will not close the huge gap. For 
farmers most of the income is from farm sales and a very small share comes 
from salaries and pensions. Employees, on the other hand, rely to a much greater 
extent on salaries and pensions and less on farm sales. 
Table 15.1:  Structure of family income (in percent)
* 
  Farmers (n=267)  Employees (n=827)
* 
Sales of farm products  87  31 
Sale of services  2  2 
Non-farm income (business and property)  0  4 
Salaries 7  41 
Social transfers  3  21 
Remittances from relatives  0  1 
Sale of assets  1  0 
Other 0  0 
Total income, %  100  100 
Total income, hrivny  54,500  9,750 
Per capita income, hrivny  15,300  3,100 
Land used, ha  113  1.7 
Note: 
* Based on weighted average amounts by sources of income. 
Another component that differentiates farmers from employees is income from 
property (i.e., lease payments for land, dividend payments for asset shares, etc.) 
and entrepreneurial activity. For employees this component accounts for 4.2% of 
family income, whereas for farmers it is practically zero. Since farmers do not 
lease out land (see Chapter 8), this basically means that they do not engage in 15. Rural family incomes 
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any off-farm business activity either, devoting all their time and efforts to the 
family farm. Employees, on the other hand, willingly lease out land (mainly 
their land shares) and thus earn some income from lease payments. For the 
subset of employee families that lease out land, lease payments contribute 6.4% 
of total family income compared to 4.2% for all families (in a weighted average 
calculation).
9 We thus conclude that on average lease payments make a relatively 
small contribution to income even among families that lease out land. 
In general, the share of lease payments in family income for employee 
households increases with the area of land controlled by the family and with the 
proportion of that area leased out to others. The relationship, however, is 
nonlinear and to obtain a satisfactory linear regression (with both coefficients 
statistically significant and R
2 =0.25) we need to use the logarithm of the share 
of lease payments as the dependent variable.  
15.2   Value of consumption of own products 
Table 15.1 gives the structure of cash income by sources as reported in the 
survey. It includes income from sales, wage income, pensions, and other cash 
receipts. It does not include the value of own farm products consumed by the 
family. This value can be regarded as additional non-cash income enjoyed by 
the family: Consumption of own farm products replaces cash expenditure on 
food purchases. Imputed income includes the estimated value of consumption of 
own products as well as cash earnings from outside sources. 
Estimation of the value of consumption of own farm products from survey data 
is a notoriously difficult undertaking when no special diaries are filled in. The 
estimation requires aggregation of many variables, and proliferation of missing 
values is a major problem preventing consistent calculations for the full sample. 
Instead of the conventional case-by-case calculation, we have roughly estimated 
the value of consumption of own farm products by multiplying the average value 
of output by the average proportion retained on the farm for the use of the family. 
The rough estimates range from nearly 5,000 hrivny a year for employee families 
to 10,000 hrivny a year for farmer families (the higher value of consumption for 
farmer families is consistent with the perception of a higher standard of living – 
see Table 15.4 and Figure 15.4). The value of own consumption thus adds nearly 
50% to the cash income of employee families and 20% to that of farmer families 
(Table 15.2). Based on these estimates, the value of own consumption of farm 
products is 32% of imputed income for employee families and 16% for farmer 
families. The structure of imputed income, including the value of own 
consumption of farm products, is shown in Figure 15.1. The figure clearly shows 
                                                 
9  Taking the actual lease payments received by employee families from a different set of 
questions and calculating the ratio of lease payments to total family income for each case, 
we obtain 9% and 5% respectively for the mean and the median contribution of leasing to 
income in the subsample of respondents reporting lease payments (n = 360). Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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the main differences in the share of farm sales, value of own consumption, and 
income from other external sources (mainly wages and pensions) between farmers 
and employees: Farm sales are the dominant component of farmers’ income even 
after imputing the value of own products, whereas in employee families wages, 
pensions, and the value of own products are more important than sales. 
Table 15.2:  Estimating the imputed income (in hrivny) 
 Farmers  Employees 
Cash income  54,500  9,750 
Value of output
* 30,000  5,700 
Percent of output consumed on farm  35  80 
Estimated value of consumption of own farm products  10,500  4,600 
Imputed income  65,000  14,350 
Note: 
* Median for farmers, mean for employees. This choice is justified because of the  
   much higher variability for farmers, where the coefficient of variation is 243%  
   compared with only 97% for employees.  
Figure 15.1: Structure of imputed family income (including value of own 












15.3  Determinants of family income 
The absolute difference in cash family income observed in Table 15.1 is largely 
an outcome of the difference in farm sizes: 113 ha for farmers, 1.7 ha for 
employees. Regression analysis shows that family income increases with farm 
size (Table 15.3, first column), and land on its own explains nearly 23% of the 
variability in cash family income. Other statistically significant determinants of 
income in Table 15.3 include family size (i.e., the number of family members), 
the age of the family head, and the average age of all family members (which 
includes children and older pensioners). Income naturally increases with family 
size and decreases with the age of the family head. The average age of family 15. Rural family incomes 
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members has a positive effect on income due to the contribution of pensions that 
the older family members receive. Beyond these quantitative determinants we 
also observe a certain farm type effect: Farmer families earn more than employee 
families adjusted for land and other factors. The type dummy has a significant 
coefficient and makes an additional (albeit small) contribution to explanatory 
power (Table 15.3).  
Table 15.3:  Determinants of family income
# 






Land (logged)  0.139
* 0.323
* 0.026 
Family size  0.150
* 0.054 0.171
* 
Age of head of family  -0.012
* -0.023
* -0.004 
Average age of family members  0.009
* 0.005 0.009
* 
Farm type: Farmers relative to employees  0.507
* 0.770
* -0.051 
R-square 0.274  0.463  0.064 
N 1080  790  952 
Notes: 
# Dependent variable: Logged income (excluding the value of own consumption). 
* Significantly different from zero at p= 0.1. 
The last two columns in Table 15.3 separate total cash income into farm income 
(sales of farm products) and non-farm income (salaries, pensions, leasing income, 
etc.). We note that the relationship between farm income and land is much stronger 
(a higher regression coefficient) and much tighter (higher R
2) than for total income. 
On the other hand, family size and number of pensioners (as reflected in the 
average age) are not statistically significant as determinants of farm income. The 
farm type effect is the same as for total income: Farm income is higher for farmer 
families than for employee families (controlling for the other factors). In contrast, 
non-farm income is not sensitive to farm size or the age of the family head (the 
corresponding regression coefficients in Table 15.3 are not statistically significant), 
but it strongly depends on family size and on the average age of the family members. 
It does not depend on farm type, however: The behavior of non-farm income is 
statistically the same for farmers and employees.  
Data grouped by logged farm size categories show a clear increase of total cash 
income, and especially farm income, with the increase of farm size (Figure 15.2). 
The share of farm income increases from 17% in the smallest farms to more than 
70% of total income in the largest. Not only total income increases: Income per 
capita also increases with farm size (Figure 15.3), rising quite dramatically from 
less than 5,000  hrivny per capita for households with up to 1-2  hectares to 
20,000 hrivny and much more for farms larger than 50 hectares. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Figure 15.2: Farm and non-farm cash income as a function of farm size  
(in logged hectares) for families of peasant farmers and rural 
employees  
 











Figure 15.3: Per capita cash income as a function of farm size (in logged 
hectares) for families of peasant farmers and rural employees 
 











15.4  Incomes and well-being 
In addition to quantitative information on family incomes, the survey explored 
the families’ perception of well-being through qualitative questions that 
classified the perceived standard of living into three levels: Low, when family 
income allows nothing beyond food and daily necessities; medium, when family 
income is sufficient for food, daily necessities, clothing, and other consumption 
needs; and comfortable, when in addition to the consumption needs the family can 15. Rural family incomes 
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afford to purchase durables and in general does not experience material difficulties. 
The qualitative perception of well-being is consistent with quantitative income 
estimates: Family income increases from low to comfortable level of well-being for 
both farmers and employees (Table 15.4). 
Table 15.4:  Well-being and income (‘000 hrivny) 
Level of well-being  Farmer families
* Employee  families
** 
1. Low (not more than food and daily  
    necessities) 
26,500 7,500 
2. Medium (daily necessities, clothing,  
    etc.) 
58,000 10,300 
3. Comfortable (able to purchase durables)  84,000  16,800 
Notes: 
*  Statistically significant pairwise differences (p = 0.1): 1-3. 
 
** All pairwise differences statistically significant (p = 0.1). 
Farmers’ families achieve a higher (perceived) well-being than the families of 
other rural households (Table 15.5,  Figure 15.4). Thus, the frequency of 
respondents reporting a comfortable standard of living is substantially higher 
among farmers than among employees; and conversely, the frequency of 
respondents reporting a low standard of living (just sufficient to meet the daily 
needs) is substantially higher among employee families. This is consistent with 
the observation that farmer families enjoy higher incomes than employee families 
(Table 15.4; also see Table 15.1). 
Figure 15.4: Perceived level of well-being for families of peasant farmers 
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We have previously noted that family income increases with farm size. It is 
therefore not surprising that family well-being also increases with the area of 
land used (or in case of employee families, also with the area of owned land). 
Households reporting a low level of well-being command significantly less land 
than households reporting a comfortable level of well-being (Table 15.6). 
Table 15.5:  Perceived well-being among farmers and employees  
(percent of respondents) 
Level of well-being  Farmers (n=309) Employees  (n=848) 
1. Low (not more than food and daily  
    necessities) 
28 48 
2. Medium (daily necessities, clothing, etc.)  51  44 
3. Comfortable (able to purchase durables)  21 8 
 
Table 15.6:  Standard of living and family income increase with land area 
used (farm size, ha) 







1. Low (not more than food and daily  
    necessities) 
61 1.45 3.73 
2. Medium (daily necessities, clothing,  
    etc.) 
106 1.42 4.56 
3. Comfortable (able to purchase durables)  326  4.21  4.53 
Notes: 
*  Statistically significant differences (p = 0.10): 1-3, 2-3. 
 
** Statistically significant differences (p = 0.10): 1-3, 2-3. 
 
#  Statistically significant differences (p = 0.10): 1-2. 
Figure 15.5: Estimated probability of achieving a given standard of living 
as a function of farm size for families of peasant farmers  
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Figure 15.6: Estimated probability of achieving a given standard of living 
as a function of plot size for families of rural employees and 
pensioners  
 














Multinomial logistic regression shows that the probability of having a higher 
standard of living (well-being level 3, gray curves in Figures 15.5, 15.6) increases 
with the area of land used, while the probability of having the lowest standard of 
living (well-being level 1, thick black curves in Figures 15.5, 15.6) decreases 
rapidly with farm size. This pattern is observed both for farmers and employee 
families in the survey. 
15.5   Income sufficiency 
The quantitative information on family income from the survey was reinforced 
with qualitative information on perceived family well-being. In addition to the 
findings based on well-being results, we tried to assess directly to what extent 
available income is sufficient to meet family expenditures. This assessment was 
based on the following question: "How much money do you think you need to 
make per month for your family to live normally?" 
The first two lines in Table 15.7 show the annual cash income and the annual 
needs estimated for matched samples in each category of families. The annual 
family needs were obtained by adjusting the monthly information from the 
survey to an annual basis, to match the scale for income. Farmer families are in 
a better situation than employee families: The gap between annual needs and 
annual income is smaller for farmers than for employees (judging by both the 
mean and the median). 
 Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 15.7:  Income sufficiency assessment: Annual income compared with 
annual needs (matched samples) 
Farmers (n=230) Employees  (n=755)   
Mean Median Mean Median 
Annual income, hrivny  58,300  20,000  9,700  8,000 
Annual  needs,  hrivny  57,600 48,000 32,300 24,000 
Needs-to-income  ratio  4.8 1.9 6.7 3.1 
 
Using matched samples of annual income and annual needs, we have calculated an 
income insufficiency measure as the ratio of needs to income for each case. The 
mean and the median values of the needs-to-income ratio for the cases in the survey 
are shown in the last line in Table 15.7, where the numbers show by what factor 
needs exceed available income. If the needs-to-income ratio is less than 1, income 
is more than sufficient to cover the needs. If needs-to-income ratio is around 1, 
needs are commensurate with income. If needs-to-income ratio is greater than 1, 
the actual income is insufficient to cover the family needs, and the insufficiency of 
income increases as needs-to-income ratio grows. Among farmers, 28% have 
needs-to-income ratio of up to 1 (i.e., income sufficient to meet the needs), whereas 
among employees the corresponding group is only 6% of respondents. Needs are 
more than double the income for 45% of the farmers and for fully 73% of the 
employee families (Table 15.8). 
Table 15.8:  Distribution of income insufficiency ratio (percent of respondents) 
 Farmers  Employees 
Income sufficient to cover needs   28  6 
Income insufficiency between 1 and 2  27  21 
Income insufficiency greater than 2  45  73 
 
Figure 15.7: Cumulative distribution of income sufficiency for families of 
peasant farmers and rural employees 
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The cumulative distributions of the income insufficiency measure (needs times 
income) are shown in Figure 15.7 for farmers and employee. The distribution of 
income insufficiency for employee families is entirely to the right of the distribution 
for farmer families. This means that at every frequency level, employee families 
are characterized by higher income insufficiency than farmers. This seems to be 
consistent with the previous comparison of well-being levels for farmers and 
employees. 
 
*    *    * 
 
Peasant farmers earn more than other rural households in absolute terms, they 
report a substantially higher standard of living, and their family needs are more 
closely satisfied by their income. Yet despite the relatively lucrative financial 
situation the dichotomy of peasant farmers and rural employees appears almost 
solidly frozen: Only 4% of respondents are planning to become peasant farmers 
within the next 2-3 years. These few are mainly motivated by hopes of a better 
future for their children, prospects for higher income, and independence. The 
remaining 96% have no plans to become peasant farmers despite better financial 
prospects. They are primarily deterred by lack of capital, risk aversion, as well 
as age and poor health. Concerns about access to inputs and lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of other family members to continue with farming activities are also 
cited as obstacles.  
Regardless of the relative success of peasant farming, the survey paints a bleak 
picture of the future of the Ukrainian village. Around 50% of respondents (both 
peasant farmers and rural employees) would like to see their children leave the 
village. Around 15% would like their children to stay in the village but go into 
business instead of farming. Farming as a future occupation of the children is 
envisaged by only 24% of peasant farmers and as few as 8% of other rural 
residents. The Ukrainian village is in the danger of being left without a continuing 
generation of farmers.   
 
16  CONCLUSIONS 
1  The 1999 Presidential Decree proved to be a true watershed for 
land ownership and farm holdings in Ukraine 
Following the 1999 land reform nearly 7 million rural residents became owners 
of physical land plots, not just paper shares, and about 70% of agricultural land 
(80% of arable land is now physically owned by rural individuals). Two-thirds 
of the rural households surveyed in 2005 received their land shares at least in the 
form of paper certificates and more than half received them in the form of a 
physical plot. These share assignment rates are substantially higher than in 
previous surveys (1994, 1996).  
Figure 16.1: Agricultural land (top panel) and gross agricultural product in 
constant prices (bottom panel) by farm type in Ukraine, 1990-2004 
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The 1999 decree has dramatically changed the face of Ukrainian agriculture (see 
Figure 16.1). From agriculture with predominant concentration of production in 
collective farms it has evolved into agriculture characterized by the clear dominance 
of individual farms. The individual sector (consisting of the traditional household 
plots and the independent peasant farms that began to emerge after 1992) controls 
today more than 40% of agricultural land, contributing 70% of agricultural output. 
Within the individual sector, the main contribution to agricultural production is 
from household plots, not peasant farms, as they also control much more land 
(33% versus 8%).  
Figure 16.2: Average size (bars) and total agricultural land (curve) in 
peasant farms (top panel) and in household plots (bottom 
panel)  
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The size of holdings in the individual sector has increased remarkably as a result 
of the 1999 reform. The average size of a family (peasant) farm increased from 
25-30  ha in 1998 to 70-80 ha in 2003-2004. The share of peasant farms in 
agricultural land doubled from 2-3% in 1995-99 to 6% in 2000 and continued to 
rise to 8% in 2003-2004. The average size of household plots grew from about 
1  hectare in 1998 to 2.5  hectares in 2004 as their share in agricultural land 
increased from 15% to 35% (Figure 16.2). The substantial increase in total land 
cultivated in household plots and their average size since 2000 is the direct 
outcome of the 1999 Presidential Decree, which made it possible for many rural 
residents to take their land share out of the former collective and use it to 
augment the traditional household plot (instead of establishing a peasant farm, as 
originally envisaged). 
The increase of landholding in the individual sector has been complemented by a 
decrease in the landholding in corporate farms as well as an increase in the number 
of corporate farms. The average size of a corporate farm in Ukraine has fallen from 
3,000 ha in 1990 to 2,000 ha in 1998 to 1,000 ha in 2004 (Figure 16.3). Collective 
agricultural enterprises (CAE), the new organizational form that dominated the farm 
structure in Ukraine between 1992 and 1999, completely disappeared after 1999. 
Corporate farms are now mainly represented by limited liability companies and 
private lease enterprises (the latter accounting for almost 25% of the total number of 
corporate farms in Ukraine). While the number of shareholders in corporate farms 
ranges from 1 to 1,600, fully 16% are single-shareholder entities and 31% have 
from 1 to 3 shareholders only.  
Figure 16.3: Average size (bars) and total agricultural land (curve) in 
corporate farms  
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Despite these changes, there remain important differences in the size distribution 
of farms in Ukraine and in market economies. First, the average size a household 
farm in Ukraine is much smaller than the average family farm in market 
economies (130 hectares in land-rich U.S., 20 hectares in EU-15). However, it 
would be erroneous to conclude that small household farms have little place in 
market agriculture. In a number of EU countries a significant portion of farmland 
is in holdings under 5 ha. Considered in this context, the 33% of land area in 
Ukraine farmed in small holdings does not look extraordinary. Such countries as 
Greece, Italy, and some of the new EU countries also have a high portion of land 
in small household farms (Table 16.1).  
Table 16.1:  Portion of agricultural land in farms with holdings of less than 
5 ha in selected European countries 
Country  Percent of land  Country  Percent of land 
EU-15 5.2  New  EU  members   
Greece 29.2  Romania  38.0 
Italy 18.8  Lithuania  30.0 
Portugal 13.8  Poland  19.5 
Spain 5.5  Latvia 4.0 
Source:  EU 2002; EC 2004. 
Second, the average size of a corporate farm in Ukraine (around 1000 ha) is still 
quite a bit larger than the average size of farms in the EU and the United States 
(see above). Even non-family corporate farms in land rich United States (about 
0.3% of farms using 1.0% of land in farms) are on average only 533 ha in size 
(USDA/NASS, 2004). Though there has been an impressive fall in the average 
size of corporate farms in Ukraine particularly since 1999, there is still some 
way to go in order that the size of Ukrainian corporate farms be consistent with 
farm sizes in market economies.  
2  Land policies now differentiate Ukraine from Russia… 
Ukraine and Russia pursued similar reform paths until 1999, when Ukraine 
embarked on its own unique strategy and began to convert paper land shares into 
physical plots. This strategy in effect brought Ukraine’s farm structure closer to 
that of Moldova than Russia, and today Ukraine has 40% of agricultural land in 
individual use compared with only 16% in Russia. The share of individual farms 
in gross agricultural output (GAO) is also higher in Ukraine: 70% to Russia’s 60%. 
Agricultural employment, on the other hand, has proven much stickier: The share 
of agricultural labor in Ukraine practically did not change between 1990 and 2003, 
probably because its larger individual agriculture acts as a "labor sink" for rural 
residents, offsetting the effect of other factors that tend to reduce agricultural 
employment (as in Russia; see Table 16.2)  Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 16.2:  Selected measures of reform outcomes: Ukraine and Russia 
2003 1990   
Ukraine Russia Ukraine Russia 
Land in individual use, %  38  16  7  2 
Share of individual farms in GAO, %  70  60  27  24 
Share of agricultural labor, %  23  11  23  15 
Share of agriculture in GDP, %  12  5  22  15 
Sources:   See Table 5.1. 
3  …and are important because they are a key factor in determining 
family incomes and subjective well-being 
Family income increases with farm size, and land on its own explains nearly 
23% of the variability in cash family income. Data grouped by logged farm size 
categories show a clear increase of total cash income, and especially farm 
income, with the increase of farm size (Figure 16.4). The share of farm income 
increases from 17% in the smallest farms to more than 70% of total income in 
the largest. Not only total income increases: Income per capita also increases 
with farm size (Figure 16.4), rising quite dramatically from less than 5,000 hrivny 
per capita for households with 1-2 hectares to 20,000 hrivny and much more for 
farms larger than 50 hectares. Because of the farm size effect, families of peasant 
farmers enjoy much higher incomes than other rural households (54,500 hrivny 
for farmers, 9,750 hrivny for employee households). 
Table 16.3:  Perceived well-being among farmers and employees  
(percent of respondents)   
Level of well-being  Farmers (n=309) Employees  (n=848) 
1. Low (not more than food and daily  
    necessities) 
28 48 
2. Medium (daily necessities, clothing, etc.)  51  44 
3. Comfortable (able to purchase durables)  21 8 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
The families’ perception of well-being was explored through qualitative questions 
that classified the perceived standard of living into three levels: Low, when family 
income allows nothing beyond food and daily necessities; medium, when family 
income is sufficient for food, daily necessities, clothing, and other consumption 
needs; and comfortable, when in addition to the consumption needs the family can 
afford to purchase durables and in general does not experience material 
difficulties. Farmers’ families achieve a higher (perceived) well-being than the 
families of other rural households (characterized as employees; Table 16.3). The 
frequency of respondents reporting a comfortable standard of living is substantially 
higher among farmers than among employees; and conversely, the frequency of 
respondents reporting a low standard of living (just sufficient to meet the daily 
needs) is substantially higher among employee families. This is consistent with 
the observation that farmer families enjoy higher incomes than employee families. 16. Conclusions 
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Family well-being, like family income, also increases with the area of land. 
Households reporting a low level of well-being command significantly less land 
than households reporting a comfortable level of well-being (Table 16.4). 
Figure 16.4: Family income (left panel) and per capita income (right panel) 
versus farm size for individual farms (households and peasant 
farms)  
 






















Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005.  
Note:  Farm size is in logged hectares, i.e., -1 stands for 0.4 ha, 0 for 1 ha, 2 for 2.5 ha,  
2 for 7 ha, 4 for 55 ha, 5 for 150 ha. 
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Table 16.4:  Standard of living and family income increase with land area 
used (farm size, ha)
* 






1. Low (not more than food and daily necessities)  61  1.45  3.73 
2. Medium (daily necessities, clothing, etc.)  106  1.4  4.56 
3. Comfortable (able to purchase durables)  326  4.21  4.53 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note: 
* Statistically significant differences (p = 0.10): 1-3, 2-3 for farmers and employees  
   based on land used; 1-2 for employees based on land owned. 
4  There has been a spectacular recovery of agricultural production 
after 2000, primarily due to growth in individual farms 
Overall, the agricultural output from both individual and corporate farms made a 
spectacular recovery since 1999, growing by 30% in constant prices (Figure 16.5, 
thin black curve). The decline in 2003 was a temporary setback associated with 
severe drought. 
GAO in the individual sector grew by 45% during this period, whereas the corporate 
farm sector grew by only 11% from 1999 to 2004 (Figure 16.5, thick curves). 
Although the post-1999 reforms have had a particularly beneficial effect on the 
performance of individual farms, they also have had some impact in the corporate 
sector. The decline in output of corporate farms stopped in 2000 and the number of 
unprofitable corporate farms dropped from almost 100% in 1997-99 to around 40% 
in 2000-2004 (although the absolute losses continued to climb). Many interpreted the 
sudden improvement in farm performance as a result of the turnaround in govern-
ment policies. Some believed that an important page had been turned in agricultural 
policy that would allow development of agriculture and rural areas to go forward. 
Figure 16.5: Gross agricultural product (GAO) by farm type 1990-2004  
(in percent of 1990) 
 














Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 16. Conclusions 
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5  The move toward private farming has brought many features of 
normal market-oriented agriculture to Ukraine 
a. The portion of the rural population connected to the corporate farm in  
    Ukrainian rural areas has fallen considerably.  
The reforms following the 1999 decree have brought a dramatic change in the 
employment structure of the rural population. In 1996, 67% of the adult population 
(in the ages between 18 and 60) worked in the local farm enterprise. In 2005, only 
21% of the adults report that their main employment is with the corporate farm. 
When heads of households were asked to characterize their relations with the 
former collective fully two-thirds of respondents reported no relations with the 
corporate farm. One-third work on the corporate farm or are (passive) shareholders 
(Table 16.5). These findings are consistent with the prevailing opinion among 
Ukrainian scholars and officials that "only one-third of the able-bodied rural 
population work in corporate farms." 
Table 16.5:  Relations of heads of households with the local corporate farm 
  % of respondents 
No relations with corporate farm  68 
Permanently employed by corporate farm  17 
Temporary employment by corporate farm  5 
Shareholder of corporate farm  10 
Total 100 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
b. Household plots and corporate farms are more and more connected by paid  
    service relations  
The support for the household plot is no longer free, however. Survey estimates 
indicate that farm managers spend 57,000  hrivny per enterprise per year on 
household plot support. Of this amount, 76%, is reimbursed by the household 
(generally in the form of labor input or farm products) and the net cost to the 
farm enterprise is only 24% of the total. This net amount equals about 0.5% of 
the total annual expenditure of the average farm. Since there are around 700 
households per farm enterprise in the survey, the net cost per household is a 
mere 20 hrivny per year.  
Table 16.6 presents an inventory of services provided by farm enterprises to the 
rural population. The first column is based on the responses of corporate farm 
managers; the other two columns are based on the responses of heads of rural 
households and peasant farmers. Assistance with household plot cultivation and 
provision of transport services are the two most important items according to 
farm managers.  
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Table 16.6:  Services provided by farm enterprises to the rural population: 
Responses of farm managers, household members, and peasant 






Assistance with plot cultivation  94  47  23 
Transport  53  18 10 
Feed, seeds  35  20 5 
Veterinary services  22  22 5 
Machinery maintenance and repairs  15  10 10 
Fuel  7  9 8 
Fertilizers, plant-protection 
chemicals 
6 15  6 
Assistance with sale of farm 
products 
8 8 3 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note: 
* Percent of those who report providing services to the rural population (84% of the  
   full sample). 
c. Most social services have now been transferred to local governments 
During the Soviet era, large farm enterprises were directly entrusted with main-
taining the entire range of social services in the village. The farm enterprise took 
over the functions normally fulfilled by local government, building roads, supplying 
water, gas, and electricity, and providing housing. It traditionally provided access to 
a comprehensive range of services and benefits for its members and employees, and 
also for other rural workers, including teachers, doctors, postal employees, etc., 
who in fact were on state payroll and not employed directly by the farm. These 
social services ranged from daily necessities, such as house maintenance and repairs, 
heating fuel, or various goods at subsidized prices, to culture and recreation, such 
as clubs and sports facilities. School buildings, clinics, shops, and other public 
facilities in the village were maintained and often built by the farm enterprise, with 
or without reimbursement from the government. The budget for all these benefits 
and services came from the operating revenues of the farm enterprise, and the farms 
in effect combined production functions with overall responsibility for social 
services in the rural areas. 
The reform agenda attempted to focus the large-scale farms on business and 
profits, which necessitated relinquishing their responsibility for rural social 
services. As part of their reorganization, farm enterprises were required to shed 
their social assets and transfer the responsibility for the social service infrastructure 
to the local councils. Initially, this process moved very slowly and haltingly, because 
the government failed to provide the local councils with the requisite budgets. As 
late as 1998, a World Bank study found that reorganized farm enterprises 16. Conclusions 
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continued to provide a wide range of social services and benefits to the rural 
population. The situation seems to have changed quite radically since  2000. 
Fully 73% of farm managers surveyed in 2005 reported that their social assets 
had been transferred to the local municipality. Of these, only 26% of farm 
enterprises had transferred their social assets prior to 2000; the remaining 47% 
transferred the social assets more recently (Figure 16.6).  
The social assets were universally transferred to the local municipality or the 
state free of charge. Among the 27% of farm managers who did not transfer 
their assets, one-third claim that the municipality has no budget and thus cannot 
accept the responsibility, while the remaining two-thirds regard the free transfer 
of social assets as an economically unacceptable option and prefer to continue 
maintaining the social infrastructure themselves.  
Figure 16.6: Transfer of social assets from corporate farms to the local 




26%  Not transferred
27%  
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005.  
 
d. Agricultural inputs are widely available and utilized for all types of farms… 
Purchased inputs, machinery, land, and credit are the four main factors of 
production for farms everywhere. Purchased inputs such as fertilizer and plant 
protection agents are now largely purchased through commercial suppliers in 
Ukraine both by corporate and peasant farms. Farm machinery services are widely 
available either through ownership or through leasing services. Land leasing is 
widely employed for redistributing land from households to large corporate and 
peasant farms. Commercial credit is now widely available and utilized by farms.  
Purchased inputs: Private trade – commercial suppliers and private individuals – 
are the main channel for farm inputs among managers and peasant farmers alike 
(Table 16.7). State suppliers continue to play an important role, but they are 
now far behind the commercial trade channels. Moreover, the role of state suppliers 
has declined dramatically over time: In the 1996 World Bank survey 60% of Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
 
144
peasant farmers reported purchasing inputs through state-owned channels, 
compared with around 15% in 2005. The reliance on private trade is particularly 
pronounced for the group of 8 high-priority inputs. Peasant farms tend to rely more 
than corporate farms on purchase of inputs from other farms. In general, other 
farms are a significant source of three kinds of inputs: Seeds and seedlings, young 
animals, and mechanized field works ("custom farming"). This is true for both 
corporate farms and peasant farms. In addition, peasant farms rely heavily on other 
farms for the purchase of machinery and equipment, often second-hand.  
Table 16.7:  Supply channels for farm inputs: Corporate farm managers 
and peasant farmers (percent of respondents)
*  
All inputs (15)  High priority inputs (8)   
Managers Farmers Managers Farmers 
State suppliers  16  14  18  15 
Commercial suppliers  44  36  58  50 
Private individuals  8  13  10  17 
Own production  4  3  4  3 
Other farms  5  7  6  9 
Other sources  1  1  1  2 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note: 
* Frequency scores averaged over inputs for respondents reporting that they need the  
   specific input (in percent). Multiple answers allowed for each input.  
Table 16.8 demonstrates the changing roles of state and commercial suppliers 
during the last decade. The responses of both corporate farm managers and 
peasant farmers in two surveys separated by more than 10 years – the 1994 World 
Bank survey and the 2005 FAO survey – reveal a sharp decrease in the importance 
of state supply channels and a sharp rise in the importance of commercial suppliers. 
The reliance on other corporate farms as a source of inputs also declined 
dramatically over time. In 1994, the state and corporate farms dominated the 
markets for farm inputs in Ukraine; by 2005 the private commercial sector had 
captured the leading role among supply channels. 
Table 16.8:  Changing role of main supply channels: 1994 and 2005 











All inputs (15)      
State channels  45  16  42  14 
Commercial suppliers  7  44  14  36 
Other farms  49  5  22  7 
High priority inputs (8)      
State channels  65  18  61  15 
Commercial suppliers  7  58  19  50 
Other farms  56  6  29  9 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 16. Conclusions 
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Access to purchased inputs was explored in more detail in the survey by asking 
the respondents – both managers and peasant farmers – to indicate if they were 
actually buying all that they needed in a list of 15 specific inputs. About 20% of 
respondents in both categories cannot buy the inputs that they need. When the 
answers are restricted to high-priority inputs (these are inputs identified as needed 
by more than 50% of respondents), the percentage of respondents who cannot 
buy what they need drops to 12-15%.  
Farm machinery services: Availability of farm machinery is reported with 
fairly high frequency among all farm types (Table 16.9). Availability among 
corporate farms is practically universal; peasant farms are not far behind; and 
even among household plots 70% report some machinery and around 50% 
report tractors or light machinery (such as plows, tillers, and seeders). Vehicles, 
and especially trucks, are comparatively less accessible to household plots and 
peasant farms. 
Table 16.9:  Availability of farm machinery  
(percent of respondents reporting machinery) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms  Household plots 
Any farm machinery  95  89  70 
Heavy machinery  94  85  49 
Light machinery  92  83  57 
Vehicles 91  52  19 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note:  Heavy machinery – tractors, harvester, combines; light machinery – plows, tillers, 
seeders, trailers, etc.; vehicles – trucks, cars.  
Figure 16.7: Sources of machinery by farm type  
(percent of respondents for corporate and peasant farms; 
percent of machinery units reported for household plots)  











Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Corporate and peasant farms use primarily own machinery, which is supplemented 
with some rental equipment (Figure 16.7). Most of the rented equipment originates 
from private sources: Access to state leasing programs is virtually nonexistent in 
the survey. Contrary to peasant farms, household plot operators show a very high 
willingness to rent or share equipment with others. Own farm machinery accounts 
for only 37% of the total machine count among household plots, and fully 50% 
is rented for farm use as needed. These findings provide a definite indication of 
the existence of machinery rental markets, which clearly act to alleviate 
machinery constraints among farms of all types.  
Land leasing is widespread among farms of all types in Ukraine. In household 
plots the land used for farming is just 36% of the family’s total land holdings and the 
rest is leased out. Peasant farmers, unlike household plot operators, use all the 
available land and do not lease anything out. On the contrary, they lease in to 
augment their owned land. Of the 140 hectares in an average peasant farm, only 18% 
is owned land, while the remaining 82% is leased from other landowners or from 
the state. For comparison, the land used for farming in household plots (2.8 hectares 
on average) is 98% owned (Table 16.10). Corporate farms, unlike peasant farms 
and household plots, have very little own land and they rely primarily on land 
leased from individuals (members, shareholders, and other rural landowners).  
Table 16.10:  Sources of land used in peasant farms and household plots 
  Ave plot size, ha Total, %  Owned land, %  Leased land, %
Peasant farm   144  100  18  82 
Household plot  2.8  100  98  2 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Peasant farmers rely on land leasing markets to increase the size of their farms. 
More than half the peasant farmers surveyed lease in land, and the average size 
of these "lessee farms" is much larger than the size of farms without leased land 
(Table 16.11). Growth in farm size is entirely attributable to the leased component: 
One  hectare of additional leased land produces a one  hectare increase in farm 
size.  
Table 16.11:  Effect of leasing on farm size 
  Percent of respondents  Farm size, ha 
Farms with leased land   53  227
* 
Farms without leased land   47  53
* 
All sample   100  144 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note: 
* Difference significant by t-test (p=0.000). 
In corporate farms most land is leased, and land owned by the corporate farm as 
a legal entity is less than 7% of the total of 1,711 hectares. Land is primarily 
leased from shareholders and other private individuals, who account for almost 
90% of the land leased by corporate farms. (Table 16.12). Only a small minority 16. Conclusions 
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of the shareholders and other lessors actually work in the corporate farm: Most 
shareholders and lessors appear to be passive landowners who entrust their land 
to the corporate farm without demanding in return the security of a wage job on 
the farm. 
Table 16.12:  Structure of sources of leased land for corporate farms 
Source  Percent of leased land 
Members (shareholders)  42 
  Of which: Work in the corporate farm    16 
Other private individuals  47 
  Of which: Work in the corporate farm    8 
State, municipality, regional government  6 
Other sources  5 
Total leased land  100 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
While the participation rates in land lease markets are quite high, the market for 
buying and selling of land is still hopelessly undeveloped: Nobody in the survey 
reported selling land and only 5% of peasant farmers reported buying land in the 
last 5 years.  
Commercial credit: Both corporate and peasant farms have a perception of 
significant access to credit. Fully 63% of corporate farm managers and 34% of 
peasant farmers report that they actually borrow (rural households borrow much 
less frequently – only 15% of respondents). In relation to respondents reporting 
that they need credit (Table 16.13), these numbers indicate that 71% of 
corporate farms and 42% of peasant farms that need credit in fact manage to 
borrow (at least partially). Corporate farms apparently enjoy better access to 
credit than peasant farms. This conclusion is strengthened by the observation 
that among peasant farmers 45% need credit, but cannot borrow, while the 
corresponding percentage among corporate farms is 26%.  
Table 16.13:  Perceived credit situation 
  Farmers, %  Managers, % 
Do not need credit  19  11 
Borrow all that is needed  24  38 
Borrow less than needed because of restrictions  10  25 
Need credit, but cannot borrow  45  26 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Access to credit has improved over time. Managers of corporate farms indicated 
that the credit situation today was better than before 2000, while among peasant 
farmers the percentage of respondents who could not borrow all that they needed 
dropped from 90% in 1994 to 55% in 2005. The percentage of peasant farmers 
using credit steadily increased from 15% in 1992 to 20% in 1994 and now to 33% 
in 2005. The respondents’ view of improved access to credit was confirmed in 
separate interviews with regional officials. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Banks and input suppliers are the main sources of credit for both corporate and 
peasant farms. Commodity credit or credit in kind plays a marginal role in the 
survey, while wage arrears or debt for taxes and social deductions do not appear 
to be a problem. The state has practically disappeared as a source of credit for 
peasant farms. Formal credit is gradually replacing informal borrowing from 
relatives and others in the individual sector.  
Agricultural producers typically borrow for 12 months at annual interest rates of 
around 19%. Given inflation rates of around 9% in 2004, the real cost of 
agricultural borrowing in Ukraine is 9-10% annually, which is quite high by 
world standards. The respondents generally complained that the interest rates 
were too high and the credit term too short: An acceptable interest rate for future 
borrowing would be 8% with credit term of 3 to 4 years. These acceptable interest 
rates are equivalent to zero (or even negative) real interest, which is not attainable 
economically. 
Borrowing from the banks naturally requires collateral, which most corporate 
and peasant farms manage to provide. Lack or insufficiency of collateral was 
perceived as one of the three main obstacles to borrowing (after high interest 
rates and short credit term). 
Contrary to the situation in the past, the level of indebtedness is not particularly 
high: The average farm debt can be paid off with 6-7 months of sales revenue. 
For corporate farms, the situation in 2005 appears to be a significant improvement 
compared with 1998, when debt-to-sales ratios were around 2 years and farm 
indebtedness was a major concern. Farm profitability has also improved signify-
cantly since 1998, but farms with debt still have lower levels of profitability than 
farms without debt.  
6  Despite many positive changes, Ukraine still faces appreciable 
challenges 
a. Families in rural areas have little non-farm income 
It is widely recognized that a key factor for ensuring higher well-being for rural 
families in developing and developed countries is increasing household 
participation in off-farm employment. For instance, an average farm in the United 
States from 1999 to 2003 earned 85-95% of its income from off-farm sources, up 
from 50% in 1960.
10 Even the largest U.S. farms (with sales over $500,000 per 
year) earned only 80% of income from farming activities in this period 
(USDA/ERS, 2006).  
In Ukraine, on the other hand, rural households – families of both peasant farmers 
and rural employees – earn very little income from off-farm sources. Table 16.14 
                                                 
10  Off-farm income includes employment earnings, other business activities, investments, and 
transfer payments.  16. Conclusions 
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shows that peasant farmers and farm employees receive only 13% and 28% of 
household cash income from non-farm sources.  
Table 16.14:  Structure of family cash income (in percent)
* 
 Farmers  Employees 
Sales of farm products  87  31 
Sale of services  2  2 
Non-farm income (business and property)  0  4 
Salaries 7  41 
Social transfers  3  21 
Remittances from relatives  0  1 
Sale of assets  1  0 
Other 0  0 
Total income, %  100  100 
Total income, hrivny  54,500  9,750 
Per capita income, hrivny  15,300  3,100 
Land used, ha  113  1.7 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Note: 
* Based on weighted average amounts by sources of income. 
Table 16.15:  Diversification between agricultural and non-agricultural  
 activities (percent of farms) 
  Corporate farms  Peasant farms 
Only agricultural activities  74  87 
One non-agricultural activity   15  11 
Two non-agricultural activities  6  1 
More than two non-agricultural activities   5  1 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 
Commercial farms in Ukraine – both corporate and peasant farms – mainly 
concentrate on primary agriculture (crops, livestock, orchards and vineyards), 
with relatively little diversification into non-agricultural activities (Table 16.15). 
This is especially true of peasant farms, where only 13% report any non-
agricultural activities. Non-agricultural activities are almost always in addition 
to primary agriculture. The paucity of off-farm employment opportunities in 
rural areas is perhaps the greatest hindrance to raising rural incomes.  
b. Ukrainian producers have significant problems of competitiveness compared  
    with agriculture in the new EU countries 
Crop yields in Ukraine lag significantly behind those in the countries of the 
European Union. Agricultural performance in Ukraine as measured by physical 
crop and livestock yields is generally worse than in the countries of the 
European Union. Ukrainian yields range between 20% and 70% of those of the 
EU-15 countries (Table 16.16). Ukrainian yields are also low compared to the 
new EU members (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). Ukrainian 
yields are lower than the yields in these countries for each crop indicated in Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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Table 16.16 except grapes. Ukraine lags behind the new EU members also in 
growth of yields between 1992-94 and 2001-03 (Figure 16.8).  
Table 16.16:  Yields in Ukraine compared with EU-15 
Crop  Ukrainian yields in percent 
of EU-15 yields  
(EU-15=100*) 




Barley 49  5 
Cereals, total  45  5 
Coarse grain, total  42  5 
Grapes 61  4 
Maize 40  5 
Potatoes 31  5 
Sugar beets  33  5 
Sunflower seed  67  5 
Tomatoes 19 5 
Wheat 46  5 
Source: FAOSTAT,  2006. 
Notes: 
*   EU-15 yields are averages for 2001-03. 
 ** Includes Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.  
Three-fifths of agricultural land is still in corporate farms, which have 
significantly lower land productivity than household farms. Yields expressed 
in physical units of output per physical unit of (a single) input, such as land, 
provide the most basic and yet the crudest measure of productivity. The detailed 
picture with crop yields is not particularly clear, because we are dealing with a 
wide range of commodities. To bring out the general patterns, Table 16.17 
summarizes the pairwise yield comparisons across a wide range of different 
crops for the three farms types covered by the survey. Judging overall ("by 
majority"), household plots seem to be doing better than both corporate and 
peasant farms in crop production. In 6 out of 10 (or respectively 11) cases household 
plots achieve higher yields than corporate or peasant farms. In 3 more cases in 
either comparison category the differences in yields are not statistically significant. 
The yields achieved by household plots are lower only in 1 case compared with 
corporate farms and 2 cases compared with peasant farms. The picture between 
farmers and enterprises, on the other hand, is very mixed. It seems that corporate 
and peasant farms overall achieve comparable crop yields.  
Table 16.17: Summary of pairwise comparisons of crop yields for farms of 
different types 
  Corporate and 
peasant farms 
Household plots 
and peasant farms 
Household plots and 
corporate farms 
Higher yields in hh plots  3  6  6 
Lower yields in hh plots  3  2  1 
No significant difference  8  3  3 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005. 16. Conclusions 
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Figure 16.8: Changes in crop yield index in the new EU members and 
Ukraine between the average for 1992-94 and the average  
for 2001-03 (percent)  
 












Source: FAOSTAT,  2006. 
Note:  The yield index is a weighted average of the yields for five major crops – cereals, 
sunflower seeds, other oil crops, potatoes, and vegetables 
Intuitively, one would expect the large corporate farms and commercial farmers 
to have an advantage in scale crops, such as cereals, while household plots are 
usually hypothesized to have a yield advantage in horticultural crops (potatoes 
and vegetables). This is definitely not the situation that we observe in the survey. 
Household plots achieve outstanding results in wheat and barley, significantly 
better than corporate or peasant farms. On the other hand, household plots seem to 
lose their advantage in crops that are grown practically by everyone. Thus, 
potatoes and vegetables are produced by 85-95% of household plots in the survey, 
compared with 20% among corporate farms and 50% among peasant farms. We 
may speculate that when a relatively small number of respondents choose to 
produce a particular commodity (e.g., cereals among household plots, horticultural 
crops among corporate and peasant farms), a positive selection effect ensures that 
these producers achieve higher yields. 
In livestock production, milk yields (in kg per cow per year) reported in the 2005 
FAO survey are significantly lower for corporate farms than for individual farms 
(2,600 kg per cow per year for corporate farms compared with 3,700 kg for 
peasant farms and household plots combined; the differences in milk yields 
within the individual sector are not statistically significant). 
Figure 16.9 shows the partial productivity of land for the period 1994-2004 for 
corporate farms, peasant farms and household farms. The partial productivity of 
land is calculated as the ratio of the value of production (in constant prices) to Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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land used. Although the land productivity of household farms decreased over time 
as they acquired more land (a decreasing returns to scale effect), it remained 
consistently higher than the land productivity of corporate and peasant farms. The 
gap between the two series is very substantial: The mean productivity for 
household plots for the period 1994-2004 is around 4,000 hrivny/ha, whereas the 
mean productivity for corporate farms and peasant farms is less than 1,000 
hrivny/ha. It is interesting to note that the land productivity of peasant farms 
taken on their own is much lower than the productivity of household plots – the 
other component of the individual sector. It is even lower than the productivity 
of corporate farms, although we observe definite convergence between corporate 
and peasant farms during this period, as land productivity of peasant farms rises 
from 60% of the productivity of corporate in 1994-1999 to over 80% in 2000-
2004. The newly created peasant farms presumably need time to adapt to external 
conditions and start performing on a par with other farm types. A similar 
comparative pattern is observed in Russia, where household plots are more 
productive than either corporate or peasant farms, whereas the latter two farm 
types are often statistically indistinguishable by their productivity results.
11 
Figure 16.9: Partial productivity of land by farm type 1994-2004  
(in constant prices)  
 













Source: AGUKRAINE, 2004. 
 
Profitability of corporate farms has improved, but many are still unprofitable. 
Corporate farms participating in the survey provided profit and loss information 
based on annual financial reports. Given the partial response of the respondents to 
financial questions, profit analysis could be conducted for at most 142 out of 208 
                                                 
11  These results for Russia emerge from a recent BASIS/CRSP study using a 2003 survey of 
farms of different organizational forms. The corresponding findings are forthcoming in 
BROCK et al. (2007).  16. Conclusions 
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farms surveyed. Of these, 70% are profitable (positive gross profit) and 30% are 
loss-makers. This constitutes a dramatic improvement compared with the situation 
in 1997, when 84% of farms surveyed reported losses (1998, WORLD  BANK 
SURVEY). The increase in the frequency of profitable farms was accompanied by a 
marked increase in profitability levels (Table 16.18). The overall profit margin in 
the sample (the ratio of gross profit to sales) increased from a loss of −24% in 
1997 to a profit of +12% in 2005. The profit margin of the profitable farms as a 
subgroup rose from 11% in 1997 to 25% in 2005.  
Table 16.18:  Profitability of corporate farms in 2005 compared with 1997 
Percent of farms  Profit margin, % of sales   
2005 1997 2005 1997 
All farms  100  100  +12  −24 
Farms reporting profits  70  16  +25  +11 
Farms reporting losses  30  84  −21  −39 
Source:  FAO Farm Survey, 2005; WORLD BANK SURVEY, 1997. 
There does not seem to be any relationship between profitability and the 
reorganization mode or reorganization time of the corporate farms. The ratio of 
70% profitable farms to 30% loss-makers observed in the entire sample persists 
both among the new reorganized structures (i.e., farms created as new organizations 
or through the splitting of former collectives) and the legacy structures (i.e., farms 
that are one-to-one successors of former collectives). The same ratio is also 
obtained for corporate farms created before and after 1999. The "new wave" 
farms are thus not doing any better than their older counterparts, and the improved 
profitability is a general feature of the economic system. Nor is there a relationship 
between profitability and farm size: Although the average size for the group of 
profitable farms is somewhat larger than for the loss-makers (2,000 hectares 
compared with 1,700  hectares), the difference is not statistically significant   
(p = 0.25). 
c. There is still a strong duality of farm structure in Ukraine. Though the duality  
    is not as severe as in Soviet times, the lack of mid-sized farms is an obstacle  
    to the development of internationally competitive agriculture.  
Large gaps in size between farms of different types are still observed in Ukraine: 
The mean size in the 2005 survey is 1,700 hectares for corporate farms, 140 hectares 
for peasant farms, and 1.7  hectares for household plots. The corporate farms, 
although shrinking rapidly, are still much larger than in market economies (500-
600 hectares per corporate farm in the U.S.), while the household plots, although 
definitely growing, are still much smaller than the average family farm in market 
economies (130 hectares in land-rich U.S., 20 hectares in EU-15). The size gaps 
perpetuate the strong duality of farm structure that characterized Soviet 
agriculture and create a farm size distribution that is neither reasonable nor 
effective by the benchmark of market agriculture. Rethinking agricultural reform in Ukraine 
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The 1999 decree was instrumental in decreasing the duality of land holding in 
Ukraine, primarily through adding land to small holding agriculture and 
increasing the portion of total land they farm. Figure 16.10 illustrates the degree 
of inequality in the size distribution of agricultural land in the EU-15 and Ukraine 
in 1996 and 2005. In this figure the horizontal axis indicates the cumulative 
percent of farms, the vertical axis the cumulative percent of land. The diagonal 
line illustrates a situation of complete equality in which each farm occupies an 
identical portion of total land. Along the diagonal 10 percent of farms occupy 10 
percent of agricultural land, 20 percent of farms occupy 20 percent of land, and so 
on. Inequality in the distribution of farm land is shown by the bowing out of the 
curve. The most severely bowed out line (Ukraine, 1996) illustrates a situation where 
about 97 percent of farms hold only 5 percent of land and 3 percent of farms hold 
95 percent of land. 
Figure 16.10 demonstrates the profound changes in land concentration in 
Ukraine between 1996 and 2006 due to the 1999 decree. By 2005, 90% of farms 
held 15% percent of land (up from 2% in 1996), while 3% percent of largest 
farms held 40% of land (down from 96% in 1996). Agricultural land holdings 
shifted significantly from large to small farms between 1996 and 2005. The 
distribution of land holding in Ukraine in 2005, however, is still far from the 
distribution in the EU-15, which represents distribution of land in market 
economies. In the EU-15, 90% of farms held 33% of land (compared to 15% in 
Ukraine in 2005), while 3% of largest farms held about 10% of land (compared 
to 40% in Ukraine). This is a far more equitable distribution of land than in 
Ukraine, even in 2005. 
Figure 16.10:  Distribution of agricultural land in farm holdings in Ukraine  
  and EU-15  
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Source: 1996 from statistical yearbooks; 2005 from FAO survey data adjusted to national 
proportions; EU-15 from EU 2004.  16. Conclusions 
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The reason why the size distribution of land is so important is that experience of 
market economies has shown that the most viable farms in market circumstances 
are neither the small household farms under 5 ha, nor the large corporate farms 
of 1,000 ha or more. The most viable farms in a market environment are mid-
sized farms of between 15 ha and 300 ha. The average size of a farm in the EU-15 
is around 20 ha, while in the United States the average size is 130 ha. Ukraine lacks 
a large contingent of mid-sized farms, precisely the kind of farms that market 
agriculture has shown are competitive in world markets.  
d. Still, a bleak picture for the future of the Ukrainian village…  
Regardless of the relative success of peasant farming, the survey paints a bleak 
picture of the future of the Ukrainian village. Around 50% of respondents (both 
peasant farmers and rural employees) would like to see their children leave the 
village. Around 15% would like their children to stay in the village but go into 
business instead of farming. Farming as a future occupation of the children is 
envisaged by only 24% of peasant farmers and as few as 8% of other rural 
residents. The Ukrainian village is in the danger of being left without a continuing 
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